The Evolution of the US-Japan Alliance: The Eagle and the Chrysanthemum

By Matteo Dian

The US-Japan alliance has contributed significantly towards the development of the Japanese security strategy. The Evolution of the US-Japan Alliance explores developments in the alliance between the US and Japan and analyzes the transformation of the Japanese security strategy from 1960 to 2013. It also describes the rise and the decline of Japanese pacifism and of the Yoshida Doctrine, the post war security strategy. Moreover, this book highlights how the end of the Cold War forced Japan to rethink its security strategy and post war pacifism. Japan has abandoned its identity of “peaceful nation, turning itself into a “normal national, drawing closer to the United States.

• Provides readers with a theoretical framework through which they can make sense of the evolutions of the US-Japan alliance and the evolution of the Japanese security strategy throughout post war history
• Provides a comprehensive overview of the shifts in the Japanese security strategies and in the American foreign and security policies in the Asia Pacific region
• Makes extensive use of primary sources
• Addresses main debates on security alliances and security strategies
• Incorporates the latest events such as the American Pivot to Asia

• Language: English
• Publisher: Elsevier Science
• Release date: Aug 26, 2014
• ISBN: 9781780634470

Matteo Dian

Dr. Matteo Dian is a Research Fellow at School of Political Sciences of the University of Bologna. He received his Ph.D. in political science from the Italian Institute of Human Sciences (Scuola Normale Superiore) in Florence. He held visiting positions at University of Oxford, London School of Economics, the Johns Hopkins SAIS (Bologna Center), and the European University Institute. He also taught at the University of Bologna, Ca’ Foscari University in Venice, and at the overseas programs of the James Madison University, Kent State University and Vanderbilt University. He is also author of The Evolution Of The Us-Japan Alliance: The Eagle And The Chrysanthemum (Chandos Books, 2014) and co-editor of The Chinese Challenge To The Western Order (FBK Press, 2014)

Book preview

The Evolution of the US–Japan Alliance

The eagle and the chrysanthemum

Matteo Dian

Table of Contents

Cover image

Title page

Copyright

List of figures and tables

Figures

Tables

List of acronyms

Acknowledgements

About the author

Preface

Timeline of events

1. Asymmetric alliances in theory

Abstract:

Introduction

Security alliances in international relations theory

How alliances evolve: the alliance game

Hypotheses

From theory to history: outline of the book

2. From creation of the alliance to the Nixon Doctrine (1960–9)

Abstract:

Introduction

Perceived threats during the 1960s

The Anpo and creation of the alliance

Japanese defence policies after 1960

Japan and the Vietnam War (1964–9)

Okinawa and American bases in Japan

Diplomacy and the China policy

Conclusion

3. The Pacific alliance during détente (1969–78)

Abstract:

Introduction

Perceived threats during the 1970s

Japanese fear of abandonment and renewal of the alliance

Kokusanka and the pursuit of military autonomy

Japan and the Vietnam War (1969–75)

Omnidirectional diplomacy and opening up to China

Conclusion

4. Renewal of the alliance and normalisation of Japan (1997–2008)

Abstract:

Introduction

Threat perceptions after the Cold War

Renewal of the alliance and the normalisation of Japan

Japanese defence policies after the Cold War

The alliance and ballistic missile defence

Diplomatic coordination and the Six Party Talks

Military cooperation: not the ‘Great Britain of the Far East’

Conclusion

5. The alliance and the American pivot to Asia (2009–2013)

Abstract:

Introduction

Perceived threats 2009–2013

The pivot and the alliance

Japanese normalisation during the pivot

Japan’s new defence policies

North Korea, the Senkaku Islands and diplomatic coordination

Conclusion

6. Conclusion

Abstract:

Bibliography

Index

Copyright

Chandos Publishing

Elsevier Limited

The Boulevard

Langford Lane

Kidlington

Oxford OX5 1GB

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First published in 2014

ISBN: 978-1-84334-766-8 (print)

ISBN: 978-1-78063-447-0 (online)

Library of Congress Control Number: 2014934494

© M. Dian, 2014

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data.

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form, or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise) without the prior written permission of the publisher. This publication may not be lent, resold, hired out or otherwise disposed of by way of trade in any form of binding or cover other than that in which it is published without the prior consent of the publisher. Any person who does any unauthorised act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages.

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Printed in the UK and USA

List of figures and tables

Figures

2.1 Aggregate military expenses 1950–1970  31

2.2 Size of the armed forces 1950–1970  32

2.3 Composite Index of National Capability 1950–1970  35

2.4 SDF active servicemen and US troops deployed in Japan 1950–1969  44

2.5 Japanese military expenses 1951–1969  45

2.6 Japan military expenses as a percentage of GDP 1954–1969  46

3.1 Military expenses 1969–80  72

3.2 Composite index of national capabilities  72

3.3 Size of the armed forces (number of troops)  76

3.4 US troops deployed in Japan  85

3.5 US troops deployed in Asia  86

3.6 Japan military expenditure  92

4.1 Military expenses 1992–2008  110

4.2 US troops deployed in Asia and in Japan  125

Tables

1.1 Synthesis  7

1.2 The alliance game  8

1.3 Balance of threat  14

1.4 Imbalance of threat  15

1.5 Commitment costs and bargaining power  17

1.6 Security dilemma of the alliance and commitment  18

1.7 Second image constructivism  21

List of acronyms

A2AD Anti-Access Area Denial

ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile

ACSA Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement

ASB Air–Sea Battle

ASDF Air Self-Defense Force

ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations

BMD Ballistic Missile Defence

C4ISR Command Control Communications Computing Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CINC Composite Index of National Capability

CLB Cabinet Legislation Bureau and Cabinet Legislative Bureau

COW Correlates of War

DNSA Digital National Security Archive

DPJ Democratic Party of Japan

DPRI Defense Policy Review Initiative

DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)

EEZs Exclusive Economic Zones

FOS Forward Operating Sites

GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GFA Geneva Framework Agreement

GOJ Government of Japan

GSOMIA General Security Of Military Information Agreement

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

ICBM Inter Continental Ballistic Missile

IFSEC Industry Forum for Security Cooperation (US–Japan)

IR International Relations

IRBM Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile

ISR Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance

JASDF Japanese Air Self-Defense Force

JDA Japanese Defense Agency

JGSDF Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force

JMD Japanese Ministry of Defence

JMSDF Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force

JOAC Joint Operational Access Concept

JSDF Japanese Self-Defense Force

JSF Joint Strike Fighter

JSP Joint Socialist Party

LDP Liberal Democratic Party

MITI Ministry of International Trade and Industry

MOBs Main Operating Bases

MSDF Maritime Self-Defence Force

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NDPG National Defence Program Guidelines

NDPO National Defense Program Outline

NIE National Intelligence Estimate

NMD National Missile Defense

NSC National Security Council

NSPD National Security Presidential Directive

NSSD National Security Study Memoranda

ODA Official Development Assistance

OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

PAC Patriot Advanced Capabilities

PKO PeaceKeeping Operations

PLA People’s Liberation Army

PLAAF People’s Liberation Army Air Force

PLAN People’s Liberation Army Navy

PRC People’s Republic of China

RIPS Research Institute for Peace and Security

RMA Revolution in Military Affairs

ROK Republic of Korea (South Korea)

SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

SCC Security Consultative Committee

SDCF Security and Defence Cooperation Forum

SDI Strategic Defence Initiative

SLBM Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile

SLOCs Sea Lines of Communication

SM Standard Missile

SOFA Status Of Forces Agreement

SPT Six Party Talks

THAAD Terminal High Altitude Area Defense

TMD Theatre Missile Defence

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

UN United Nations

USFJ United States Forces Japan

WESTPAC WESTern PACific Missile Architecture

WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction

Acknowledgements

This book would not have existed without the support of many people. I owe a special debt of gratitude to Filippo Andreatta, my advisor at the Istituto Italiano di Scienze Umane (SUM) whose support and guidance contributed fundamentally to the research. My time in Florence and at the SUM was made enjoyable by many friends and colleagues. I am grateful for time spent with Simone Dossi, Felipe Piletti, Andres Spognardi, Tullia Galanti, Monica Montano Reyes, Luca Tomini, Antonio Ciaglia, Nicola Maggini, Marco Di Giulio, Sara Bonanni and Loretta Dell Aguzzo. I wish to thank the two directors of the PhD program in political science, Leonardo Morlino and Giliberto Capano. Moreover, I am particularly indebted to Claudius Wagemann. He is both an excellent instructor in methodology and a thoughtful adviser.

Antonio Fiori deserves special thanks for advising me to send my manuscript to Chandos Books and for allowing me to teach several lessons on Japanese foreign policy as part of his courses at the University of Bologna. I express my sincere thanks to the entire team of Chandos Books and particularly to George Knott, Harriet Clayton and Glyn Jones. I also wish to thank Sean Hladkyj and Neil Shuttlewood for their work in improving the formal quality of the manuscript.

Part of the research and the writing of the book was conducted during the academic year I spent at the Centre for Diplomacy, Security and Strategy of the London School of Economics. I want to express my gratitude to Michael E. Cox and Odd Arne Westad, then the two codirectors of the centre, for their encouragement and their support. They allowed me to enjoy the inspirational environment of their centre and they offered me the possibility to conduct a seminar on the US-Japan alliance which was extremely useful for my research.

I also want to thank my colleagues at LSE IDEAS – in particular, Luca Tardelli, Gregorio Bettiza, Emanuel Mourlon Druol, Nick Kitchen, Eirini Karamuzi, Leslie James, Jie Yu, Fai Narapruet, George Aldeman, Ian Wirajuda and Will Shield. I particularly thank Li Fan of the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs for long conversations on the peaceful rise of China and for providing me a Chinese perspective on my research. Moreover, I further want to express my gratitude to Tiha Franulovic, Emilia Knight, Sue Onslow, Svetozar Rajak, Vinna Baptist and Indy Endaya for their help and support.

While writing the book a number of people made comments and gave advice. I am particularly grateful to Ellis Krauss, Barry Buzan, Axel Berfkosky and Lorenzo Zambernardi. A special thank-you goes to Richard Samuels. His course on IR in East Asia was extremely inspirational and ultimately helped me to focus the research topic on the US–Japan alliance. I also thank Matteo Legrenzi who supervised my research as a postdoctoral fellow at the Ca’ Foscari University in Venice.

Finally, I want to thank my parents for their constant encouragement and support. This book is dedicated to them.

About the author

Matteo Dian is a Postdoctoral Fellow at the Ca’ Foscari University of Venice and an Adjunct Lecturer at the School of Political Sciences of the University of Bologna. He received his PhD in political science from the Italian Institute of Human Sciences in Florence. He was a visiting student at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, and a visiting graduate student at the European University Institute and at the London School of Economics and Political Science.

Preface

The US–Japan alliance has contributed significantly towards the development of Japan’s security strategy. The Evolution of the US-Japan Alliance explores developments in the alliance between the US and Japan and analyzes the transformation of Japan’s security strategy from 1960 to 2013. It also describes the rise and fall of Japanese pacifism and the Yoshida Doctrine, the postwar security strategy. Moreover, this book highlights how the end of the Cold War forced Japan to rethink his security strategy and postwar pacifism. Japan has abandoned its identity of ‘peaceful nation’, turning itself into a ‘normal nation’, drawing closer to the United States. Today an increasingly ‘normal’ Japan is no longer able to resist US pressure to play a more active role in the alliance. Moreover, China’s military rise renders Tokyo ever more dependent on US forces. This process, often confused with a ‘new militarisation of Japan’, is rather a reaction to a growing sense of weakness and to a new-found perception of vulnerability and dependence on the American ally. The first two chapters introduce the alliance from a theoretical perspective and the US–Japan alliance in the 1960s. The subsequent three chapters cover the US–Japan alliance from the 1970s to the modern day, and the American pivot to Asia.

Timeline of events

1

Asymmetric alliances in theory

Abstract:

The first chapter introduces the theoretical framework of the book. First, it introduces how different traditions in international relations theory, such as realism, rationalism and constructivism, explain the origin, the evolution and the possible demise of security alliances. Second, it puts forward an analytical framework aimed at analysing the evolution of asymmetric security alliances based on four main analytic dimensions: political cooperation, technological and military cooperation, diplomatic alignment and war cooperation. Finally, it proposes new hypotheses aimed at evaluating the evolution of asymmetric alliances.

Key words

realism; constructivism; balance of power; commitment; technology; diplomacy; alliances; international relations theory

Introduction

Contemporary international order is mainly defined by two realities, the political, economic and military primate of the United States, and the ‘power shift’ towards East Asia. The debate over the nature of the present order is inevitably related to a wider discussion about its durability and its stability over the longer term. Almost all the scenarios relevant to a possible US relative decline are associated with the ‘power shift’ towards Asia (Chan, 2004; MacDonald and Parent, 2011; Taliaferro, 2001) This region is marked, at the same time, by the highest rate of economic growth and the most intense rise of military capabilities. The vertiginous growth of military hardware in the area, the significance of a number of unsettled disputes and historical enmities between major powers make the region ‘ripe for rivalry’ (Friedberg, 1994).

One of the key elements of stability for this fragile equilibrium is the enduring presence of the United States, which is connected to a number of relevant actors in the area through a ‘hub and spoke’ network of asymmetric alliances (Calder, 2004). The hub and spoke system allowed the United States to be more than a relevant extra regional actor; in fact, it allowed it to be the central force in the constitution of regional stability and order. The US presence in the region, as well as the evolving interaction with its allies, has represented a major determinant of the patterns of equilibrium for regional security order; moreover, it is likely that this will continue to be the case.

The cohesion of alliances and the clarity of commitments to them are major sources of stability. On the contrary, uncoordinated pacts are likely to destabilise the international system, to foster arms races and to make the escalation of conflicts more likely (Christensen, 2011). Consequently, the future of the security order of East Asia is related to the durability and the evolution of hub and spoke asymmetric alliances that connect the United States with its partners in the area. Indeed, both the Cold War and post Cold War history testify to the fact that, when alliances constituting the San Francisco system were in doubt, the stability of the region was brought into question and relevant regional crises emerged (as exemplified by Taiwan in 1954 and 1995).

As Henry Kissinger famously stated, the US presence in East Asia and particularly in Japan, represented the ‘cork in the bottle’ that prevented the re-emergence of great power rivalry degenerating into open conflict (Kissinger, 1982). Apart from shielding allied countries such as Japan, Taiwan and South Korea from external threats, the network of asymmetric alliances stabilised the region and favoured integration of these countries in the US-led system (Ikenberry, 2005).

The role and the scope of hub and spoke relationships have fundamentally evolved since the end of the Cold War. The rise of China and the recent American pivot to Asia fundamentally altered the role and behaviour of the main Asian actors. On the one hand, the military rise of China represents a potential threat to Asian neighbours and a fundamental challenge to American primacy. On the other hand, China’s economic ascendency represents a powerful magnet for economic and commercial development of the region. The Obama administration responded by trying to turn its Asian partners into local security providers and reaffirming the centrality of the region in American global strategy.

Equilibrium in the Asia Pacific region will not however be determined solely by the bilateral relationship between the United States and China. On the contrary, the role of other middle powers such as Japan will have a fundamental impact on the future of the region. Whether Japan will remain a faithful ally of the United States and the main hub for American military power in the region, or find a compromise with Beijing in an attempt to shape an alternative order, will determine the balance of power in the region and will fundamentally shape the nature of the future global order. Consequently, a theoretical and empirical investigation of hub and spoke asymmetric alliances in East Asia, and particularly of the US–Japan alliance as a cornerstone of the US presence in the region, is definitively a privileged point of observation from which to shed light on developing a security equilibrium in East Asia. The question of ‘how asymmetric alliances evolve’ and what constitutes the main determinants of their evolution is, indeed, central to understanding the dynamic of the region and the prospects of stability for the whole system.

Therefore, this book will analyse the evolution of the US–Japan alliance since the signing of the Treaty of Mutual Security between Japan and the United States in 1960. Moreover, it will use the US–Japan alliance as a fundamental test case to investigate how ‘asymmetric alliances’ evolve and to analyse what variables are involved in terms of influence, burden sharing, diplomatic alignments and military cooperation.

Security alliances in international relations theory

This research will be based on a few theoretical stepping stones. First, I will present a theoretical framework based on the concept of ‘asymmetric alliance’ that will help theoretically elucidate the evolution of the US–Japan alliance. The concept of asymmetric alliance defining a peculiar pattern of interaction helps delineate the theoretical and empirical horizon of the analysis more effectively. In the following chapters I will analyse the evolution of the alliance since its creation to the present day, highlighting how the proposed theoretical framework and the different explanatory factors considered in this book contribute to shedding light on the evolution of the security relationship between Washington and Tokyo, and how Japanese and American security policies evolved during the postwar era.

Before introducing the proposed theoretical framework, we should define the features of an asymmetric alliance. Military alliances are not only defined by the relative size of allies or their relative military contribution. The relation of (a)symmetry is not defined by the bilateral relationship between allies, or by their relative power or size, but by the triangular context of relations between allies and adversaries (Andreatta, 1997). Formalizing this kind of reasoning in a model, we can assume the existence of a universe constituted by three states (A, B and C); C represents a threat to the security of A and B, A and B will ally in order to face the threat constituted by C. The alliance can be defined as asymmetric, when A owns the necessary capabilities to face C even without the cooperation of B, while B is not able to face C alone (A > C > B). The alliance is asymmetrical when one state is necessary and sufficient to face the external threat alone, while the other(s) are neither necessary nor sufficient. This condition of asymmetry generates a different set of preferences, similar to a suasion game (CC, CD, DC, DD) for the major ally and similar to the prisoner’s dilemma (DC, CC, DD, CD) for junior partners.

Finally, this way of conceptualising asymmetry identifies the presence of a necessary and sufficient ally, able to face the external threat, while the other members are neither necessary nor sufficient.

The second fundamental stepping stone for research is derived from different theoretical approaches present in international relations (IR) theory, presenting several hypotheses capable of describing the evolution of the alliance and the behaviour of allied states. Various scholarly traditions have stressed different rationales for the origins of alliances and their persistence. The first attempt to theorise the phenomenon of security alliances was made by classical realists. Classical realists generally considered alliances to be a manifestation of the balance of power (Morgenthau, 1959). As Morgenthau (1948, p. 184) argued in Politics Among Nations, ‘The historically most important manifestation of the balance of power is to be found in the relations between one nation or alliance and another alliance.’

Structural realism, and particularly the general theory proposed by Kenneth Waltz, represented a step forward in theorising the role of alliances. Waltzian theory identifies the distribution of capabilities in the system as the crucial variable for the origin and collapse of alliances. According to Waltz, alliances are a by-product of structural factors (Waltz, 1979). They play a major role and represent one of the main strategies available to a state to face systemic imbalance. The first is ‘internal balancing’ (i.e., a military build-up). The second is ‘external balancing’ through the formation of alignments or alliances. This theory suggests that states tend to ally with the weaker coalition in order to re-equilibrate power imbalances in the system. According to this theory a major systemic change, such as the collapse of a superpower, would generate a structural tendency toward equilibrium. Over the longer term, it would lead to balancing behaviours against the remaining superpower. Eventually this would determine the collapse of the existing alliances.

Another relevant step in the theorisation of security alliances is represented by the balance of threat theory formulated by Stephen Walt (Walt, 1987). Walt argues that states ally to balance against threats rather than against power alone. Although the distribution of power is an extremely important factor, the level of threat is also affected by geographic proximity, offensive capabilities and aggressive intentions (Walt, 1997). The greater the threat posed by a state, the greater will be the tendency for others to align against it.

A valid theoretical alternative is represented by the securitisation approach proposed by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever and the Copenhagen school approach to security studies. According to them, the perception of threat should be described as a process of securitisation that determines the perception of a different image of a third party and leads to the recognition of another actor as a menace to security. The Copenhagen School defines the process of securitisation as an act ‘through which an inter-subjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object’ (Buzan and Waever, 2003, pp. 490–2). Admitting that perception of a threat can be constructed and not entirely determined by material factors helps to explain the differences in perception between allies; something that we will find throughout our empirical analysis.

The idea