The Maryland Campaign of September 1862: Volume III - Shepherdstown Ford and the End of the Campaign

By Ezra A. Carman

The Battle of Shepherdstown and the End of the Campaign is the third and final volume of Ezra Carman’s magisterial The Maryland Campaign of September 1862.

As bloody and horrific as the battle of Antietam was, historian Ezra Carman—who penned a 1,800-page manuscript on the Maryland campaign—did not believe it was the decisive battle of the campaign. Generals Robert E. Lee and George B. McClellan intended to continue fighting after Sharpsburg, but the battle of Shepherdstown Ford (September 19 and 20) forced them to abandon their goals and end the campaign. Carman was one of the few who gave this smaller engagement its due importance, detailing the disaster that befell the 118th Pennsylvania Infantry and Maj. Gen. A. P. Hill’s success in repulsing the Union advance, and the often overlooked foray of Jeb Stuart’s cavalry to seize the Potomac River ford at Williamsport.

Carman also added a statistical study of the casualties in the various battles of the entire Maryland Campaign, and covered Lincoln’s decision to relieve McClellan of command on November 7. He also explored the relations between President Lincoln and General McClellan before and after the Maryland Campaign, which he appended to his original manuscript. The “before” section, a thorough examination of the controversy about McClellan’s role in the aftermath of Second Manassas campaign, will surprise some and discomfort others, and includes an interesting narrative about McClellan’s reluctance to commit General Franklin’s corps to aid Maj. Gen. John Pope’s army at Manassas. Carman concludes with an executive summary of the entire campaign.

Dr. Clemens concludes Carman’s invaluable narrative with a bibliographical dictionary (and genealogical goldmine) of the soldiers, politicians, and diplomats who had an impact on shaping Carman’s manuscript. While many names will be familiar to readers, others upon whom Carman relied for creating his campaign narrative are as obscure to us today as they were during the war.

The Maryland Campaign of September 1862, Vol. III: The Battle of Shepherdstown and the End of the Campaign, concludes the most comprehensive and detailed account of the campaign ever produced. Jammed with firsthand accounts, personal anecdotes, detailed footnotes, maps, and photos, this long-awaited study will be appreciated as Civil War history at its finest.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Savas Beatie
• Release date: Feb 15, 2017
• ISBN: 9781611213034

Ezra A. Carman

Ezra Ayres Carman was born in Oak Tree, New Jersey, on February 27, 1834, and educated at Western Military Academy in Kentucky. He fought with New Jersey organizations throughout the Civil War, mustering out as a brevet brigadier general. He was appointed to the Antietam National Cemetery Board of Trustees and later to the Antietam Battlefield Board in 1894. Carman also served on the Chattanooga-Chickamauga Battlefield Commission. He died in 1909 on Christmas day and was buried just below the Custis-Lee mansion in Arlington Cemetery. Thomas G. Clemens earned his doctoral degree at George Mason University, where he studied under Maryland Campaign historian Dr. Joseph L. Harsh. Tom has published a wide variety of magazine articles and book reviews, has appeared in several documentary programs, and is a licensed tour guide at Antietam National Battlefield. An instructor at Hagerstown Community College, he also helped found and is the current president of Save Historic Antietam Foundation, Inc., a preservation group dedicated to saving historic properties.

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The Maryland Campaign of September 1862

Vol. III: Shepherdstown Ford and the End of the Campaign

by Ezra Carman

Edited and annotated by

Thomas G. Clemens

Savas Beatie

California

© 2017 by Thomas G. Clemens

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher.

Library of Congress Control Number: 2010481380

ISBN 978-1-61121-302-7 / hardcover

978-1-61121-303-4 / digital

978-1-61121-303-4 / mobi

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To the Men of Antietam,

In researching the lives of veterans for the Biographical Dictionary, the immense suffering war inflicted on soldiers was inescapable. Their inestimable suffering should always be in the forefront as we calculate the costs of war.

Contents

Introduction and Acknowledgments

Chapter 23

Boteler’s Ford

Chapter 24

The Results of the Maryland Campaign

Chapter 25

Lincoln and McClellan

Chapter 26

Lincoln, Halleck and McClellan

Chapter 27

Resume of the Maryland Campaign of September 1862

Appendix 1

Errata Vol. I

Appendix 2

Errata Vol. II

Appendix 3

Biographical Dictionary

Bibliography

List of Maps

Shepherdstown (Boteler’s) Ford, September 19

Shepherdstown (Boteler’s) Ford, September 20, 8:30-9:30 a.m.

Shepherdstown (Boteler’s) Ford, September 20, 11:30 a.m.

Second Manassas Campaign

Introduction

Contrary to popular perceptions, the battle of Sharpsburg, or Antietam, did not end the Maryland Campaign of 1862, nor did it prove to be the decisive battle of the campaign.

General Robert E. Lee intended to continue his ambitious plan. He led his Army of Northern Virginia back to the Virginia side of the Potomac River while planning to move upstream and reenter Maryland at Williamsport. General George B. McClellan intended to use his Army of the Potomac to pursue Lee’s army into Virginia, hoping to inflict further harm upon that battered army. Both commanders were forced to change their plans due to the often overlooked, but extremely critical, battle at Shepherdstown Ford.

Volume Three begins with a chapter on the fighting at Shepherdstown Ford, which proved to be the culminating and conclusive battle of the Maryland Campaign. (It will be helpful to read Chapter 22, the last chapter in Volume II, before reading Chapter 23, the first chapter in this volume.) Historian Ezra Carman followed his account of the fighting at Shepherdstown Ford with a chapter summarizing the casualties and results of the entire campaign. Well aware of the importance of politics in war, he next wrote a chapter on the political interaction of army commander McClellan and General in Chief Henry Halleck with President Abraham Lincoln and his cabinet. The result of these post-campaign strategy disagreements was the replacement of McClellan as commander of the Army of the Potomac in early November 1862. Perhaps significantly, Carman did not include any further discussion of Lee and his intentions or relations with his president. Even General Jeb Stuart’s celebrated raid into Pennsylvania in October of 1862 was mentioned only as it affected relations between Lincoln and McClellan.

The final two chapters of the manuscript provide evidence of Carman’s plans for his work. He placed a chapter titled Lincoln, McClellan and Halleck as the penultimate chapter despite the fact that it was obviously intended to serve as a bridge between Chapters One and Two in Volume One. In it, he covered the illdefined command situation between Generals Halleck, McClellan, and Pope, as well as the controversial actions or inactions of Generals Porter and Franklin in the events connected to the battle of Second Bull Run. His final chapter is a drastically condensed summary of the chapters leading up to the battle of Antietam, perhaps for inclusion in a larger work, or in an attempt to reduce the size of the manuscript for publication purposes. It can double as an executive summary for the campaign.

Carman mentioned more than 1,500 people across the pages of his history. A significant number were veterans whose accounts are found in Battlefield Board Papers Carman mined for information in his narrative. I have added a Biographical Dictionary with information about the major figures of the campaign and, more importantly, details on many of the lesser-known survivors. Readers might desire more information about those veterans who wrote their memoirs, marked map snippets, and provided comments while visiting the battlefield, so I added them because Carman used their memoirs in telling the story of the campaign.

I have also included two Errata chapters to correct errors in the preceding two volumes. I am sure this list is not complete, and further errors will be brought to my attention. Those who find mistakes are encouraged to notify me via my blog: Maryland Campaign of 1862.com or my FB page, under my name.

Acknowledgments

As with any book of this scope, I cannot claim to have accomplished this work alone, and am indebted to many people. First among them is my patient, thoughtful and loving wife Angela; also Dr. Ethan Rafuse of the Command & General Staff School, Leavenworth KS; author & scholar Vince Armstrong; Dr. Susan Trail, Ted Alexander and Stephanie Gray of Antietam National Battlefield, Steve Stottelmyer, and all of the Antietam Battlefield Guides. Dan Toomey, John Banks, Eric Wittenberg, Dr. Carol Reardon of Pennsylvania State University, Dr. Susannah Ural of the University of Southern Mississippi, Melissa Jones, and Mark Big Dutchy Pflum helped with the Biographical Dictionary. Gene Thorp generously provided his expertise in creating the maps.

I also must include my publisher Theodore P. Ted Savas, Marketing Director Sarah Keeney, Production Manager Lee Merideth and the rest of the staff at Savas Beatie, as well as many others who have helped in so many ways. My sincere thanks to all, including those I have neglected to mention by name.

Thomas G. Clemens

Keedysville, Maryland

Chapter 23

Boteler’s Ford

(September 20th)

The information gained by Porter’s troops on the evening of the 19th was to the effect that Lee had retreated on the Charlestown and Martinsburg roads towards Winchester. To verify this and to ascertain how far he had retreated Porter was authorized to send over a reconnoitering force on the morning of the 20th. Pleasonton was directed to cross the river at daybreak and co-operate with Porter. Porter ordered Morell and Sykes to cross their divisions at 7 a. m. preceding their main columns by advance guards thrown well forward on the roads to Shepherdstown and Charlestown.¹

Before these movements were made and as soon as it was light enough to see, the 4th Michigan and 62nd Pennsylvania of Griffin’s Brigade, crossed the river with some horses from Battery D, 5th U. S. Artillery, commanded by Lieutenant Hazlett, and brought back three guns, several caissons, and 1 battle-flag, picked up on the field, returning to camp about 8 a. m.²

Sykes was directed to cross with a brigade and push out on the Charlestown Road. He took Lovell’s Brigade—1st and 6th U. S., 2nd and 10th U. S., 1st battalion of 11th U. S., 1st battalion of 17th U. S.—crossed the river at 8 o’clock, threw out skirmishers, and advanced Lovell on the Charlestown road. Lovell went about a mile and upon approaching a belt of woods, discovered the enemy in force—A. P. Hill’s Division—on his right and front. Sykes was informed and he ordered Lovell to fall back to the crest of the river bluff. Lovell fell back slowly and in good order, skirmishing lightly, until reaching the open ground on the heights near the river, when a heavy fire was opened upon him. The 2nd and 6th U. S. Infantry were then thrown into a piece of woods on the left, but, soon after, the Union batteries beyond the river opened fire, much of it fell in and around the two regiments, rendering it absolutely necessary to withdraw them to the crest of the hill, and soon after Colonel Warren’s Brigade—5th and 10th New York—formed on Lovell’s left. The cavalry, which was to have preceded the infantry, at daybreak, came up after Lovell had encountered the enemy, and being useless were at once withdrawn.³

The evening before Pleasonton had been ordered back to his camp by Porter. At 10.45 p. m. he was directed by McClellan to have his cavalry and artillery at the river by daylight, and precede Porter’s infantry; later, during the night, he was ordered to send two brigades and a battery in the direction of Williamsport. These he started at 6.30 a. m. on the 20th at which hour, he dispatched McClellan, from his camp near Keedysville, that the remainder of his command was about getting off for Shepherdstown, and complained that:

The order of Maj. Gen. Fitz John Porter of yesterday, sending my command to the rear, by the order of General McClellan, and which was transmitted by General Buford, has interfered most materially with a proper pursuit of the enemy. Many of the men of my command have had nothing to eat for two days, and last night, in consequence of the movement to the rear, they missed their trains, and are now starting out without anything. I trust, after the past experience of yesterday, the general commanding will not permit corps commanders to interfere with the cavalry under my command, for it breaks up all my system and plans.⁴

Meanwhile, about 9 a. m. Barnes’ Brigade, of Morell’s Division, crossed the Potomac, under orders to go on the road to Shepherdstown and see what was there and Sykes requested Barnes to occupy the crest on the right of the Charlestown road and connect with Lovell’s right, which was then falling back. Barnes’ Brigade was composed of the 18th Massachusetts, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Hayes; 22nd Massachusetts, Lieutenant Colonel William S. Tilton; 2nd Maine, Colonel Charles W. Roberts; 1st Michigan, Captain Emory W. Belton; 13th New York, Colonel Elisha G. Marshall; 25th New York, Colonel Charles A. Johnson; and 118th Pennsylvania, Colonel Charles M. Prevost; in all 1700 officers and men. As soon as the 18th Massachusetts, the leading regiment, had crossed the ford it was drawn up on the road leading to Shepherdstown, and under a bold bluff overlooking the road and the river. It was at this moment, and before the other regiments had crossed that Sykes came up to Barnes with information that the enemy were in strong force less than two miles in front, and gave Barnes orders to suspend his march on Shepherdstown and directed that the 18th Massachusetts take position near but below the top of the ridge on the bluff, which ran over the left of and parallel to the road; and the 25th and 13th New York, as they crossed, were placed on the right of the 18th Massachusetts, but to reach which, it was necessary to pass along the road and beyond the ravine, by which the 18th Massachusetts had ascended, to another ravine a few rods distant, the interval forming a rocky bluff, nearly perpendicular, up which it was impracticable to advance. Sykes at 9.15 a. m. reported to Porter that he had sent Barnes temporarily to the top of the ridge to support Lovell, and suggested that more troops be sent over and someone in authority.⁵

A brief description of the ground is necessary. The ford by which the movement was made and by which Lee recrossed the Potomac is about a mile below Shepherdstown, and was variously known as the Shepherdstown, Blackford and Boteler ford. On the Maryland side it starts from the Blackford farm and reaches the Virginia side on the Boteler farm. It crosses the river a short distance below the breast of a mill dam, constructed to give water power to a large mill— Boteler’s. On the Virginia side the ford road runs along the southern extremity of a high bluff off in the direction of Charlestown; another road extends along the foot of a bluff, between it and the river, in the direction of Shepherdstown. The bluff rises almost perpendicular and for some distance is scarped to give passage for the road. Boteler’s Mill is about 350 yards above the ford, and beyond it, along the lower face of the bluff, and on the right of the road, were several kilns or arches, for the burning of cement, of which the bluff furnished excellent material. The road to Shepherdstown passed over the kilns, the bluff still, as it passes over, continuing to rise precipitously; and another road passes down from the northern extremity of the bluff and in front of the kilns. The dam-breast, some ten feet wide, had been long neglected, many of the planks had rotted away or been removed, and water trickled through numerous crevices, the outer face, sloping to its base, was covered with a slippery green slime. On the Virginia side, some twenty feet had been left for a fish-way, through which flowed a rapid current. The river was low, and the fish-way easily fordable.⁶

The operations of Sykes’ two brigades were conducted on the Charlestown road and south of Boteler’s Mill, those of Barnes’ Brigade on the high bluff running north from the mill. The 118th Pennsylvania followed the 25th and 13th New York in crossing, and was ordered to follow these two regiments and Barnes says to take a similar position below the top of the ridge and on their left and on the left of the 118th Pennsylvania, the 1st Michigan, 2nd Maine and 22nd Massachusetts joined the 18th Massachusetts, skirmishers were thrown forward; who immediately began firing upon those of the enemy who had by this time advanced within musket range, and were deployed along the whole front, in large numbers and at very short intervals. At first Barnes was informed that the enemy were advancing on the left of the position held by his brigade. It was, however, soon perceived that they were not only approaching with a greatly superior force from that direction but that they were, also, in equal numbers advancing in his front and on his right. Springing as it were from the bushes and cornfields which had concealed them to this time, and making their first appearance within short musket range, a rapid and vigorous fire began immediately, and, notwithstanding the vastly superior numbers of the enemy, every man stood his ground firmly.⁷

The attacking force was A. P. Hill’s Division. When General Lee heard that Griffin had crossed the river on the evening of the 19th, and received Pendleton’s alarming report that much of the Reserve Artillery had been captured and that the Union cavalry were in Shepherdstown, he suspended his movement on Williamsport and returned toward Shepherdstown with the intention of driving McClellan back, if not in position with his whole army but if in force he thought an attack would be inadvisable and should make other dispositions. Longstreet was left in bivouac and Jackson was turned back toward Shepherdstown to rectify occurrences in that quarter.⁸

On the evening of the 19th Jackson moved on the road leading to Martinsburg and early on the 20th, ordered A. P. Hill and Early, who had bivouacked about five miles from Boteler’s Ford to return and drive into the river some brigades that had been reported as having crossed and captured some of the artillery. Hill led the advance at half past 6 o’clock and as he approached the river by the Charlestown road threw out a skirmish line and about one and a half miles from the ford came in contact with Lovell’s skirmishers, upon which he formed in a woods in two lines, the first line composed of the brigades of Thomas, Gregg and Pender, in order from right to left, under command of General Gregg, and the second line of Brockenbrough’s, Lane’s and Archer’s brigades, in order from right to left, under General Archer. Early, with his own brigade, and those of Trimble and Hays, as a support to Hill, took position in a wood on the right and left of the road. The Union artillery was seen on the opposite heights of the Potomac. Hill’s Division, preceded by heavy line of skirmishers, advanced, Lovell’s men slowly retiring to the heights near the ford, and Hill now came under a heavy fire of shot and shell from the batteries across the river, and he saw the Union infantry on the bluff and south of it, and made a short halt to rectify his lines, but his skirmishers advanced and became heavily engaged.⁹

Meanwhile, Sykes: Knowing that the Virginia side of the river was no place for troops until a proper reconnaissance had been made, and several reports from citizens inducing the belief that a large force of the enemy was sweeping down upon us...expressed his opinion to General Porter, who directed the immediate recrossing of the troops. Skirmishers were left on the line, the batteries of Weed, Randol and Van Reed kept up a heavy fire, and Lovell and Warren affected their crossing in excellent order and without loss. Warren, on regaining the Maryland side, threw his two regiments behind the embankment of the canal, the 1st U. S. Sharpshooters were on their right, and assisted the other troops to recross by keeping up a fire on such of the Confederate infantry as appeared on the river bank opposite. The loss in the two brigades was trifling, 1 killed and 8 wounded; but Barnes was not so fortunate.¹⁰

While Sykes was withdrawing his two brigades the skirmishing was growing more severe on Barnes’ line, and the Union batteries across the river opened a heavy fire, some of which fell short, struck in his ranks and inflicted some casualties. All his regiments, save one, were under cover, and suffered slight loss from the enemy’s fire in front and to this one regiment—the 118th Pennsylvania—we now confine our attention. The regiment, as we have seen, was ordered to follow the 25th and 13th New York and form on their left. It passed the Boteler Mill and the cement kilns, at the foot of the bluff, and as the head of the regiment approached a ravine or glen on the left by which a path led to the summit, a staff officer dashed up and reported the enemy approaching in heavy force, and Barnes, who was riding with Colonel Prevost, asked if he could get his regiment onto the bluff and Prevost, replying that he would try, dismounted and led his column into a narrow, unfrequented path that led from the ravine to the summit, and Barnes rode back to the left of his brigade.¹¹

As the head of the column reached the summit it saw before it open country for a mile or more, with occasional cornfields, then the fields changed to forests, and a wide belt of timber skirted the open lands. Farm house, barn and haystack dotted the plain, and to the right in the distance were the roofs and spires of Shepherdstown. But the beauty of the landscape did not impress them so much as did the musket-barrels of A. P. Hill’s Division gleaming and glistening in the sunlight, in their front and to the right, not a half mile away, a whole brigade sweeping down with steady tread, its skirmishers well in advance, moving with firm front; and ere the head of the regimental column had scarce appeared upon the bluff, they opened a desultory straggling fire. As his men came up Prevost brought them by file into line, and Company E, with Lieutenants Hunterson and Lewis, was deployed as a skirmish line. Advancing but a short distance, it was soon severely engaged, and, unable to resist the heavy pressure, very shortly fell back upon the main line.¹²

The time at which the regiment reached the summit is fixed by Major George L. Andrews, 17th U. S., of Lovell’s Brigade, who was the last of that brigade to retire. He was on the right of his brigade, under the crest of the southern extremity of the bluff, on the Charlestown road, shut off from view of the rest of the brigade, and hearing that it was falling back, went to the top of the hill and noticed a line of battle of our own troops, as it were, rise out of the ground to my right.¹³ He immediately received orders to recross the river. At about the same time, Barnes, who was with the left of his brigade, saw that Lovell and Warren on his left were retiring and had nearly reached the foot of the hill, when he received orders to retire in good order and to cross the river. Barnes gave orders to the four regiments on the left of the 118th Pennsylvania to fall back and recross the river, which was quickly done with some small loss, and dispatched Lieutenant Davis of his staff, up the road to recall the 25th and 13th New York, and sent an orderly to recall the 118th Pennsylvania. As soon as Davis passed to the right on his mission to recall the two New York regiments he observed that the 118th Pennsylvania was making no movement to withdraw, but actually becoming engaged, and called up the ravine to an officer nearest him, to tell Colonel Prevost that Barnes’ orders were that he withdraw his regiment at once. The word was passed to Prevost, who by this time had only the right wing of his regiment up the bluff and in position, but he refused to recognize an order received in that way, saying: If Colonel Barnes has an order to give me, let his aid come to me, and he continued to conduct the formation of the regiment.¹⁴

Davis recalled the 13th and 25th New York, from the right, and these two regiments retired and crossed the river with a loss of a few wounded, but the orderly sent by Barnes to recall the Pennsylvania regiment did not reach it, and it was now alone upon the bluff to receive the attack of A. P. Hill’s Division.¹⁵

In his official report Colonel Barnes states that he ordered the regiment to a position below the top of the ridge and that it advanced in the excitement of the contest from the cover of the ridge¹⁶ and Lieutenant Colonel Gwyn, of the regiment, says it was ordered to form line of battle on the top of a bluff, and under cover. It was a new regiment, but a few days in service, and crossed the river with 737 officers and men all of most excellent material but with no experience, and to this fact must be attributed the hard fate that befell it. Owing to the nature of the ground the regiment, in reaching the summit of the bluff, came in line on the right by file. Seven companies only had formed line, under partial cover, when firing was heard on the right flank, two companies on the right were refused to meet it, the other companies had now come up, and Prevost ordered an advance to the crest of the hill, and the enemy were seen advancing in heavy force in front and on the left. Prevost now led the three left companies to meet the movement on the left, to a knoll on the left of the regiment, there became almost immediately engaged, and about the same time the right was fired on from a heavy force in front, and, by Lieutenant Colonel Gwyn’s order, began firing by file. The engagement was now general along the whole line, this one regiment contending at close quarters with four brigades of A. P. Hill’s Division.¹⁷

Hill’s advance along the Charlestown road was not seriously opposed by Lovell, who fell back before it but the fire from the Union batteries across the river, is described in some of the Confederate reports as the most terrific ever witnessed, tearing great gaps in the ranks, particularly in Gregg’s Brigade. Thomas on the right and a part of Gregg, quickly drove back the skirmishers that Lovell had deployed to cover his retreat across the river, and advanced to the high ground covering the ford, but did not venture near it, as the artillery fire and that of the sharpshooters on the Maryland side, was very active and very accurate. Pender’s Brigade, on Hill’s left, became very hotly engaged with Barnes’ skirmishers and then with those of the 118th Pennsylvania, and believing that his left was threatened, when he saw the 118th advance, Pender informed Archer of the supposed danger, and that officer promptly moved by the left flank, and the left regiment of his brigade as soon as it was unmasked by Pender, and other regiments, as soon as unmasked by the preceding one, went in on the double-quick, and coming up on Pender’s left opened fire.¹⁸ The Pennsylvanians were poorly armed with Enfield rifles, many of which could not be discharged. Their line began to waver, when Prevost, seizing the colors advanced and was almost immediately severely wounded in the shoulder and compelled to leave the field. The regiment now fell back in some disorder to the position where it had formed and a total rout seemed imminent, when Lieutenant Colonel James Gwyn, with the assistance of Major C. P. Herring, succeeded in rallying about 200 men, and charged over the slope of the hill in front; a heavy fire was poured into his left, the enemy was still advancing on his front and extending beyond his right. Captains Courtland Saunders and Joseph W. Ricketts and Lieutenant J. M. Moss were killed, many others were killed and wounded, and Gwyn fell back under the brow of the hill and reformed with the intention of repeating the charge. At this moment a regiment of the enemy, with colors displayed, crowned the hill on the left and opened fire. Gwyn ordered a fire in response and was directing it, when Adjutant Perot came up with an order which had been sent by Barnes that the regiment was to be withdrawn and cross the river as both the right and left flanks had been turned. Its left was completely turned and Lane’s and Brockenbrough’s brigades, following the movements of Archer, had extended A. P. Hill’s line far to the right and commanded the ravine by which the regiment had reached its position, and Hill’s line of five brigades was now advancing. The only line of retreat was over the precipitous bluff. Orders were given to get into the road and retreat across the river. The loss had already been very heavy and the historian of the regiment says the scene following the order almost beggars description, the men breaking in wild confusion for the river. Perot remained almost alone upon the bluff, firing his pistol at the enemy, was severely wounded and taken prisoner. The greater part of the regiment made furiously for the ravine, down which they dashed precipitously. Since the march up, a tree, in a way never accounted for, had fallen across the path. This materially obstructed the retreat. Over and under it the now thoroughly demoralized crowd jostled and pushed each other, whilst, meanwhile, the enemy, having reached the edge of the bluff, poured upon them a fatal and disastrous plunging fire. The slaughter was fearful; men were shot as they climbed over the tree, and their bodies suspended from the branches were plainly visible from the other side of the river. Others, who avoided the rout by the ravine, driven headlong over the bluff, were seriously injured or killed outright.¹⁹

A. P. Hill reports that the final charge on the regiment was made by the brigades of Pender and Archer and the enemy driven pell-mell into the river. There commenced the most terrible slaughter this war has yet witnessed. The plateau on the bluff was very much exposed to the fire of the Union guns and Hill drew back the greater part of his men, but the 22nd North Carolina, of Pender’s Brigade, and detachments from other commands crept close to the edge of the bluff and kept up a fire on those in the road and upon those who were struggling in the water to escape.²⁰

"An old abandoned mill stood upon the ford road at the base of the cliff. It completely commanded the ford and the dam-breast. When the last of the fugitives had disappeared from the bluff, the enemy crowded the doors, windows and roof and poured their relentless, persecuting fire upon those who had taken to the water. Numbers, observing the telling effect of the fire upon those who had essayed to the venture of crossing, huddled together and crowded each other in the arches of the kilns at the base of the bluff; whilst others, hoping to escape the fatal effect of the avenging bullets, took to deeper water and crossed where the stream was deep enough to cover the entire body and leave the head alone exposed. At this moment a battery from the Maryland side opened heavily. The practice was shameful. The fuses, too short, sent the terrible missiles into the disorganized mass fleeing in disorder before the serious punishment of the enemy’s musketry. It was a painful ordeal, to be met in their effort to escape an impending peril by another equally terrible. Shell after shell, as if directly aimed, went thundering into the arches, bursting and tearing to pieces ten or twelve of those who had crowded there for cover. A cry and wail of horror went up, plainly heard above the din and roar of battle.

Waving handkerchiefs fixed to ramrods, they endeavored by their signals to warn the gunners to desist, but to no avail; the fatal work continued. Hoping for better treatment, numbers turned with their white insignia of truce towards the enemy and, again ascending to the hill-top, surrendered. The dam-breast was still crowded, and here and there across it were the dead, wounded and dying. As the last of the survivors were nearing the Maryland shore Berdan’s Sharpshooters appeared. Deploying hurriedly in the bed of the canal, shouting loudly to those still exposed to seek what cover they could, they opened vigorously with their usual unerring and effective aim and soon almost entirely cleared the other bank. Those who had not yet fully accomplished the entire journey were thus enabled to complete it in comparative safety." Lieutenant J. Rudhall White was killed as he touched the Maryland shore.²¹

* * *

In this disastrous affair the 118th Pennsylvania lost 63 killed, 101 wounded, and 105 missing, an aggregate of 269; the loss in the entire brigade was 317 killed, wounded, and missing.²² This was bad enough but scarcely justifying A. P. Hill’s extravagant report: The broad surface of the Potomac was blue with the floating bodies of our foe. But few escaped to tell the tale. By their own account they lost 3,000 men killed and drowned, from one brigade alone. We readily accept Hill’s statement that it was a wholesome lesson to the enemy and taught them to know that it may be dangerous sometimes to press a retreating army. Hill’s loss was 30 killed and 231 wounded, exceeding by 70 that of the Union killed, drowned and wounded.²³

After the engagement A. P. Hill and Early marched from the field and joined the main body of the army, which bivouacked that night on the Opequon, near Martinsburg. Munford’s cavalry remained at the ford observing the Union army.

The Union loss at Boteler’s Ford on the 19th and 20th, was 71 killed, 161 wounded and 131 missing, an aggregate of 363. The Confederate losses were, in A.P. Hill’s Division, 30 killed, and 231 wounded; in Early’s Division 9 wounded; Armistead’s Brigade 8 wounded; and in the artillery 3 killed and 4 wounded, an aggregate of 33 killed and 252 wounded.²⁴

Before crossing the Potomac on the 19th Lee, in order to threaten McClellan’s right and rear, and make him apprehensive for his communications and thus prevent pursuit, sent Wade Hampton’s cavalry brigade up the Virginia side of the Potomac to cross over at Williamsport, and put his army in motion for the same point, with the intention of recrossing the river and moving upon Hagerstown. Hampton crossed at Mason’s Ford, into Maryland and, on the afternoon of the 19th, joined Stuart at Williamsport.²⁵ Stuart had preceded him and with a part of the 12th Virginia Cavalry, dashed across the river, drove back a few pickets and occupied the place. In this movement Stuart was supported and aided by a battalion of infantry, under command of Captain W. W. Randolph of the 2nd Virginia; a detachment of the 11th Georgia, and Stuart says: it may be by small detachments of other regiments; a section of the Salem Artillery and one of the Second Company of the Richmond Howitzers. Hampton having joined him, Stuart moved out upon the ridges overlooking the town, and active demonstrations were made on the various roads. On the 20th, Hampton, in attempting to advance, was met by a part of Pleasonton’s cavalry and Couch’s Division of infantry, and, keeping up a bold front and skirmishing until dark, Stuart ordered his whole force to recross the river at night, which was done without loss.²⁶

1 U.S. War Department. The War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 128 vols. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1880-1901), Gen. Fitz-John Porter’s October 1, report, Series 1, Vol. 19, pt. 1, p. 340. Pleasonton’s orders are found in ibid., 51, pt. 1, p. 853, where he was ordered to split his force and also confront Gen. Stuart’s force at Williamsport. The only in-depth treatment of this battle is Thomas A. McGrath, Shepherdstown: Last Clash of the Antietam Campaign, September 19-20, 1862 (Lynchburg, VA: Schroeder Publications, 2007).

2 OR Vol. 19, pt. 1, Griffin’s October 6 report, p. 350. Carman cited this report almost word-for- word. The flag captured was from the 38th Georgia Infantry, Lawton’s brigade, which was guarding the ford. An article in The Sunny South, an Atlanta newspaper, dated January 10, 1891, described the loss of the flag on September 19 at Shepherdstown Ford. The cannon loss is listed in Curt Johnson and Richard C. Anderson Jr., Artillery Hell: The Employment of Artillery at Antietam (Texas A&M University Press, 1995), pp. 106-7, lists four guns abandoned on the retreat including a Parrott rifle from Maurin’s Donaldsville (LA) Artillery, and three smoothbore guns. The Parrott rifle was one of the guns taken from then-Captain Charles Griffin’s Battery D, 5th US Artillery at First Manassas according to Stephen Minot Weld, War Diaries and Letters of Stephen Minot Weld, 1861-1865 (Boston: Massachusetts Historical Society, 1979), p. 139. Weld was a staff officer at Fifth Corps Headquarters.

3 OR 19, pt. 1, Sykes’ September 30 report, pp. 351-2.

4 The first part of this paragraph is taken from ibid. Vol. 51, pt. 1, p. 853 with Pleasonton’s orders. The direct quote with his protest and explanation for his failure to provide cavalry support for Porter is from ibid. OR 19, pt. 2, p. 334.

5 This paragraph was taken from Col. Barnes’ September 25 report, OR 19, pt. 1, p. 346, which included the order from Morell. The quoted portion at the end is from Sykes’ 9:15 a.m. message to Porter, ibid., pt. 2, p. 335.

6 Carman’s note: John L. Smith, History of the 118th Pennsylvania Volunteers. The full title is History of the 118th Pennsylvania Volunteers, Corn Exchange Regiment, from their first engagement at Antietam to Appomattox, authored by a committee of survivors of the regiment and published by John L. Smith, Map Publishers, Philadelphia, PA, 1888 (republished in 1892 and 1905). All citations are from the 1905 edition, which was printed from the same plates as the earlier editions. Not only the quoted portion at the end, but much of the description, came from this source, pp. 54-5. A fish-way was an opening in the dam that allowed fish to travel up and down stream.

7 Carman’s note: Barnes’ Report. OR 19, pt. 1, pp. 346-7. Not only the quoted portion, but most of the paragraph came from this source.

8 The only direct confirmation of General Lee’s thoughts are the letters he sent on September 20 and 21 to President Jefferson Davis, which did not include times. It is clear that only Gen. Stonewall Jackson’s command was sent, but Joseph Harsh, Taken at the Flood, Robert E. Lee and Confederate Strategy in the Maryland Campaign of 1862 (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1999) pp. 459-60 noted Jackson was authorized to call on Gen. Longstreet for support.

9 The description of A. P. Hill and Jubal Early’s return was taken very closely from Jackson’s April 23, 1863 report of the campaign, OR 19, pt. 1, p. 957. Carman supplied Lovell’s retirement from ibid. p. 361, for context.

10 Sykes’ report was the source for this quote and the rest of the paragraph, OR 19, pt. 1, p. 352. As will be seen, Gen. A. P. Hill’s division was advancing in two lines, three brigades per line. Carman’s estimate of Hill’s strength at Antietam was 2,568, including artillery, for the three brigades engaged. Ezra Carman, Maryland Campaign of September 1862, Vol. II, p. 594. With losses of 417, including four of the six brigades, it is logical to estimate Hill’s strength at approximately 4,000 men. Ibid. p. 607.

11 Carman reverted to Smith’s History of the 118 Pennsylvania Volunteers for this paragraph, p. 59.

12 History of the 118 Pennsylvania Volunteers, p. 59-60. Another excellent source on this battle is J. Gregory Aken, ed., Inside the Army of the Potomac, The Civil War Experiences of Captain Francis Adams Donaldson (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1998), which provides many useful details that were unavailable to Carman. While Smith’s History of the 118 Pennsylvania Volunteers provided the narrative Carman used here, Donaldson’s letters, p. 132, described the captain of Company E, Lewis Passmore, deserting the company as it came to the top of the bluff, leaving the two lieutenants were left to deploy the skirmishers.

13 Carman quoted a portion of the September 24 report of Major George L. Andrews, OR 19, pt. 1, p. 366 to establish the time of the attack. It is likely Carman misread Andrews’s report, and the regiment he saw was the 18th Massachusetts not the 118th Pennsylvania. The 118th was farther to the west, and as stated in the previous paragraph, was going into battle formation by file into line, which would have the unit appear two by two and not the entire line at one time. William J. Hardee, Rifle & Light Infantry Tactics (Philadelphia: Lippincott, Granbo & Co. 1855) Vol. I, pp. 120-1. Andrews was likely gone by the time the 118th arrived on the bluff. Thanks to Tom McGrath for these insights.

14 Smith, History of 118 Pennsylvania Volunteers, pp. 60-61. Because Carman copied Barnes’ report he did not further identify Lt. Davis. Donaldson’s letters reveal it was Lt. Walter S. Davis, originally of 22nd Mass. Infantry and assigned to the brigade staff. Acken, Inside the Army of the Potomac, p. 456, fn. 79, and John Lord Parker, Henry Wilson’s Regiment, History of the Twenty-second Massachusetts Infantry, the Second Company Sharpshooters, and the Third Light Battery, in the War of the Rebellion, by the regimental association, Press of Rand Avery Company, Boston, MA, 1887. p. 583.

15 The information here is inferred, but not stated in the reports of Col. Barnes or Lt. Col. Gwyn, that Lt. Davis was Col. Barnes’ aide. OR 19, pt. 1, pp. 347-9. See also Smith, History of 118 Pennsylvania Volunteers, p. 64.

16 Ibid., Barnes’ report, p. 347.

17 Smith, History of 118 Pennsylvania Volunteers, p. 64-6, Gwyn’s report, OR 19, pt. 1, p. 348.

18 Carman assembled this narrative from the reports of several Confederate leaders. See A.P. Hill’s February 25, 1863 report, OR 19, pt. 1, p. 982; Samuel McGowen, ibid., p. 989; James J. Archer, ibid. p. 1001-2; William D. Pender, ibid., p. 1004.

19 The tree blocking the path could have fallen as a result of the large Union artillery barrage from the north bank of the river. Carman wrote that the regiment was armed with Enfield muskets, imported from England, and according to Lt. Col. Gwyn’s report, over 50% were condemned. OR 19, pt. 1, p. 348. Donaldson offered a contrasting account, writing the weapons were Belgian imports and the unschooled soldiers of the regiment had loaded them improperly and thus rendered them useless. Inside the Army, p. 133. Either way the regiment’s firepower was diminished. Carman assembled most of this narrative from Smith, History of 118 Pennsylvania Volunteers, pp. 62-67. Mark Snell, Baptism of Fire: The 118th (Corn Exchange) Pennsylvania Infantry at the Battle of Shepherdstown, in Civil War Regiments, Vol. 6, No. 2 wrote that weapons were issued on different days. It is possible both types were carried by different companies.

20 These two sentences come from two sources, Hill’s report, OR 19, pt. 1, p. 982, and Pender’s report, ibid., p. 1004.

21 Smith, History of the 118th Pennsylvania, pp. 67-70.

22 Return of Casualties in the Union Forces in the skirmishes at Sharpsburg, Shepherdstown Ford and near Williamsport, MD, September 19, action near Shepherdstown VA September 20, and general summary for the campaign, OR 19, pt. 1, p. 204. The figures for Barnes brigade are not consistent with his report, in ibid. p. 348.

23 These quotes, and the casualty figures came from A. P. Hill’s report, ibid., p. 982. Carman was correct to call Hill’s report extravagant because he greatly exaggerated Union casualties, as seen in the figures below.

24 Union casualties are taken from ibid., p, 204; A. P. Hill’s casualties are from ibid., p. 982; Jubal Early’s January 12, 1863 report contained a chart showing a total of eight casualties at this engagement, so it is unclear how Carman arrived at nine. His report also mentioned their bivouac following the battle. It is unknown how Carman learned of the eight casualties in Armistead’s brigade. William N. Pendleton’s September 24 report gave his casualties for the Shepherdstown fight in ibid. p. 834. McGrath, Shepherdstown: Last Clash of the Antietam Campaign, listed six captured or missing Confederates, p. 217. See McGrath for a more detailed account of this battle.

25 Gen. Wade Hampton’s October 31 report, OR 19, pt. 1, p. 824.

26 Carman assembled this paragraph, including the unquoted portion, from Gen. J. E. B. Stuart’s February 13, 1863 report, OR 19, pt.1, p.820-1.

Chapter 24

The Results of the Maryland Campaign

Losses in the Army of the Potomac in the Maryland Campaign, September 5th-20th, 1862

Losses in the Army of Northern Virginia in the Maryland Campaign, September 5-20, 1862

These figures do not represent the full loss of Lee’s army in its unsuccessful campaign. All reports agree that there was much straggling in the army, and it is known that large numbers of stragglers were left on the road from South Mountain to the Antietam. Pleasonton reports that he picked up hundreds of them.³ General McClellan reports that during the campaign he captured 6,000 prisoners, in which we conclude are included the 2336 as reported and probably from 750 to 1000 of the most severely wounded that could not be removed, in all 3100 to 3300 men, the remaining 2700 to 2900 being stragglers.⁴ Add these captured stragglers to our table of casualties and we have a loss in the campaign of 16,600. Longstreet says it was more. In an article in Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, he writes: Lee’s army on entering Maryland was made up of nearly 57,000 men, exclusive of artillery and cavalry. As we had but 37,000 at Sharpsburg, our loss in the several engagements after we crossed the Potomac, including stragglers, reached nearly 20,000.⁵ And in this 20,000 are not included the casualties of Sharpsburg. But not all of these 33,922 men were lost to the Confederacy, quite 17,000 of them rejoined the ranks soon after Lee recrossed the Potomac, in fact, many preceded him. But the importance of the campaign and its results are not to be measured by the losses on either side.⁶

The battle of Antietam, September 17, 1862, and the affair at Blackford’s or Boteler’s Ford, on the 20th, ended the two weeks Maryland campaign. The condition of Lee’s troops demanded repose, and he marched to the Opequon, near Martinsburg, from which position it was his desire to threaten a passage into Maryland to occupy the enemy on this frontier, and if his purpose could not be accomplished draw them into the valley, where he could attack them to advantage.⁷ Lee says that when he withdrew from Sharpsburg into Virginia, it was his intention to re-cross the Potomac at Williamsport, and move upon Hagerstown, but the condition of the army prevented.⁸ Resting a few days on the Opequon, and seeing that McClellan was not disposed to follow him on that line, he marched to Bunker Hill and Winchester, where, October 2nd, he issued the following address to his army:

In reviewing the achievements of the army during the present campaign, the commanding general cannot withhold the expression of his admiration of the indomitable courage it has displayed in battle and its cheerful endurance of privation and hardship on the march. Since your great victories around Richmond, you have defeated the enemy at Cedar Mountain, expelled him from the Rappahanhock, and, after a conflict of three days, utterly repulsed him on the plains of Manassas, and forced him to take shelter within the fortifications around his capital. Without halting for repose, you crossed the Potomac, stormed the heights of Harper’s Ferry, made prisoners of more than 11,000 men, and captured upward of seventy-five pieces of artillery, all their small-arms, and other munitions of war. While one corps of the army was thus engaged, the other insured its success by arresting at Boonsborough the combined armies of the enemy, advancing under their favorite general to the relief of their beleagured comrades. On the field of Sharpsburg, with less than one third his numbers, you resisted from daylight until dark the whole army of the enemy, and repulsed every attack along his entire front of more than 4 miles in extent. The whole of the following day you stood prepared to resume the conflict on the same ground, and retired next morning without molestation across the Potomac. Two attempts subsequently made by the enemy to follow you across the river have resulted in his complete discomfiture and being driven back with loss. Achievements such as these demanded much valor and patriotism. History records few examples of greater fortitude and endurance than this army has exhibited, and I am commissioned by the President to thank you in the name of the Confederate States for the undying fame you have won for their arms. Much as you have done, much more remains to be accomplished. The enemy again threatens with invasion, and to your tried valor and patriotism the country looks with confidence for deliverance and safety. Your past exploits give assurance that this confidence is not misplaced.⁹

McClellan considered that he was in no condition to follow Lee. He had moved from Washington with the single purpose of expelling Lee from Maryland, and considered that purpose fully and finally accomplished by the battle of Antietam. He sums up the objects and results of the campaign:

In the beginning of the month of September the safety of the National Capital was seriously endangered by the presence of a victorious enemy, who soon after crossed into Maryland and then directly threatened Washington and Baltimore, while they occupied the soil of a loyal State and threatened an invasion of Pennsylvania. The army of the Union, inferior in numbers, wearied by long marches, deficient in various supplies, worn out by numerous battles, the last of which had not been successful, first covered by its movements the important cities of Washington and Baltimore, then boldly attacked the victorious enemy in their chosen strong position and drove them back, with all their superiority of numbers, into the State of Virginia, thus saving the loyal States from invasion and rudely dispelling the rebel dreams of carrying the war into our country and subsisting upon our resources. Thirteen guns and thirty-nine colors, more than 15,000 stand of small-arms, and more than 6,000 prisoners were the trophies which attest the success of our arms."¹⁰

On November 7th McClellan was removed from command of the Army of the Potomac. In closing an elaborate report of its operations, while under his command he paid it this just tribute:

I am devoutly grateful to God that my last campaign with this brave army was crowned with a victory which saved the nation from the greatest peril it had then undergone. I have not accomplished my purpose if, by this report, the Army of the Potomac is not placed high on the roll of the historic armies of the world. Its deeds ennoble the nation to which it belongs. Always ready for battle, always firm, steadfast, and trustworthy, I never called on it in vain; nor will the nation ever have cause to attribute its want of success, under myself or under other commanders, to any failure of patriotism or bravery in that noble body of American soldiers.

No man can justly charge upon any portion of that army, from the commanding general to the private, any lack of devotion to the service of the United States Government and to the cause of the Constitution and the Union. They have proved their fealty in much sorrow, suffering, danger, and through the very shadow of death. Their comrades, dead on all the fields where we fought, have scarcely more claim to the honor of a nation’s reverence than the survivors to the justice of a nation’s gratitude.¹¹

The result of the Maryland campaign was satisfactory to neither the North or the South. In the North there was great dissatisfaction at the loss of Harper’s Ferry and its garrison, which was in no way the fault of McClellan, and this dissatisfaction was intensified by the indecisive results at Antietam and Lee’s escape, when his army should have been destroyed. At the South there was criticism of Lee and disgust at the apathy of the people of Maryland. Lee, himself, was disappointed at the result. Fitz-Hugh Lee says: "General Lee’s Maryland campaign was a failure. He added but few recruits to his army, lost 10,000 men, and fought a drawn battle, which for an