Sea-Based Airpower—The Decisive Factor In Expeditionary Operations? Norway 1940, Falkland Islands 1982
()
About this ebook
In April 1940, there were no airfields in central Norway capable of supporting modern, high performance aircraft. As the Norwegian campaign unfolded and the British faced a significant land-based air threat from the Luftwaffe, they failed to appreciate the tactical and operational potential of sea-based aviation. At the same time, British naval aircraft were technically inferior in design and capability compared to their Luftwaffe land-based counterparts in 1940. Nevertheless, despite determined attacks on British naval assets at the tactical level, at the operational level, the German command limited their campaign goals and did not exploit their advantage in the air to the extent possible. Their actions did, however, place great pressure on British sea based lines of communication in central Norway, the operational pivot of the campaign.
In 1982, against the Argentines, the British faced another opponent with superior land-based aviation. Although the British fully appreciated the need for air superiority, they employed a tactical scheme not unlike what had occurred in Norway. Nevertheless, the British were able to successfully contest the airspace above the Falklands and ultimately succeeded in defeating Argentine ground forces and ejecting them from the islands.
Major Willard A. Buhl
See Book Description
Related to Sea-Based Airpower—The Decisive Factor In Expeditionary Operations? Norway 1940, Falkland Islands 1982
Related ebooks
9 April 1940 German Invasion Of Norway - The Dawn Of Decisive Airpower During Joint Military Operations Rating: 5 out of 5 stars5/5Forcible Entry And The German Invasion Of Norway, 1940 Rating: 3 out of 5 stars3/5British Artillery During Operation Corporate Rating: 5 out of 5 stars5/5Airborne Assault On Holland [Illustrated Edition] Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsNo Shells, No Attack! - The Use Of Fire Support By 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines During The 1982 Falkland Islands War Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsTaranto: And Naval Air Warfare in the Mediterranean, 1940–1945 Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsThe Influence Of British Operational Intelligence On The War At Sea In The Mediterranean June 1940 - November 1942 Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsThe U-Boat War in the Atlantic, 1944–1945 Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsA New Look At The Battle Of The Atlantic Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsThe AAF In The Invasion Of Southern France [Illustrated Edition] Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsA Study Of The Aerial Interdiction of Railways During The Korean War Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsImplementing New Strategy In Combat: Ira C. Eaker 1942-1943 Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsA Photographic History of Airborne Warfare, 1939–1945 Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsThe U.S. Marines And Amphibious War: Its Theory, And Its Practice In The Pacific Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5The Practice Of Operational Art In Operation Weserübung: The German Invasion Of Norway 1940 Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsTHE ADMIRALTIES - Operations Of The 1st Cavalry Division 29 February - 18 May 1944 [Illustrated Edition] Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsHow the RAF & USAAF Beat the Luftwaffe Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsMarine Close Air Support In World War II Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsFleet Air Arm Carrier War: The History of British Naval Aviation Rating: 3 out of 5 stars3/5Marines In World War II - The Defense Of Wake [Illustrated Edition] Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsThe Royal Navy and the Falklands War Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5North Sea Battleground: The War and Sea, 1914–1918 Rating: 2 out of 5 stars2/5Self-Inflicted Wound: Allied Defeat In Crete, May 1941 Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsThe Battle of Britain Pocket Manual 1940 Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsThe Normandy Air War, 1944 Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsLiberating Europe: D-Day to Victory in Europe, 1944–1945 Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Leaping The Atlantic Wall - Army Air Forces Campaigns In Western Europe, 1942-1945 [Illustrated Edition] Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratings
Wars & Military For You
Churchill's Ministry of Ungentlemanly Warfare: The Mavericks Who Plotted Hitler's Defeat Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5The Art of War Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Sun Tzu's The Art of War: Bilingual Edition Complete Chinese and English Text Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5The God Delusion Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Doctors From Hell: The Horrific Account of Nazi Experiments on Humans Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5A Daily Creativity Journal Rating: 3 out of 5 stars3/5Killing the SS: The Hunt for the Worst War Criminals in History Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Mein Kampf: The Original, Accurate, and Complete English Translation Rating: 0 out of 5 stars0 ratingsUnit 731: Testimony Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5God Is Not One: The Eight Rival Religions That Run the World--and Why Their Differences Matter Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Masters of the Air: America's Bomber Boys Who Fought the Air War Against Nazi Germany Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Blitzed: Drugs in the Third Reich Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5The Only Plane in the Sky: An Oral History of 9/11 Rating: 5 out of 5 stars5/5The Girls of Atomic City: The Untold Story of the Women Who Helped Win World War II Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Art of War: The Definitive Interpretation of Sun Tzu's Classic Book of Strategy Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Unacknowledged: An Expose of the World's Greatest Secret Rating: 5 out of 5 stars5/5The Art of War & Other Classics of Eastern Philosophy Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5The Wager Disaster: Mayem, Mutiny and Murder in the South Seas Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5The Doomsday Machine: Confessions of a Nuclear War Planner Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5The Last Kingdom Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Resistance: The Warsaw Ghetto Uprising Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5"The Good War": An Oral History of World War II Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5Band of Brothers: E Company, 506th Regiment, 101st Airborne from Normandy to Hitler's Eagle's Nest Rating: 5 out of 5 stars5/5Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5The Rise of the Fourth Reich: The Secret Societies That Threaten to Take Over America Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5When I Come Home Again: 'A page-turning literary gem' THE TIMES, BEST BOOKS OF 2020 Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich Rating: 4 out of 5 stars4/5
Reviews for Sea-Based Airpower—The Decisive Factor In Expeditionary Operations? Norway 1940, Falkland Islands 1982
0 ratings0 reviews
Book preview
Sea-Based Airpower—The Decisive Factor In Expeditionary Operations? Norway 1940, Falkland Islands 1982 - Major Willard A. Buhl
This edition is published by PICKLE PARTNERS PUBLISHING—www.picklepartnerspublishing.com
To join our mailing list for new titles or for issues with our books – picklepublishing@gmail.com
Or on Facebook
Text originally published in 2002 under the same title.
© Pickle Partners Publishing 2015, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted by any means, electrical, mechanical or otherwise without the written permission of the copyright holder.
Publisher’s Note
Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.
We have also made every effort to include all maps and illustrations of the original edition the limitations of formatting do not allow of including larger maps, we will upload as many of these maps as possible.
SEA-BASED AIRPOWER—THE DECISIVE FACTOR IN EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS?
NORWAY 1940
FALKLAND ISLANDS 1982
by
Major Willard A. Buhl
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Contents
TABLE OF CONTENTS 4
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5
Thesis 5
Discussion 5
Conclusions 5
METHODOLOGY 7
INTRODUCTION 8
CHAPTER I—THE NORWEGIAN CAMPAIGN 1940 9
Strategic Considerations 9
Operational Planning 12
Role and Effectiveness of Airpower 14
Lessons Learned 20
Conclusions 23
CHAPTER II—SEA-BASED AIR POWER AND AIR SUPERIORITY IN THE FALKLANDS WAR OF 1982 26
British Invasion Force 28
Operational Planning 31
Role and Effectiveness of Airpower 33
Lessons Learned 36
CHAPTER III—CONCLUSION: LESSONS LEARNED 40
Dénouement 41
REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 43
BIBLIOGRAPHY 44
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Thesis
This essay examines the British use of sea-based aviation in support of two modern amphibious campaigns: the British campaign in Norway in 1940 and in the Falkland Islands War in 1982. The purpose is to determine whether or not aircraft carriers (sea-based aviation) were at the root of the success or failure of British efforts.
Discussion
In April 1940, there were no airfields in central Norway capable of supporting modern, high performance aircraft. As the Norwegian campaign unfolded and the British faced a significant land-based air threat from the Luftwaffe, they failed to appreciate the tactical and operational potential of sea-based aviation. At the same time, British naval aircraft were technically inferior in design and capability compared to their Luftwaffe land-based counterparts in 1940. Nevertheless, despite determined attacks on British naval assets at the tactical level, at the operational level, the German command limited their campaign goals and did not exploit their advantage in the air to the extent possible. Their actions did, however, place great pressure on British sea based lines of communication in central Norway, the operational pivot of the campaign.
In 1982, against the Argentines, the British faced another opponent with superior land-based aviation. Although the British fully appreciated the need for air superiority, they employed a tactical scheme not unlike what had occurred in Norway. Nevertheless, the British were able to successfully contest the airspace above the Falklands and ultimately succeeded in defeating Argentine ground forces and ejecting them from the islands.
Conclusions
In Norway the British were able to execute successful counter-landings in northern and central Norway in April 1940. In the far north (Narvik area), where their forces could operate at the extreme range of German land-based airpower, the British achieved tactical success and periods of local air superiority. In central Norway (Trondheim area), the operational pivot of their campaign, they were unable to sustain their forces ashore which were exposed to continuous and energetic German air operations.
{1} The British logistical situation became desperate when the Luftwaffe destroyed the two principle ports supporting landing force operations in central Norway. The Luftwaffe enjoyed air supremacy in central Norway due to a complete absence of allied antiaircraft weapons ashore and an Allied air defense that was limited to warships and British carrier-borne aircraft. The British carrier task force commander, Vice Admiral Wells, positioned his two carriers, Ark Royal and Glorious, 120 miles off the coast of Norway. Wells was not confident his embarked aircraft could sufficiently protect his carriers from German land-based aircraft, and ordered operational constraints to ensure the survivability of his aircraft carriers. With the British unable to contest the air, the ground forces ashore could not be sustained.
In the Falklands in 1982, the British again faced an enemy with numerically superior land-based airpower. Employing tactics similar to those used in the Norwegian campaign in 1940, the British task force commander, Vice Admiral John Woodward, positioned his two carriers, Invincible and Hermes, at the extreme eastern end of the tactical engagement area. The carriers’ position allowed only 20-minutes time on station for the limited number of embarked Harriers. Although not optimal for combat air patrol over the task force and close air support for operations ashore, the British Harriers were able to gain and maintain air parity, and destroyed enough of their Argentine adversaries to enable successful landings and a successful campaign ashore.
Drawing upon the examples above, certain inferences can be drawn from which certain conclusions may be reached. Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare (EMW) operations and sustainable littoral power projection will require versatile and flexible sea-based airpower. Much as the British expeditionary forces faced land-based airpower threats in Norway in 1940 and the Falkland Islands in 1982, U.S. aircraft carriers will be required to establish local air superiority over the fleet. Whereas land-based aircraft can attack fleets from great distances, current land-based fighters cannot protect the fleet from attack without extended aerial refueling. When air superiority cannot be maintained over the fleet, as evidenced in Norway and the Falklands, naval forces become prey to land-based airpower. Power projection from the sea occurs as a result of