Gathering Of Human Intelligence In Counter-Insurgency Warfare:: The French Experience During The Battle Of Algiers (January-October 1957)

By Major Hervé Pierre

If in a short-term perspective the battle of Algiers was an operational success since the terrorist attacks ended by the of fall 1957, the different methods used to gather intelligence proved to be strategically counterproductive and left an open wound on the French Society.

In 1956, both internal and international political situations favored the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN). In August, during a clandestine meeting in the Soummam valley (Kabylie), the FLN decided to direct the fighting against the European population in urban areas. Such an intensification of the conflict was aimed at winning a decisive battle: bringing the terror to Algiers was perceived as the last step before the independence.

Facing a paralysis of regular courses of action, the French reacted to the terrorist wave by giving the military extraordinary police powers. Jacques Massu’s 10th Para Division implemented radical methods. From 20 January to 31 March 1957, it succeeded in disorganizing the whole insurgency (first battle). However, the tactical victory against terrorism was as blatant as it proved to be short-lived. Facing a resuming tactical threat, General Massu entrusted Colonel Yves Godard with the AOR of Algiers (second battle). If the first battle was fought using bloody swords, the second one, based on infiltration and disinformation operations, proved to be a surgical operation using scalpels. On 8 October 1957, the battle of Algiers ended.

In a blurred conflict that belonged neither to police operations nor to conventional war, the legal black hole ineluctably led to the temptation of committing illegal acts. Paul Aussarresses and Yves Godard embodied the two opposite approaches that are distinguishable during the battle. Pushing the justification of illegal violence to the limit, Aussarresses represents the dark face of COIN operations while Godard repeatedly stated that there was no need to use torture.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Tannenberg Publishing
• Release date: Nov 6, 2015
• ISBN: 9781786253477

Major Hervé Pierre

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Text originally published in 2009 under the same title.

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Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.

We have also made every effort to include all maps and illustrations of the original edition the limitations of formatting do not allow of including larger maps, we will upload as many of these maps as possible.

GATHERING OF HUMAN INTELLIGENCE IN COUNTER-INSURGENCY WARFARE: THE FRENCH EXPERIENCE DURING THE BATTLE OF ALGIERS

(JANUARY-OCTOBER 1957).

by

Major Hervé Pierre, French Troupes de Marine

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS 4

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5

Thesis 5

Discussion 5

Conclusion 6

PREFACE 7

BATTLE OF ALGIERS OR BATTLE FOR ALGERIA 9

1956: The Progresses of the Rebellion 9

A person killed in Algiers will cause a more important scandal… 9

First Attacks, First Fears: the Spiral of Violence 11

THE SWORD AND THE SCALPEL, THE TWO BATTLES OF ALGIERS 14

Calling For the Centurions. 14

The Sword: The First Battle of Algiers 15

The Scalpel: The Second Battle of Algiers 17

HUMAN INTELLIGENCE OR INHUMAN INTELLIGENCE 19

Aussaresses versus Godard 19

Trivialization of Ordinary Violence or Institutionalization of Torture? 20

Winning the Battle, Losing the War: the Counter-productive Effects 22

Conclusion 24

Bibliography 25

English Sources 25

Books: 25

Student Theses 25

Articles 25

French Sources 26

Books: 26

Student Theses 27

Articles 27

Military publications 27

Films 28

REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 28

APPENDIX A: MAPS 29

1—Algiers in Algeria 29

2—The Casbah in Algiers (1956) 30

APPENDIX B: INSURGENCY NETWORKS 31

1—FLN Administrative and Political Organization. 31

2—ALN Military Organization. 32

3—ALN Bomb Network. 32

APPENDIX C: THE FRENCH QUADRILLAGE 33

APPENDIX D: BIOGRAPHIES 34

General Jacques MASSU (1908—2002) 34

Colonel Yves Godard (1911—1975) 36

General Paul Aussaresses (born in 1918). 37

Colonel Roger Trinquier (1908—1986) 39

Saadi Yacef (born January 20, 1928) 41

Charles Lacheroy (1906—2005) 42

APPENDIX E: CHRONOLOGY 43

1954 43

1956 43

1957 43

1962 44

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Thesis

If in a short-term perspective the battle of Algiers was an operational success since the terrorist attacks ended by the of fall 1957, the different methods used to gather intelligence proved to be strategically counterproductive and left an open wound on the French Society.

Discussion

In 1956, both internal and international political situations favored the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN). In August, during a clandestine meeting in the Soummam valley (Kabylie), the FLN decided to direct the fighting against the European population in urban areas. Such an intensification of the conflict was aimed at winning a decisive battle: bringing the terror to Algiers was perceived as the last step before the independence.

Facing a paralysis of regular courses of action, the French reacted to the terrorist wave by giving the military extraordinary police powers. Jacques Massu’s 10th Para Division implemented radical methods. From 20 January to 31 March 1957, it succeeded in disorganizing the whole insurgency (first battle). However, the tactical victory against terrorism was as blatant as it proved to be short-lived. Facing a resuming tactical threat, General Massu entrusted Colonel Yves Godard with the AOR of Algiers (second