President Truman And (The Challenge Of) The Potsdam Conference 1945

By Col. Uwe F. Jansohn

This monograph examines how U.S. President Harry S. Truman was prepared for the Potsdam Conference from 17 July to 2 August 1945 which is seen as a crucial turning point in modern history. Reviewing his preparations and assessing his actions during the actual conference allows one to examine whether Truman had a strategy for the Potsdam Conference in 1945 with achievable objectives. This monograph argues that Truman did have a strategy for the Potsdam Conference, which was coordinated with Roosevelt’s former advisors, the Department of State, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Nevertheless, this strategy diverged from Roosevelt’s original intent. Truman’s goals were not achieved in their entirety as the new President found himself confronted by the challenges of international policy and had to adapt his strategy during the conference for various reasons.

The method used in this monograph to analyze the U.S. strategy towards the Potsdam Conference is drawn from the contemporary U.S. design methodology outlined in Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. There does not exist one comprehensive document which provided Truman a strategic approach for the conference in understanding the ends, ways, and means that was clearly defined. The monograph shows, that the preparing papers were more a conglomeration of documents containing a mix of background information, objectives, and ideas. Using the design methodology, the monograph will emulate a strategy, as it could have been formulated by Truman advisors in 1945. Having this strategy the monograph evaluates the events of the Potsdam conference day by day and assesses the reasons why there was a requirement for an adjustment in Truman’s strategy during the conference and why he changed his course of action. The monograph also provides an assessment of whether Truman had an opportunity to avoid the start of the Cold War in Potsdam.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Lucknow Books
• Release date: Nov 6, 2015
• ISBN: 9781786254108

Col. Uwe F. Jansohn

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Text originally published in 2013 under the same title.

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Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.

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PRESIDENT TRUMAN AND (THE CHALLENGE OF) THE POTSDAM CONFERENCE 1945

by

COL(GS) Uwe F. Jansohn, German Army

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS 4

ABSTRACT 5

ILLUSTRATIONS 6

INTRODUCTION 7

REVIEW OF LITERATURE 11

From Roosevelt to Truman—The Development of a Strategy for the Potsdam Conference 13

General 13

The Actors 14

Relevant History: The Yalta Agreement 20

Description of the Strategic Environment 21

Churchill’s Strategic Approach 22

Stalin’s Strategic Approach 24

The U.S. End State 28

Defining the Problem Truman Faced 28

Peace Negotiations and Territorial Settlements 29

How to End the War with Japan? 30

How to Deal with the Poland Problem and the other Eastern Europe States Who Were Occupied by the Soviet Union? 31

How to Deal with the Defeated Germany 33

Morgenthau Plan 33

Reparations 34

How to Build a Functioning Allied Administration for Germany 35

How to Deal with the Economic Support for Great Britain and the Soviet Union? 36

The Problem Statement 36

Truman’s Strategic Approach 37

Line of Effort: Peace Negotiations 38

Line of Effort: Handling of Germany 38

Handling of Eastern Europe 39

Handling of Further European Issues 40

Handling of the Middle and Far East 40

Summary 41

THE POTSDAM CONFERENCE 42

17 July 1945 43

18 July 1945 44

19 July 1945 44

20 July 1945 45

21 July 1945 45

22 July 1945 47

23 July 1945 47

24 July 1945 48

25 July 1945 49

26 July 1945 49

27 July 1945 50

28 July 1945 50

29 July 1945 51

30 July 1945 51

31 July 1945 52

1 August 1945 52

TRUMAN’S ADAPTATION—AN ASSESSMENT 55

APPENDIX 61

Truman’s Strategic Approach 61

REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 69

BIBLIOGRAPHY 70

Archival Sources 70

Published Primary Sources 70

Memoirs 70

Secondary Sources 70

ABSTRACT

This monograph examines how U.S. President Harry S. Truman was prepared for the Potsdam Conference from 17 July to 2 August 1945 which is seen as a crucial turning point in modern history. Reviewing his preparations and assessing his actions during the actual conference allows one to examine whether Truman had a strategy for the Potsdam Conference in 1945 with achievable objectives. This monograph argues that Truman did have a strategy for the Potsdam Conference, which was coordinated with Roosevelt’s former advisors, the Department of State, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Nevertheless, this strategy diverged from Roosevelt’s original intent. Truman’s goals were not achieved in their entirety as the new President found himself confronted by the challenges of international policy and had to adapt his strategy during the conference for various reasons.

The method used in this monograph to analyze the U.S. strategy towards the Potsdam Conference is drawn from the contemporary U.S. design methodology outlined in Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. There does not exist one comprehensive document which provided Truman a strategic approach for the conference in understanding the ends, ways, and means that was clearly defined. The monograph shows, that the preparing papers were more a conglomeration of documents containing a mix of background information, objectives, and ideas. Using the design methodology, the monograph will emulate a strategy, as it could have been formulated by Truman advisors in 1945. Having this strategy the monograph evaluates the events of the Potsdam conference day by day and assesses the reasons why there was a requirement for an adjustment in Truman’s strategy during the conference and why he changed his course of action. The monograph also provides an assessment of whether Truman had an opportunity to avoid the start of the Cold War in Potsdam.

ILLUSTRATIONS

Truman’s Strategic Approach.

Line of Effort Peach Negotiation.

Line of Effort: Handling of Germany—Political.

Line of Effort: Handling of Germany—Economy, Social, Infrastructure, Information.

Line of Effort: Handling of Eastern Europe—Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary.

Line of Effort: Handling of Eastern Europe—Austria, Italy, Yugoslavia.

Line of Effort: Handling of Eastern Europe—Miscellaneous.

Line of Effort: Handling of the Middle and Far East.

INTRODUCTION

I reached the White House about 5:25 P.M. and was immediately taken in the elevator to the second floor and ushered into Mrs. Roosevelt’s study... I knew at once that something unusual had taken place. Mrs. Roosevelt seemed calm in her characteristic, graceful dignity. She stepped forward and placed her hand gently about my shoulder. ‘Harry,’ she said quietly, ‘the President is dead.’ For a moment I could not bring myself to speak. ‘Is there anything I can do for you?’ I asked at last. I shall never forget her deeply understanding reply. ‘Is there anything we can do for your?’ she asked. ‘For you are the one in trouble now.’—Harry S. Truman, Memoirs {1}

When Vice President Harry S. Truman heard Mrs. Roosevelt’s serious reply on 12 April 1945, it became clear to him that the trouble Mrs. Roosevelt mentioned would not be far away. President Roosevelt had died. Brought aboard on the democratic ticket as Vice President at a last minute, Truman had little expertise in foreign affairs. Dennis Merrill described Truman as, sixty years of age, gray and bespectacled, and of shorter than average height, he seemed an accidental president—only badly miscast for his role.{2} Yet Truman soon put his own stamp on the Presidency, so much that a lot of historians typically refer to his years in the White House from 1945 to 1953 as the ‘Truman Era’. Above all, the Truman years were a time of profound and historic change. The accidental president oversaw the end of World War II, the drawing of the atomic age, America’s embrace of new international responsibilities, and the origins of the Soviet-American Cold War.{3}

One of Truman’s first important tasks was to attend the Potsdam Conference three months after being sworn into office. There he would meet the Soviet General Secretary Joseph Stalin and the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill for the last great summit of World War II. The Potsdam Conference was held from 16 July to 2 August 1945. The three leaders of the Grand Alliance or the Big Three gathered primarily to decide how to handle the defeated German Reich, which had agreed to unconditional surrender nine weeks earlier. The aims of the conference were the establishment of a post-war order, the coordination of the further course of action for the Far East, and the introduction of a peacemaking and consultative machinery. Despite the fact that the communique, which they issued at the end of the conference, gave the impression of allied unanimity, several critical issues were not decided upon by the three allies. These lingering issues were to be answered by a final peace conference, to be called as soon as possible. Hence, the future of Germany was left open as were several other European problems. All of them would contribute to the beginning of the Cold War in the aftermath. The question of whether Truman and Stalin could have avoided the Cold War in Potsdam engaged historians for the next 60 years.

This monograph examines how the new president, who was a savvy domestic politician with limited experience in foreign affairs, prepared himself for this conference which is seen as a crucial turning point in modern history. Reviewing his preparations and assessing his actions during the actual conference allows one to examine whether Truman had a strategy for the Potsdam Conference in 1945 with achievable objectives. This monograph argues that Truman did have a strategy for the Potsdam Conference, which was coordinated with Roosevelt’s former advisors, the Department of State, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Nevertheless, this strategy diverged from Roosevelt’s original intent. Truman’s goals were not achieved in their entirety as the new President found himself confronted by the challenges of international policy and had to adapt his strategy during the conference for various reasons.

The method used in this monograph to analyze the U.S. strategy towards the Potsdam Conference is drawn from the contemporary U.S. design methodology outlined in Joint Publication 5-0, Joint