Precautionary Principle, Pluralism and Deliberation: Science and Ethics

By Bernard Reber

This volume tackles the burden of judgment and the challenges of ethical disagreements, organizes the cohabitation of scientific and ethical argumentations in such a way they find their appropriate place in the political decision. It imagines several forms of agreements and open ways of conflicts resolution very different compared with ones of the majority of political philosophers and political scientists that are macro-social and general. It offers an original contribution to a scrutinized interpretation of the precautionary principle, as structuring the decision in interdisciplinary contexts, to make sure to arrive this time to the “Best of the Worlds”.  

• Language: English
• Publisher: Wiley
• Release date: Nov 23, 2016
• ISBN: 9781119335764

Book preview

Introduction

Every territory on our planet has been discovered, investigated, mapped, attributed and reproduced in various formats, from both geographical and anthropological perspectives. Some areas have even been filmed from above, through the open door of a helicopter flying just above the treetops, as in the movie Home¹, which, following its much-anticipated international release, allows viewers to become familiar with even the most distant corners of the planet. What, then, are our new worlds? For some, these new worlds are to be found in the stars, and the poetry of black holes and antimatter; however, the future and the transformation of the world we currently live in, through enframing² and increasingly invasive technological colonization, is a new world which concerns us all. In some ways, these developments participate in the birth of a new world.

Nevertheless, the process of navigation to reach this new world is as uncertain as that used by Columbus, who believed he had reached the Indies. Engineers and industrialists often make new, better micro-worlds, promises that are taken up and transmitted by political decision makers in their constant quest for innovation. Other scientists, associations or politicians are opposed to the idea of this promised best new world, considering it to be dangerous, and preferring either the current status quo or another, third option. Both sides are often wrong: Columbus’ Indies turned out to be America, with all of its possession of not only dangers and treasures, but also, and especially, its irreversible effects on a fragile world. An alternative title for this book might have been Deliberating on the Best Possible Worlds.

The first New World, given this title during the Age of Discovery – another title which could equally be applied to modern times – was also the subject of controversy. The term controversy itself first became widespread during this period, in the context of political and, to a greater extent, theological disputes, at a time when the two domains were much more closely linked than today. Most of the literature concerning the term controversy is of a theological nature, regarding disputes that led to a schism within Christian communities, and the spread of Reformation (and counter-Reformation) ideas through the cities of Europe.

The most famous controversy of the time, the Valladolid Debate, remained within the Catholic sphere and directly concerned the New World. Without wishing to join the historical debate, it is useful to consider this unique incident in a little more depth, touching on some of the lesser known aspects, as it has relevance for the study of contemporary controversies. The question facing the emperor Charles V in 1550, and, before him, the Council of the Indies on July 3, 1549, concerned the extent to which values could be transmitted to another civilization justly and in good conscience. Effectively, Ginés de Sepùlveda, canon of Cordoba and the emperor’s royal chronicler, and his adversary, Bartolomé de Las Casas, ex-bishop of Chiapas, participated in one of the first debates foreshadowing the concept of Human Rights and ethical security, in front of an audience of 15 experts and sages in the chapel of the College of St Gregory, Valladolid. This view³ of the debate has been put forward by the historian Jean Dumont⁴. The ethical security aspect of the debate is, evidently, not the first element which comes to mind when considering the episode from a distance, or through the prism of Jean-Daniel Verhaeghe’s screen adaptation (1992), based on a historical novel by Jean-Claude Carrière. More memorable aspects include the greed of the Spanish and Portuguese empires and their thirst for the Indians’ gold, justified through the use of more noble pseudo-justifications, such as the correction of barbarian behaviors which allowed infant sacrifice. The conquerors created a hierarchal distinction between races, defended with precision by the brilliant Aristotelian philosopher Ginès de Sepùlveda, who translated Aristotle’s Politics 2 years before the Controversy, and was the author of Democrates (alter), or On the Just Causes of War Against the Indians⁵.

The time when an emperor⁶ could take charge of ethical questions concerning the conquest of a territory is long gone; it is also unthinkable that a debate on this subject could take place, often by letter, over a period of 8 months⁷. Nor would a modern leader request the advice of two theologians or philosophers in reaching a decision. Nowadays, the location for final discussions might be the United Nations Security Council, where the cold conflict of political considerations has more influence over decisions, sometimes at the expense of expertise; this is evident in the case of the erroneous proof of the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq on the eve of the Second Gulf War, produced by the 56th US secretary of state, himself a high-ranking military official and a hero of the First Gulf War⁸.

What, then, are the current forms of deliberation with regard to future worlds, from best to worst and back again? What moral security is desired in different cases, in terms of knowledge and skills, and how should this be obtained?

Whilst knowing may require courage, tenacity and creativity, this is even more true of action, further still if the action is to be successful and if knowledge is limited. All ethical controversies are subject to these difficulties. The strategies used in confronting such problems vary, and may involve elements from traditional sources of reference; religions or thought systems; social mores and norms; personal intuition; and reasoning, which should be as logical as possible.

Controversial, or new, technologies must meet two separate but connected claims. A technical solution is often proposed in response to a problem or to improve the conditions in which a task is accomplished using older techniques. For example, scientists working in the field of GMO may consider themselves to be enhancers⁹. We are facing improvements that have to meet scientific and ethical requirements.

Considered in this way, the question cannot be fully resolved using a conventional debate configuration, between facts, provided by the scientific community, and ethics, regarding values or normative aspects of the proposed solutions. Therefore, a situation of competing improvements emerges. This competition exists on several levels. First, the promised world and the current world are compared. These worlds are described, predictions are made and competing and, sometimes, conflicting scenarios are described. Second, these worlds are also debated, alongside the proposed modes of solution and improvement. These debates involve a comparison of improvements in order to select the best option, and a discussion of the undesirable, negative effects associated with each improvement.

The new worlds resulting from the intrusion of these technologies, their rejection or even their modification¹⁰, are the subject of controversies between possible, future-worthy possibilities (futuribles), and with regard to these possibilities themselves, expressed as different types of probabilities – or an equivalent, in cases where the element of uncertainty is too great.

These debates concern at least three points:

1) the choice (determined and without hazard) between desirable and undesirable worlds;

2) the possibility that a given state (better or catastrophic) will emerge in the given world, on the basis of probabilities or anticipations, following an event such as an accident;

3) ranking, creating the best possible order of these worlds, in such a way as to make worlds as compatible as possible (compossible), thus minimizing the irreversible element of the greatest number of worlds, including the current, shared world¹¹.

These three types of difficult questions are interconnected and mutually informative. The specific domain of risk assessment is concerned mostly with the second dimension, but RA does not provide a sufficient response to these questions taken in isolation. Certain new technologies have created a pressing need for true ethics for the future, and a new science of politics considering these issues.

The three types of questions appear bit by bit and in a heterogeneous manner in verbal exchanges in the context of participatory technology assessment (PTA), and also in relation to Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI), both in the field of research and in private companies.

These forums are a socio-political innovation with regard to the collective and interdisciplinary evaluation of controversial technologies, and are the modern equivalent of Valladolid. Whilst discussions are, necessarily, briefer than those which took place in the 1550s, the sphere of convocation is considerably broader, including both experts and ordinary citizens, assisted by specialists¹² in this new type of debate, and, sometimes, of institutional design.

Current controversies may concern not only individual choices, but also, more significantly, collective choices with long-term and wide-reaching (spatio-temporal) implications. In some cases, these choices are irreversible. The socio-technical usages in question may involve individual practices, production and collective effects. Consider, for example, the technological layer cake of the Internet, which involves material elements, a wide variety of usages falling within Web 2.0 and implications for private life, along with programs, protocols and modes of governance.

I.1. From the New World debate to assessing the best of worlds

So, how did we get here? What happened between the New World of the Great Discoveries, innovations meant to participate in the creation of better worlds, and the current situation in which innovations, their new contributions and the planned worlds themselves are called into question? The status of notions such as progress, newness and innovation is no longer unquestionable. Innovation still enjoys a measure of implicit justification due to its links to the health of the economy, the employment market and wellbeing, and to its potential to act as a stimulus in certain domains of research; however, this justification is no longer automatic. For example, certain researchers, having developed new skills such as transgenesis, permitting the production of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO), find themselves confronted with militant opposition groups who, citing ethical and societal arguments, destroy crops in even the best-guarded fields. Working in this way, they destroy the proof the scientists require. Similarly, these controversial experiments have an impact on quarrels of legitimacy, between territories and types of issue. Decrees issued by mayors, in the name of the precautionary principle, to halt tests of this type until they have been scientifically proven to be safe have been invalidated by French administrative tribunals; concurrently, all of the Swiss cantons banned the use of animal or vegetable GMOs as a result of a popular initiative¹³. Improvements and progress, intended to support innovation, are now tinged with suspicion. Innovation itself is on trial, and is sometimes met with fierce resistance. The promised better world may hide something worse. To borrow an expression from Hans Jonas, one of the rare philosophers to attract a wide readership with his Principe responsabilité. Une éthique pour la civilisation technologique¹⁴, meliorism can be dangerous. The promises of modern techniques have turned out to be threats, or rather (…) the two are intrinsically linked…. For Jonas, this technological civilization constitutes an undiscovered territory for ethics, or rather a land for exploration in order to move beyond immediate, interpersonal ethics, unmediated by technology, both in the interweaving of relationships, which he refers to as rampant apocalyptics¹⁵, and for long-term projections regarding the effects of the technologies in question.

This style of remark is not new, as fans of ready-made argumentation will attest. Many arguments concerning new technologies can, in their general form, be applied to techniques which are already ancient. The discovery of fire, fictionalized in Roy Lewis’ Evolution Man: Or How I Ate My Father, is a good example of this. In a different sphere, moving from the discovery of bones as weapons to futuristic machines, we might consider Stanley Kubrick’s 2001: A Space Odyssey.

How, then, is the debate surrounding such controversial subjects to be organized? What public policy may be developed in order to draw the ethical conclusions based on the Responsibility Principle?

Technological assessment offices have contributed to the evaluation of new controversial technologies¹⁶, such as genetically modified organisms (GMO) or certain medical techniques (preimplantation diagnosis, xenotransplantation, research on the brain, nanotechnologies), by developing a variety of new forms of procedure involving citizen participation. This is known as participatory technology assessment (PTA). These evaluation offices¹⁷ are responsible for preparing the ground for discussions of complex scientific and technological questions for political or economic decision makers, and sometimes for public information. Technology assessment (TA) has its limits, notably when faced with public opposition and fears, and in relation to questions of normative legitimacy, standardization, values and other aspects falling within the sphere of the humanities and social sciences. Unfortunately, representatives of these fields are generally absent from these spaces. For certain controversial scientific and technological decisions, the exclusive advice of experts¹⁸, even of differing opinions, considered by political and economic experts, the resources of simple scientific vulgarization for the general public, or the communication processes involved in mediation¹⁹ to make industrial and technical projects acceptable to the public, appear to be insufficient. If, at the end, the final decision is made by political representatives, a desire is sometimes expressed by them to involve a broader range of actors in debates concerning controversial technological objects. Note that, in France, the law of 27 February 2002²⁰ on local democracy may be applied to situations of this type. Experiments have been carried out on a reduced scale, showing that an articulation between the different worlds of science and technology is possible, taking the form of technology assessment (TA). Different approaches have resulted in the creation of spaces for discussion between actors with a wide range of capacities, using a variety of communicational regimes (narration, interpretation, argumentation and reconstruction)²¹.

This new and innovative domain of political experimentation, a premise of RRI, may be considered as a socio-political laboratory, and has presented a certain number of justifications, mixing the uncertainty of scientific expertise, or at the least its inability to respond to certain questions concerning the potential risks associated with these new controversial technologies²² and the plurality of perspectives, sometimes including deeply entrenched opposing positions, as much within disciplines and scientific communities or interests as between these concerned groups. Normative uncertainty is added to the existing cognitive²³ and practical²⁴ uncertainty²⁵. This tripartite characterization is typical in the fields of PTA and RRI. However, the tenets of these domains do not enter into the details of scientific uncertainties to give greater precision; this situation will be discussed in Chapter 4. Furthermore, uncertainties in PTA and RRI are subject to the constraint of plurality, factually (de facto) and legally (de jure), in the context of dual scientific and ethical assessments of controversial technologies.

I.2. Precaution and pluralisms

As we have seen already, questioning regarding the consequences of technological innovations for the society and the environment is not a new development. Over 50 years ago, Hans Jonas was already considering this idea in the light of a turnaround between theory and practice²⁶. It led to a radicalization of philosophical approaches; in this area, the difficulties involved with excessively large scales, excessively long chains of causality and probabilities which are difficult, if not impossible, to establish had already been noted, for example, by philosophers such as Hume²⁷ or, more recently, Simmel²⁸. The same goes for Mill’s chains of arguments²⁹.

Kant himself, a philosopher of limits who created a framework of three essential questions, appears excessively optimistic in our modern context. What may I hope? and What can I know? have no obvious solutions in the context of issues such as GMO, and the answer to a third question, What must I do?, is even harder to obtain.

Should we, then, simply adopt a form of minimum ethics, which Jonas would have referred to as stuffing? Must we simply use biodegradable laws and regulations, changeable with each technological evolution in order to avoid hindering the realization of new possibilities? Is technology the destiny of politics, as suggested by Jonas? Should the advancement of politics be subject to the pressure of different lobbies, in favor of, or opposed to, a given technology? May we envisage a form of civic or civil public debate?

Refusing to give in to fear, we may wish to qualify Jonas’ dramatic statements, which are somewhat apocalyptic and superior, to use Kant’s term, further developed by Derrida³⁰. Admittedly, Jonas’ remarks are valid in relation to the insufficiency of traditional ethics, or ethics he considers to be merely stuffing in the face of perceived threats. The philosophies of Aristotle, Kant, Heidegger and Levinas, amongst others, have also been justly criticized in a more recent work by Peter Kemp on the ethics of techniques, L’irremplaçable. Une éthique technologique ³¹. These ethics, important contributions in the history of philosophy, apply to intersubjective relationships between contemporaries, often present in the flesh, for small actions on a small scale with limited effects, and not via the medium of technological objects, however simple. Moreover, these ethics do not consider socio-technical relationships and their variations. We must also consider the fact that techniques have changed³², as demonstrated by Gilbert Simondon, an original philosopher of techniques, who divided the period into four³³, each resulting in phase shifts and changes in the evolutionary rhythm. Simondon took an optimistic view and hoped that rebalancing would occur. Jonas, however, in his reflections on the history of relationships between techniques, power, knowledge and responsibility, did not take this view. For Jonas, molecular biology represented a revolution (in the original sense of the term); whereas technology had previously been human’s ally against nature, this development brought human into conflict with technology, making him a potential object of manipulation.

One thesis defended by Jonas in The Imperative of Responsibility highlights a number of problems, which are still relevant today: this thesis concerns the need for an ethics of technology, focused on the future, which takes things that are yet to happen into account and where the technology is the object of differing judgments, ranging from strongly positive to apocalyptic. Jonas also considered futurology to be impossible for scientists, further complicating the task.

Another possible position is that of enlightened catastrophism, as described by Jean-Pierre Dupuy³⁴, amongst others, in his critique of the precautionary principle, partly inspired by Jonas. However, this approach is not inevitable. The precautionary principle, when understood correctly, notably in relation to selecting the most complete formulations, validated by legitimate authorities following long negotiations, as seen in the Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle of February 2, 2000, provides a framework which may be used to extend Jonas’ reflection. This principle allows for the use of a political element, which Jonas, despite his audacity, considered too difficult³⁵. Certain commentators have labeled Jonas an anti-democrat. The philosopher Marie-Hélène Parizeau, for example, writes: On a political level, his choices support the notion of government by experts, rather than democracy³⁶. At best, Jonas felt that power should be given only to experts, the only individuals able to take the necessary decisions, rather than to politicians, subject to the rules of democracy and to a short life expectancy, i.e. the duration of their mandates. Electors also tend to make their evaluations based on a short-term view, without looking beyond the immediate future and with a very limited global vision.

The precautionary principle, on the other hand, has its roots in the wish to avoid any serious and/or irreversible damage, occurring within a much longer temporal window. It presents the advantage of connecting the political world in which decisions are made with the scientific worlds in which facts are established, in situations with a high level of uncertainty, where it is not possible to establish probabilities. It promotes the creation of public institutions with the capacity to handle new technological challenges, and constitutes one of the pillars of European politics. Since 2005, it has formed part of the Environmental Charter appended to the French Constitution. The precautionary principle was also a key motivating factor in the creation of certain institutions, such as the Commission nationale du débat public (National Commission for Public Debate), participating in the renewal of public policies, in increasing participation as promoted by RRI and in exploring new forms of democracy. This commission draws its legitimacy directly from the precautionary principle³⁷, and was first established by the Barnier laws in 1995. These laws also concern the principle of public information and participation in the context of large projects³⁸. A notable project of this type was the ambitious ITER, International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (2006)³⁹, research project on nuclear fusion, discussed at a local level in towns around the intended site at Cadarache, in the south of France, selected following long and detailed international negotiations.

The precautionary principle differs from prevention, in that the establishment of facts is not certain, but there is a strong suspicion that a serious and/or irreversible damage may occur. This principle removes the need to wait for a conclusive scientific proof before taking action, or, more precisely, as we shall see in Chapter 4, to plan for further research before deciding on a course of action. Considering the complexity of establishing scientific facts and probabilities, we enter the realm of epistemic pluralism and hypotheses relating to the understanding of the phenomena in question. This pluralism concerns both the epistemic values that guarantee the quality of the knowledge in question, and the elements included in, or excluded from, the establishment of probabilities, or when probabilities cannot be established, for the scenarios in question⁴⁰.

Another problem facing PTA and RRI concerns the management of plurality. Plurality is increasingly important in our society, alongside high levels of specialization in knowledge. This plurality, as discussed in La démocratie génétiquement modifiée⁴¹, directly concerns the quality and evaluation criteria used in PTA – and thus in RRI – in which the term pluralism is used in an imprecise manner. In criteriology, pluralism (normative) is often equated with plurality (descriptive) rather than receiving separate consideration, which leads to a specific approach to managing plurality. Plurality should be used to refer to facts, whilst pluralism indicates a type of treatment opposed to both relativism and monism, as we shall see in Chapters 1 and 2. Whilst excessive plurality or radical pluralism can pose a threat to the stability of a society, both concepts also constitute guarantors and requirements of a democratic society, at different levels⁴². Ethical pluralism is often presented as a pluralism of values (Chapter 1); however, we shall also consider its place in practical judgment, and within normative ethical theories, which may guide or justify evaluations (Chapter 2). These may be individual or public, ex post or ex ante.

Thus far, we have discussed the notion of ethical pluralism. However, the term moral pluralism is more widespread in published literature on the subject; many philosophers use the term moral in preference to ethical and ethics. Certain philosophers go so far as to refuse to distinguish between the two and claim that they cannot be separated in a satisfactory manner⁴³. Our position, as set out in DGM, based on published literature and debates in moral philosophy, remains unchanged. Etymology is not helpful in this case, as the roots of the two words are direct equivalents in Greek and Latin. Philosophical usage is not always helpful either, as different philosophers have used the terms morality and ethics in different ways, some directly opposed to others. In France, there is a tendency to prefer the term ethics in order to avoid connotations of moralism, but both terms may be used to denote an object or area of study relating to various, and often contradictory, forms of the good, the just or other normative concepts⁴⁴, via the difficulty of choice, the meaning of life, rules for justification, the definition of principles or even the definition of moral sentiments. However, whether the term ethics or morality is used, there is a general distinction in usage between different levels, with (1) mores, which seem straightforward, (2) the order of more or less generalized shared references, (3) questions applied to specific domains, (4) moral theories and (5) meta-ethics. Items (4) and (5) are more reflexive in nature. More commonly, a distinction may be made between (a) applied ethics (3), (b) normative ethics (with moral theories) (4) and (c) meta-ethics (5), even if a level of permeability is accepted.

For example, using the final three levels, when considering the ethical legitimacy of a certain type of GM maize (applied ethics), several means of justifying one’s position (using various normative theories) should be considered, whilst attempting to establish the requisites for justification (meta-ethics).

In many cases, particularly in the context of motivations, our moral intuitions are sufficient to establish a correct course of action, particularly within a very limited time frame. In other situations, intuitions may be unstable, or further reflection may be required. This is particularly true of complex and controversial cases, where spontaneous judgments and intuition may leave us uncertain, confused and/or in disagreement with the opinions of others⁴⁵. In the case of controversial technologies, for example, the moral intuitions of some individuals are alarmed, whilst others consider the problem to be minimum or non-existent.

In these situations, we move beyond the initial level of morality and into the field of ethics for the purposes of justification. PTA and RRI are almost exclusively concerned with this context, which may be radical if it is made up in a pluralist manner. In this work, we shall focus on levels (b) and (c) of ethical theories and meta-ethics.

I.3. Informed decisions and shaping decisions

Across the fields of science, ethics and politics, PTA and RRI are concerned with the sensitive issue of the relationship between information and decisions. Let us consider the case of a typical format used in PTA and sometimes considered for RRI: a consensus, or citizens’, conference⁴⁶. The panel of citizens is not a representative entity in statistical or legal terms, and the participants are not decision makers in the full and legitimate sense of the term. Therefore, this group of citizens does not make the ultimate decision⁴⁷. However, it must produce a report based on discussions with experts, and thus makes certain decisions, at the very least in terms of writing the report. The specification for consensus conferences requests that the responses to questions be noted, alongside the recommendations of the panel. Note that this task is taken seriously, despite the fact that it is less precisely regulated than a court jury, which certain analysts have held up as a comparable entity⁴⁸.

The relationship between information and decisions was considered very early on by Jürgen Habermas, when he was interested by the context of the technological question⁴⁹, within the framework of relationships between specialist knowledge and politics⁵⁰. These relationships were presented in the form of three models. They remain valid for analytical purposes, and are often implicitly present in work on PTA and RRI.

Using the first, technocratic model, the responsibility for the initiative is devolved to scientific analysis and technical planning, to the detriment of the political authority, which becomes simply the executory organism⁵¹.

The second model, Hobbesian, then Weberian⁵², contrary to the first model, draws a clear distinction between the functions of experts and those of politicians⁵³. Decisions may be exempted to a requirement for justification presented in the form of a public discussion. This model is thus decisionist, and broadly Weberian⁵⁴; the democratic will ultimately consists of certain elites taking turns in power, according to an acclamatory process weighted in their favor. The irrational essence of domination may thus be legitimized, but not rationalized. Political action would constitute a choice between certain orders of values and certain religious beliefs⁵⁵, which are in competition, without the need for a rational basis. In this case, the rationality involved in the choice of method would go hand in hand with the declared irrationality of the stances adopted in relation to values, aims and requirements.

The third, pragmatist model, inspired by John Dewey, involves a critical interrelation between the functions of experts and politicians, refusing the decisionist dissociation of facts and values⁵⁶. Habermas took a pragmatic approach to the confrontation of value systems, reflections of social interests and technical possibilities, alongside the strategic methods needed to satisfy these systems. Defending the need for a translation combining both technical and practical knowledge, he established the lineaments of his theory of communicative action, taking a more hermeneutical approach than Dewey. Habermas considered Dewey to be too naïve and too confident in the existence of good will and common sense, whereby technologies, strategies and the orientations of different social groups, marked by interests in relation to certain values, would work together for their mutual benefit. Habermas also disagreed with Dewey’s view that public opinion is not excessively complex⁵⁷.

We feel that Habermas was unnecessarily critical on this point. For Dewey, the necessary public articulation is a long process, requiring sufficient time to reach a full awareness of the possible consequences of the activities of other groups. Dewey attempted to constitute a public based precisely on the fact of being affected by the consequences of technologies. Dewey also proposed a weighty Theory of Enquiry⁵⁸, for use in identifying and evaluating these consequences, which are often unexpected. To this end, social inquests must be carried out with the same dedication and precision used in experiments in the natural and engineering sciences, in order to identify consequences and attempt to prevent or plan for them; watching activity, carried out by qualified civil servants, is also necessary in Dewey’s definition of the State.

The relationship established between technological consequences and certain publics is, therefore, not new, and is at the heart of the theory of pragmatism, an important one in social sciences, in the version given by John Dewey in 1927.

Habermas preferred the third and final of these types of relationships between information and decisions. His ideal was a controlled translation of technical knowledge into practical knowledge⁵⁹, the only possibility allowing for communication of individuals to retake possession of knowledge, with the potential to result in certain consequences, in their own language.

This point is still used by analysts in PTA and RRI, notably in the sociology of science and technology, and in public policy analysis, making implicit use of the third open pathway.

Nonetheless, Habermas’ proposition is still too general, and not sufficiently refined for PTA and RRI. A clearer picture of the passage from information to decision in the third version would be beneficial. In his Theory of Communicative Action⁶⁰, and with the theory of deliberative democracy, which some tenets refer to him, Habermas defended the importance of argumentation. However, paradoxically, his definition of arguments, like those of the majority of proponents of this theory, is incomplete⁶¹. How, then, is it possible to claim, in practice and based on real cases, that the best argument has won, particularly when confronted with the heterogeneous nature of different disciplines and arguments? These questions will be considered in much detail in Chapters 3 and 6.

Although it does not solve the decision issue, Habermas’ strategy may be useful in bringing disagreements to light, and in envisaging three types of relationships between the scientific, political and, to a lesser extent, ethical spheres⁶². The first type is reductionist, and it favors the sciences. The second, inversely, gives an advantage to the political sphere. The third places the emphasis on common sense, following a translation process. Habermas does not, therefore, make use of the resources of moral philosophy; in this case the moral philosophy resources are elements that will be used extensively in this book.

Spaces, which Dewey and Habermas could only have dreamed of, with the third version of the relationship between information and decisions, have existed within the context of PTA for over 30 years, and should be forthcoming for RRI. These specific meetings have, we feel, been created due to the limitations of the two other solutions when faced with certain technological choices.

Surprisingly, seen against the background of the analysis of these experiments, with a greater weight given to risk evaluation, citizens tend, initially, to express a form of nostalgia for the simple, technical response produced by the first form of the relationship between techniques and decisions, with politically neutral decisions being made by experts. Nowadays, populations are used to the specialization of knowledge and a certain form of science.

The same is true of conflicts resulting from ethical considerations. For some individuals, ethics, or their morals, constitute a basis or foundation for rejecting certain techniques. Experts and citizens thus share the desire for simple ethical responses, particularly if they have not had the opportunity to fully apprehend the complexity and dimensions of problems from this perspective.

The current context has resulted in certain shifts, further complicating the limits of a descriptive rationality of facts, abandoning questions of evaluation and prescription in favor of decisionist principles, and further reducing the rational capacity⁶³, which should be applied. In citizens’ conferences, for example, the Habermasian problem of dual translations between techniques and practice is not the only question. Technical expertise itself is now less certain. Paradoxically, nonscientists have an increasing tendency to make strong peremptory assertions, whilst scientists are increasingly cautious.

We must also take account of tension due to partial anticipation, which arises between requirements and technological responses. We therefore need to translate the understanding of an issue expressed in probabilistic terms, between disciplines, or between theories within disciplines, in addition to the approach described by Habermas. For this reason, citizens and experts are confronted with scientific uncertainty, which is, furthermore, associated with conflicts; more rarely, these issues also raise ethical dilemmas that need to be formulated and resolved.

We therefore need to move from relationships between information and decisions to a more thorough formation of decisions, in a two-way communication between ethics and science, with a more demanding and more precise approach to components, such as organisms⁶⁴ or arguments (Chapter 6).

I.4. Evaluating evaluation

PTA and RRI may themselves be the objects of evaluation, as there are different solutions to the questions discussed above. All too often, the problems in question were not anticipated. The evaluation of participation is complicated, and rarely carried out in a transparent manner⁶⁵; the evaluation of evaluation is even more important. Evaluation as a whole is a complex action, and it may concern:

1) Coherency, compatibility, conformity or identity between a standard (or a template or model) and an object (or a phenomenon, or an event). The recorded differences may be measured