Persian Gulf 2015: India's Relations with the Region

By PR Kumaraswamy

While the wider Middle East is important, the core Indian interests lie in the Persian Gulf region. This series focuses on India's bilateral relations with the region and discusses the political, strategic, economic, energy, cultural and social relations. Persian Gulf 2015 is the fourth in the series and examines the bilateral developments during 2014.

• Language: English
• Publisher: PR Kumaraswamy
• Release date: Jun 9, 2015
• ISBN: 9781310188732

PR Kumaraswamy

Professor P R Kumaraswamy teaches contemporary Middle East in Jawaharlal Nehru University and is the Honorary Director of Middle East Institute, New Delhi.

Book preview

Tables

1.1 Place of PG countries among the top 20 trading partners of India during 2013-14

1.2 Persian Gulf share in India’s total imports (in US$ million)

1.3 Persian Gulf share in India’s total exports (in US$ million)

1.4 India’s Five Largest Trading Partners in 2013-14 (US$ Million)

1.5 Trade deficit – oil import linkages

1.6 India’s energy imports from the Persian Gulf region (in US$ million)

1.7 Top five energy suppliers

1.8 Share of Oil-related Exports to Iran (in US$ million)

1.9 Share of oil-products in India’s exports (in US$ million)

1.10 Share of energy in India’s total foreign trade (in US$ million)

1.11 Oil reserves

1.12 Gas reserves

1.13 List of countries requiring ECR for Indian migrant labourers

1.14 ECR issued

2.1 India-Bahrain Bilateral Trade (in US$ Million)

2.2 Share of Oil in India’s Imports from Bahrain (in US$ Million)

2.3 India’s Energy Imports from Bahrain (in US$ Million)

3.1 India-Iran Bilateral Trade (in US$ Million)

3.2 Share of Oil in India’s Imports from Iran (in US$ Million)

3.3 India’s Energy Imports from Iran (in US$ Million)

4.1 India-Iraq Bilateral Trade (in US$ Million)

4.2 Share of Oil in India’s Imports from Iraq (in US$ Million)

4.3 India’s Energy Imports from Iraq (in US$ Million)

5.1 India-Kuwait Bilateral Trade (in US$ Million)

5.2 Share of Oil in India’s Imports from Kuwait (in US$ Million)

5.3 India’s Energy Imports from Kuwait (in US$ Million)

6.1 India-Oman Bilateral Trade (in US$ Million)

6.2 Share of Oil in India’s Imports from Oman (in US$ Million)

6.3 India’s Energy Imports from Oman (in US$ Million)

7.1 India-Qatar Bilateral Trade (in US$ Million)

7.2 Share of Oil in India’s Imports from Qatar (in US$ Million)

7.3 India’s Energy Imports from Qatar (in US$ Million)

8.1 India-Saudi Arabia Bilateral Trade (in US$ Million)

8.2 Share of Oil in India’s Imports from Saudi Arabia (in US$ Million)

8.3 India’s Energy Imports from Saudi Arabia (in US$ Million)

9.1 India-UAE Bilateral Trade (in US$ Million)

9.3 Share of Oil in India’s Imports from UAE (in US$ Million)

9.4 India’s Energy Imports from UAE (in US$ Million)

10.1 India-Yemen Bilateral Trade (in US$ Million)

10.2 Share of Oil in India’s Imports from Yemen (in US$ Million)

10.3 India’s Energy Imports from Yemen (in US$ Million)

11.1 India-GCC Bilateral Trade (in US$ Million)

11.2 India’s Energy Imports from GCC (in US$ Million)

Figures

1.1 Exports, Imports and Ranking of Persian Gulf Countries in India’s Total Trade (2013-14)

1.2 Persian Gulf’s Share in India’s Total Imports

1.3 Persian Gulf’s Share in India’s Total Exports

1.4 Exports and Imports with the Five Largest Trading Partners, 2013-14

1.5 Trade Balance with India’s Top Five Trading Partners in 2013-14

1.6 Trade Deficit - Oil Import Linkages

1.7 India’s Energy Imports from the Persian Gulf Region

1.8 Share of India’s Oil-related Exports to Iran (in US$ Million)

1.9 Share of Oil Products in India’s Exports

1.10 Share of Energy in India’s Total Foreign Trade

1.11 Persian Gulf Share of Oil to Global Total

2.1 India-Bahrain Bilateral Trade

2.2 Share of Oil in India’s Imports from Bahrain

3.1 India-Iran Bilateral Trade

3.2 Share of Oil in India’s Imports from Iran

4.1 India-Iraq Bilateral Trade

4.2 Share of Oil in India’s Imports from Iraq

5.1 India-Kuwait Bilateral Trade

5.2 Share of Oil in India’s Imports from Kuwait

6.1 India-Oman Bilateral Trade

6.2 Share of Oil in India’s Imports from Oman

7.1 India-Qatar Bilateral Trade

7.2 Share of Oil in India’s Imports from Qatar

8.1 India-Saudi Arabia Bilateral Trade

8.2 Share of Oil in India’s Imports from Saudi Arabia

9.1 India-UAE Bilateral Trade

9.2 Share of Oil in India’s Imports from UAE

10.1 India-Yemen Bilateral Trade

10.2 Share of Oil in India’s Imports from Yemen

11.1 India-GCC Bilateral Trade

11.2 Share of GCC in India’s Total Energy Imports

12.1 China- Bahrain Trade: 2009–13 (in US$10,000)

12.2 China- Iran Trade: 2009-13 (in US$10,000)

12.3 China- Iraq Trade: 2009-13 (in US$10,000)

12.4 China- Kuwait Trade: 2009-13 (in US$10,000)

12.5 China-Oman Trade: 2009-13 (in US$10,000)

12.6 China- Qatar Trade: 2009-13 (in US$10,000)

12.7 China- Saudi Arabia Trade: 2009-13 (in US$10,000)

12.8 China- UAE Trade: 2009-13 (in US$10,000)

12.9 China- Yemen Trade: 2009-13 (in US$10,000)

List of Abbreviations

Notes on Citation

- Trade figures put out by the Director General of Foreign Trade in India for a current year are often revised in the following year and hence there could be a slight discrepancy. For example, the trade figures for 2012–13 would be different in Persian Gulf 2014 and Persian Gulf 2015.

- References to the internet websites (URLs) were accurate at the time of writing; the authors or publisher are not responsible for URLs that may have expired or changed since the manuscript was finalized.

- Unless otherwise stated all tables and figures pertaining to India’s trade that appear in this volume are adapted from the Export-Import Databank section of the Directorate General of Foreign Trade (www.dgft.gov.in/).

- The acronym MEA denotes publications, statements and other announcements put out by the Ministry of External Affairs of India.

1. Introduction

P. R. Kumaraswamy

The most decisive development in 2014 happened not in the ever turbulent Middle East or the Persian Gulf region, but in India, namely the election of Narendra Modi as Prime Minister. The outcome of the 16th Lok Sabha elections marked a shift. For the first time since 1984, a single political party secured an absolute majority in the 543-member lower house of parliament, thereby paving the way for a stable government at the Center. The appointment of Sushma Swaraj as Minister of External Affairs meant fulltime attention to foreign policy; in recent years, either the incumbent was either a political lightweight or was preoccupied with domestic firefighting for the ruling alliance.

Since the days of Jawaharlal Nehru, foreign policy has been the domain and prerogative of the prime minister and Modi has added his personal touch to it. Taking an active role, often accompanied by political rhetoric and economic calculations, the prime minister has emerged as the chief architect and manager in projecting India not only to foreign leaders, but also to the foreign populations through an effective use of the non-resident Indian (NRI) community. The utilization of the expatriate Indian community, often referred to as the Indian Diaspora, has only been novel, but also game changing. Rather than seeing them merely as workers earning their livelihoods abroad, the Modi government looks to them as the socio-cultural bridge between the Indian homeland and offshore. An effective use of this strategy should enable India to tap and expand its economic relations with the outside world and in the process secure political influence.

There are clear indications that the Modi-Swaraj duo would overcome the policy paralysis witnessed during the later years of the United Progressive Alliance’s (UPA) rule (2004–14) when India failed to capitalize on the political advantages of the civilian nuclear deal with the US. The 2005 deal committed American support for India’s quest for nuclear energy without the latter having to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This shift opened many diplomatic gates and scores of western and regional powers discovered India’s economic ascendance and political influence. The delays in implementing the agreement and controversies over India’s nuclear liability bill considerably diluted the diplomatic gains of the nuclear deal. Seen in the wider context, Modi’s election as prime minister generated hope and even hype for robust political involvement in foreign policy-making and active diplomatic engagement with the outside world. These got a boost with the Prime Minister’s Make in India campaign launched in September 2014 whereby he sought foreign participation in developing India’s manufacturing sector. Between May and December, Prime Minister Modi visited eight countries and the External Affairs Minister visited 14 countries.

The formation of the Modi-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government was not without challenges. Since its formation in April 1980, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has been criticized for its perceived anti-Muslim and anti-minority slant. The party’s emphasis on Hindu nationalism and other Hindutva-driven agenda and its pivotal role in the demolition of the controversial Babri Masjid in Ayodhya in December 1992 have raised some apprehensions in the minds of India’s minority population. This anti-minority tag became pronounced after the 2002 Godhra riots in Gujarat for which the then Chief Minister Narendra Modi was vilified for his failure to curb the communal violence. Thus, Modi’s election as prime minister in May 2014 was watched closely not only by his political opponents, but also by the minorities.

However, the emergence of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) was the most important but dangerous development in the Persian Gulf region and the wider Middle East. The ill-fated and shortsighted US-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003 and the resultant sectarianism and civil war facilitated this new wave of religious extremism. The degeneration of the country into Shia, Sunni and Kurdish blocs and the resultant marginalization of the Sunnis who had dominated the Iraqi political landscape since Iraq came under British mandate was largely responsible for the ISIS. At the same time, the blame should not be limited only to President George W. Bush and his Iraqi invasion. There are other players whose omissions and commissions have contributed to the birth of ISIS. Shortsighted choices, unfortunately, has never been the prerogative of individuals alone and nation-states and their statespersons also forget to learn from their past mistakes and misadventures. In the 1980s, a number of western and Middle Eastern countries supported the Afghan mujahedeen against the Soviets only to witness the emergence of the Taliban and later on of the al-Qaida who wrecked havoc not only in the Middle East, but also the international community. Despite this experience, countries such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE did not hesitate to fund various jihadi and salafi movements who have been fighting the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Damascus since early 2011. Influential segments in a number of Western countries were urging their governments to offer financial aid and military support to various jihadi elements involved in the Syrian civil war. While their antagonism toward the Assad regime is understandable, the politico-military support by some of these countries to jihadi elements eventually culminated in the emergence of ISIS.

The demand for the restoration of caliphate, the principal political objective of the ISIS, is not new. Toward the end of the First World War when the millennium-old institution came under threat, there were numerous efforts in this direction. The leaders of the Indian Khilafat Movement even sent a delegation to Istanbul demanding the continuation of the caliph in the wake of the deposition of the last caliph Abdülmecid II by Kamal Ataturk. Infuriated by the Indian ‘interference in the Turkish affairs’, in March 2014, Ataturk abolished the institution of caliph, an institution that sought unify and guide the Muslims after the death of Prophet Mohammed in 632 AD. This abolition did not end the debates with Islamic societies and various efforts were made toward its revival, beginning with the efforts by Hussein, the then Sharif of Mecca in the same year. The emergence of al-Saud and their Wahhabi interpretation of Islam temporarily dampened interests in caliphate. When a group of Sunni extremists led by Juhaiman al-Uthaibi briefly took control of Kaba’a in Mecca in November 1979, the demand for a leader of the Sunni ummah resurfaced. Mohammad Abdullah al-Qahtani brother-in-law of al-Uthaibi was proclaimed Mahdi and the new Caliph (see Kèchichian 1986). Likewise, in 1949, Indonesia witnessed the emergence of the population movement Negara Islam Indonesia (Islamic State of Indonesia) whose principal demand was the return of the caliphate. This demand has resurfaced after the fall of Suharto in May 1998 in Indonesia and the introduction of multiparty elections.

The ISIS, however, is radically different from the caliph-directed attempts as well as other religious extremists. The amorphous movement has managed to take control over vast swaths of territory in Iraq and Syria and inspired the formation of similar groups committed to caliphate in other countries. Since 2011, such groups have emerged in Egypt and Libya or secured the loyalty of groups such as Boko Haram which were active for quite some time (BBC 2015). Thus, in the immediate and medium terms, the ISIS threatens the territorial integrity and hence political survival of Syria and Iraq. Any collapse of these countries or their political leadership would have cascading impacts upon their neighbors, especially Saudi Arabia and Lebanon. At the ideological level, the ISIS threatens the conservative Wahhabi ideology and the Saudi state. Thus, the growing instability in the Persian Gulf region does not bode well for India.

The religious extremism unleashed by the ISIS has intensified anti-Islamic stereotypes in different parts of the world. As happened in the wake of the September 11 terror attacks in the US, the brutality unleashed by the militant Islamic group, especially against women, children, nom-Muslim minorities and western hostages, has rekindled debates over the peaceful nature of Islam and its followers. Denouncing the brutalities of the ISIS might be politically correct and emotionally satisfying, but it would falter on rational scrutiny. That decapitating, burning and forced capture of dhimmi (non-Muslim religious groups such as Jews, Christians and Zoroastrians in Iran) have strong historical and theological basis in Islam only makes things worse. As with the Talibanese destruction of the 6th century Bamiyan Buddha statues in March 2001, burning Muslim and non-Muslims captives and hostages could also be justified in the name of religion. As highlighted by scholars like Mushirul Hasan (2008) and others, it is essential to recognize the plurality of Islam, hence Islams rather than one all-encompassing Islam (Hirji 2010).

The ISIS phenomenon also ended India’s age of innocence vis-à-vis international terrorism. In the aftermath of the September 11 terror attacks, a number of observers noted and commemorated the absence of any Indian involvement in the largest terror attack in the world and attributed this to the moderate and non-extremist Indian environment (Raman 2002; Shuja 2005). The ISIS altered this complacency when it was disclosed that a handful of Indians volunteered to fight with the militant group, including a couple of IT professionals who managed the social media arm of the ISIS (The Hindu 2014). According to former intelligence chief M K Narayanan, about 150 Indians were known to be fighting with the ISIS (Sonwalkar 2014). Considering that India is home to the second largest Muslim community in the world, these numbers are small, but significant. As reminded by September 11 attacks, terrorism is never measured by the number of terrorists but by the lethality of their actions and any Indian complacency over the small number of Indians being attracted to ISIS would myopic and dangerous.

Furthermore, the ISIS has emerged as the new galvanizing force for a large number of western youth, including girls and young women, who have a host of complaints and disappointments vis-à-vis their society. That over 10,000 western-born or bred youth have joined the new wave of religious extremism is a reminder that liberal society or education is not an effective guarantee against the attraction of religious extremism. Moreover, some of the Indians who were active with the ISIS were IT professionals, thereby demystifying the argument that terrorism is a product of poverty and illiteracy.

The emergence of ISIS came against the backdrop of the al-Qaida’s renewed interests in India. In September 2014, amidst the rising profile of the ISIS, al-Qaida announced the establishment of al-Qaidat al-Jihad (base of jihad), with the sole purpose of launching a jihad in the Indian subcontinent (The Sunday Morning Herald 2014). It is essential to recognize that India’s diversity and plurality also provide a congenial atmosphere to ferment extremism as reminded by Indian Mujahedeen and other extremist groups. Even if an ISIS-type organization is unlikely, sympathy for its objective or shared worldview might result in some Indians providing local or logistical support to the ISIS. Therefore, recognizing the sense of alienation among sections of Muslims due to poverty, illiteracy, prolonged political neglect and economic backwardness at the early stage and working toward their welfare in a holistic manner would be the ideal first step for India in its fight against ISIS.

The second major development in 2014 was the lowering of, if not an end to, the tension between Qatar and its powerful neighbors. Though they were on the same page on the Libyan crisis and support anti-Assad forces in Syria, the Qatari positions on other regional issues did not go down well with Saudi Arabia. For long, coverage of regional issues and domestic issues by al-Jazeera (funded by the Qatari Emir) angered many Middle Eastern leaders. At one time or another, rulers of Bahrain, Egypt, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Syria and the UAE did not take kindly to the negative coverage by the maverick Arab media channel and have often complained to the Qatari government or acted against al-Jazeera.

The simmering differences between Qatar and other Arab rulers became pronounced over Egypt. As Riyadh was struggling to come to terms with the fall of its longtime ally President Hosni Mubarak following popular protests, Doha was quick to embrace Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohammed Morsi who was elected president in June 2012 and contributed US$5 billion toward consolidation of the Morsi regime (al-Jazeera 2013). Meanwhile, popular unrest sparked military intervention under the then army chief Abdel Fattah El-Sisi and Morsi was overthrown in July 2013 and incarcerated. While Saudi Arabia was quick to embrace the turn of events in Cairo, Qatar moved in the opposition direction and criticized the return of the military and the overthrow of the democratically-elected leader. These tensions worsened in August 2014 after the Egyptian government proscribed the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorism organization and three journalists from al-Jazeera were charged with helping terrorists and spreading false news. The approach of Doha toward the situation in Bahrain complicated its relations with other members of the GCC. There was a widespread perception that al-Jazeera’s coverage was unsympathetic and even hostile toward Manama. Doha fast-forwarding naturalization process of Sunni citizens of Bahrain fueled tensions further (Reuters 2014).

Thus, in a coordinated move on 5 March Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE decided to recall their ambassadors from Doha, thereby fracturing the six-member GCC. While Oman continued to maintain its maverick position on Gulf politics, Kuwait sought to mediate between the two sides. After months of behind-the-scene efforts, in November 2014, both sides agreed to ‘resolve’ their differences. In return of Doha agreeing to stop its support for Muslim Brotherhood and negative coverage by al-Jazeera, the three Arab ambassadors returned to Doha in December. It is still early to say if this entente would be sustained and at what cost.

Three, the generational change of leadership has not diminished the Qatari desire to play an active role in various crises facing the Middle East. Continuing its campaign against President Assad, Doha extended its funding to various Syrian rebels, especially the Islamic Front but its decision in March 2013 to name the Syrian National Council as the official Syrian representative in the League of Arab States floundered. The election of al-Sisi as Egyptian president in May considerably weakened Doha’s influence in Egypt and partly contributed to its tensions with Riyadh. The most decisive Qatari role was exhibited, albeit with negative consequences, during the 50-day long Gaza crisis. As President al-Sisi was seeking to secure a ceasefire within days after the hostilities began on 8 July, Doha squarely stood behind the Palestinian militant group Hamas in seeking an end to the siege that Israel has imposed upon the Gaza Strip in 2007 as a precondition. As violence continued and Palestinian casualties mounted, backed by Doha, Hamas was not prepared for an early ceasefire without political gains vis-à-vis Israel as well as the Fatah-led Palestinian National Authority (PNA). According to many observers and commentators, the Gaza crisis provided an opportunity for Qatar to enhance its role and influence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and established Doha as a key player in any future mediation (Barakat 2014). At the same time, it is obvious that Qatar’s political, diplomatic and financial support to Hamas partly prolonged the crisis. Thus, in the future, Egypt would be competing with the resource-abundant Qatar while trying to defuse the periodic Israeli-Palestinian violence.

Four, succession issues continue to haunt a number of Gulf monarchies. None were prepared to emulate the example of Qatari Emir Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani who in June 2013 abdicated in favor of his son Tamim bin Hamad. The succession issue in Oman becomes complicated as Sultan Qaboos bin Said does not have an heir nor has he nominated anyone as the crown prince since assuming office in July 1970. Against this background, he has suffered from unspecified illness and spent long periods of 2014 in Germany. During his absence, the county was run by the cabinet, an unusual move for a monarchy. Likewise, the health of octogenarian Saudi ruler Abdullah continued to be bad throughout 2014; while his foreign travels became rare, he prepared the ground for the next generation of rulers. In an unusual move, in March 2014, he named Prince Muqrin as the second deputy Prime Minister and hence the third in line of succession after Crown Prince Salman. This arrangement was formalized in January 2015 following the death of King Abdullah; upon becoming King, Salman named Muqrin as Crown Prince and Muhammad bin Nayef as second deputy Prime Minister. After prolonged illness, Jalal Talabani, Iraq’s first directly-elected president was replaced by another Kurdish leader Fuad Masum in July 2014. Periodic media reports also indicated the flailing heath of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei who assumed the position in 1989 upon the death of the founder of Islamic Republic Ayatollah Khomeini. There are uncertainties not only over the potential successor, but also over the continuation of the office after Khamenei’s death.

Five, the highpoint of the year was the smooth political transition in Tunisia that was possible due to political maturity and statesmanship shown by its principal stakeholders, especially the Islamist Ennahda Party and its leader Rashid al-Ghannushi. The adoption of an inclusive constitution that eschewed any controversy in January 2014 was a reflection of the Tunisian recognition of the unfolding drama in the Middle East. Arab countries which drew inspiration from the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi soon plunged into a spiral of violence. The removal of Mubarak through popular protests did not pave the way for a smooth political transition as the democratically elected President Morsi showed authoritarian tendencies that culminated in the military-led coup. Since June 2013, Egypt has plunged into a cycle of violent confrontation between the supporters of Morsi and Muslim Brotherhood and military-backed secular population. The same holds true for Libya, Syria and Yemen where the Arab Spring came to symbolize violence and anarchy.

Conscious of these developments in the region, Ghannushi avoided insisting on an Islamic constitution for Tunisia that would have provoked a confrontation with the larger secular population. The presidential elections held in November-December saw Beji Caid Essebi, a cabinet minister under former President Zein El Abidine Ben-Ali emerge as the victor. Similar elections in other Middle Eastern countries were less inclusive and hence brought unpopular outcomes. Amidst the ongoing civil war and continuous exodus of refugees, in June, Bashar al-Assad ‘secured’ 88 per cent of popular votes and was ‘reelected’ for the third time. Elections to the 40-member Majlis al-Nuwab (Council of Representatives) in Bahrain in November 2014 did not brighten the prospects for a political settlement to the three-year old unrest. Most seats were won by individuals identified with the Shia opposition. Political differences prevented the election of a successor to President Michel Suleiman in Lebanon whose six-year term ended in May 2014 and the failure of the lawmakers to agree on the elections resulted in incumbent Prime Minister Tammam Salam also taking charge as acting President.

It was against the background of far-reaching political changes in the region one has to examine India’s bilateral relations with the Persian Gulf during 2014.

India and the Persian Gulf

On the eve of the Lok Sabha elections, there was a furry of visitors from the Persian Gulf. The only head of state visit during the year took place in February when Bahraini King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa paid a three-day visit. The previous visit from the Island Kingdom took place when Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad al-Khalifa visited India in March 2012 amidst raging protests in Manama. The timing of the King’s visit was interesting as India hosted the beleaguered ruler who is increasingly dependent upon Riyadh for his survival and for economic largesse. Moreover, Riyadh and Manama have been accusing Iran of meddling in internal Bahraini affairs. By hosting al-Khalifa, New Delhi was perhaps signaling its desire to engage with various stakeholders on a bilateral level without getting involved in the inter-regional tensions. Interestingly, however, al-Khalifa’s visit took place when the Congress-led UPA was in power. Shortly after this, the Foreign Ministers of Iran and Oman and the National Security Adviser of Saudi Arabia visited New Delhi in quick succession

The timing of these visits from the Persian Gulf raises a few questions. The tenure of the UPA government was ending in May and India was heading for the Lok Sabha elections; election schedule was announced on 15 March, just weeks before the visit of King Hamad of Bahrain. It was, therefore, obvious that the Bahraini King and Foreign Ministers of Oman and Iran were negotiating with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh who would be leaving office soon. Moreover, on the eve of the elections, the Prime Minister declared that he would not return to office irrespective of the electoral prospects of the Congress party. When inter-state visits and exchanges carry significant political implications and relevance, why were these undertaken when the UPA government was on the way out? While the Indian side might have organized them with an eye on the elections, why would the Gulf countries choose to engage with a leader who would be demitting office within the next few weeks? Perhaps the Gulf embassies in New Delhi did not anticipate the electoral defeat of the UPA or were unfamiliar with political changes brought by electoral democracies.

The manner in which Middle Eastern leaders responded to Modi’s election was interesting. The Palestinian leaders who could be apprehensive over the potential direction of the Modi-led government should have been the first to take cognizance of the political change in New Delhi, but did not. On the contrary, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was among the first world leaders to congratulate Modi even before final results were out. While Iran and Qatar issued congratulatory messages, there was unusual silence from the Middle East. On 3 June, Omani Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Yusuf bin Alawi bin Abdullah became the first foreign leader to visit India after the NDA government was formed. His customary meeting with External Affairs Minister Swaraj was followed by a courtesy call on the prime minister. Swaraj’s first visit to the Persian Gulf took her to) Bahrain (6 September) and the UAE (10–12 November). In tune with the new trend, she attended a NRI conference in Manama where she highlighted the contribution of the Indian expatriate workers for