Aristotle's Metaphysics

By Aristotle

Metaphysics is one of the principle works of Aristotle and the first major work of the branch of philosophy with the same name. Many of the earliest books, particularly those dating back to the 1900s and before, are now extremely scarce and increasingly expensive. Pomona Press are republishing these classic works in affordable, high quality, modern editions, using the original text and artwork.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Read Books Ltd.
• Release date: Dec 10, 2012
• ISBN: 9781447486237

Aristotle

Aristotle (384–322 BCE) was a Greek philosopher whose works spanned multiple disciplines including math, science and the arts. He spent his formative years in Athens, where he studied under Plato at his famed academy. Once an established scholar, he wrote more than 200 works detailing his views on physics, biology, logic, ethics and more. Due to his undeniable influence, particularly on Western thought, Aristotle, along with Plato and Socrates, is considered one of the great Greek philosophers.

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ARISTOTLE’S METAPHYSICS

EDITED AND TRANSLATED BY

JOHN WARRINGTON

INTRODUCTION BY

SIR DAVID ROSS, K.B.E., M.A., D.LITT.

Former President of the Aristotelian Society

TO

DOM WILFRID PASSMORE, O.S.B.

Tò παλαὶ καὶ τò ν ν καὶ ẚ∊ὶ ζητoύμ∊νoν καὶ ẚπoρoύμ∊νoν: τί τò ∊ἵναι

EDITOR’S PREFACE

I

ARISTOTLE was born at Stagira in Chalcidice in 384 B.C. He was the son of Nicomachus, physician to Amyntas II of Macedonia; his mother’s name was Phaestis. At the age of about eighteen he went to Athens, became a member of the Academy, and so distinguished himself as to be nicknamed by Plato ‘the mind of the school.’ Long before Plato’s death, however, Aristotle had become out of sympathy with Academic theories. And so, when the personal influence of his master was finally withdrawn in 348, he took up residence at Assos in Mysia, at the court of Hermias, whose niece Pythias he soon afterwards espoused.

In 345, Aristotle crossed over to Mitylene, and some two years later he accepted an invitation from Philip of Macedon to undertake the instruction of his son Alexander who was then thirteen years of age. In 336 Alexander succeeded to the throne, and Aristotle returned to Athens. He now made a complete break with the Academy, no longer referring to himself, as in the Assos days, as a member of that school. He hired a gymnasium in the grove of Apollo Lyceius, north-east of the city, and there welcomed an ever-increasing number of students. Such was the origin of the Lyceum; and from the shaded colonnades (π∊ρίπaτoι) beneath which Aristotle walked in discussion with his more advanced pupils, the new school derived its title of ‘Peripatetic.’ It was at about this time that Pythias died and Aristotle entered into a permanent union with Herpyllis, a native of Stagira, who bore his son Nicomachus.

Following the death of Alexander in 323 there were anti-Macedonian riots at Athens. In order to escape trial and inevitable condemnation on the stock charge of impiety, Aristotle resigned the presidency of the Lyceum to Theophrastus, fled to Chalcis in Euboea, and died there in 322 B.C.

II

The admission of Aristotle’s Metaphysics to Everyman’s Library is justified by the permanent influence of his teaching upon Western thought. But the fourteen books of which the work is composed involve difficulties such as to rule out their presentation here in the exact form and order in which they have come down to us. These difficulties arise partly from the structure of the work as a whole, partly from the internal arrangement of certain individual books, and partly from the style of the original. I have endeavoured to achieve the highest degree of clarity attainable within the narrow limits of this volume. As for the translation, I have done my best to satisfy those readers who are not Greek scholars, who may have little or no experience of the subject-matter under discussion, and who would inevitably lose heart if confronted with the obscurities and over-elaborate sentences of an absolutely literal translation. While nothing of the original has been omitted, the following paragraphs are necessary to explain my rearrangement of the text, to illustrate the kind of treatment used to eliminate possible confusion from the reader’s mind, and to prepare him for the extremely formidable chapters that lie ahead.

My version is based upon the edition of Sir David Ross,¹ perhaps the noblest monument of scholarship in this or any other age. To his learning and advice must be attributed whatever merit the pages following may be found to have; their defects are my responsibility.

III

(A) Soon after Aristotle’s death in 322 B.C. his manuscripts were arranged by editors to form the present corpus of his works. A number of treatises were placed immediately ‘after the Physics,’ μ∊τὰ τὰ Φύσικα from which their title Metaphysics is derived. It is explained in the introduction to this volume that the Metaphysics is not a single finished work, but a collection of treatises composed by Aristotle at different times, and intended as lectures either to a Platonic circle at Assos or later in his own school at the Lyceum. It is also of the first importance to remember that the Metaphysics, as Sir David Ross has said, ‘expresses not a dogmatic system but the adventures of a mind in its search for truth. The method is, for the most part, not that of formal syllogistic argument.’ The truths which Aristotle sets out to establish ‘are fundamental truths which cannot be inferred from anything more fundamental’; he chooses, therefore, ‘to commend them by showing the paradoxical consequences of the denial of them.’

The traditional order of these treatises, which are numbered AαBΓΔEZHΘIKΛMN, is illogical and renders the sequence of their author’s thought unnecessarily hard to follow. The researches of Jaeger¹ and their subsequent criticism by Sir David Ross have distinguished the several elements, each of which we are now able to see in its proper relations to the others. The groups ABΓE, ZHΘ, MN, and I appear to have been revised and delivered in that order by Aristotle himself to form what may be described as his later metaphysical course. Λ follows logically upon this series. We are left then to account for α, Δ, and K. The fact is that α and K 1065a26–fin. have no place in a work on metaphysics. The former is commonly believed to be a group of notes taken by Pasicles of Rhodes on a discourse preliminary to the study of physics. It is, however, thoroughly Aristotelian in style and content; I have accordingly placed it as Appendix I. The second part of K consists of extracts from Physics, ii, iii, and v, and stands as Appendix II; the first part, however, is an earlier and much shorter version of the group BΓE, and is dealt with here as follows. K chapters i and ii answer to B chapters ii–vi; their various sections (with two transpositions indicated by footnotes) are printed immediately following the dialectical discussion of the respective problems to which those sections correspond. Chapters iii–viii (1064b15–1065a26) answer to Books Γ and E. They are printed here immediately after the chapters or parts or groups of chapters to which they correspond, as indicated by their respective headings. Thus, for example, K chapter v answers to the second half of Γ chapter iii and Γ chapter iv; it is therefore printed after Γ chapter iv.

Δ is a kind of lexicon; it distinguishes the several meanings of thirty terms whose manifold significance is apt to be obscured by common usage. The book was never intended by Aristotle to form part of his metaphysical course; it might justifiably have been made an appendix, as was suggested to me by Sir David Ross. But since it is often referred to in later sections of the work, and is admittedly a useful introduction thereto, I have allowed it to stand by itself as a preliminary treatise. I hasten to add that the reader will be at no disadvantage in leaving its perusal until after that of the substantive treatises, with which it cannot be said to rank in interest or importance.

(B) (1) The criticism of Plato’s Ideal theory found in the ninth chapter of A is treated more elaborately in MN; the fourth and fifth chapters of M, in fact, contain an almost verbatim repetition of A 990b2–991b8. It is probable that Aristotle omitted A ix, at any rate in the lecture-room, after he had written M.

(2) Z xii will be found printed parallel with H vi, of which it is a doublet. It has all the appearance of being a fragment inserted by an editor to fill up the end of a roll. There is another problem arising from the construction of Z. Aristotle seems to have formed it out of two separate treatises, the one represented by chapters i–vi, x, xi, xiii–xvii, and the other by chapters vii–ix. The latter, which deals with the implications of becoming, forms a serious break in the discussion of substance as essence. But that Aristotle intended it to stand in its present position is clear from a reference in chapter xv, the genuineness of which there is no cause to doubt.

(3) M init.–1086a21 and N were originally two independent criticisms of Academic theories viewed from slightly different standpoints. The second is earlier in date than the first, and belongs to the Assos period (348–345 B.C.). But in his later course of metaphysical lectures Aristotle seems to have strung them together as a single treatise in their present order.¹ He professes to deal first with the question whether Ideas and numbers exist independently of particular things, and then to discuss the first principles of those Ideas and numbers. Inevitably there is some overlapping of material. The final section of M (1086a21–fin.), which contains an introduction similar to M 1078b12 ff., is a fragment inserted by an editor. It is printed here as Appendix III.

(4) We can scarcely admit the traditional arrangement of Λ to be due to Aristotle himself. This book, whose aim is to demonstrate the existence and nature of the prime mover, is described by Sir David Ross as the coping-stone of the whole Metaphysics. Although it is in the main an early and quite independent group of lecture notes, its logical position is at the end of the work. The original part of the book consists of chapters i–vii, ix, x. Chapter viii, as has been shown in the Introduction, belongs to the latter years of Aristotle’s life and contains views incompatible with that of a single prime mover contained in chapters vi, vii. It is manifestly out of place, and I have therefore transferred it as a kind of postscript to follow chapter x, excepting, however, a small section (1074a31–8). This is a fragment of much earlier date, which I have therefore printed as a note in the text immediately after chapter vii.

IV

Having arranged the fourteen books in some kind of logical order, there remained the task of signposting the reader’s way through the complexities of Aristotle’s exposition. These, with the unfamiliarly elaborate or over-terse phrases in which they are often cast, are likely to daunt, if not hopelessly to confuse, all but the most accomplished scholars. The first step was to provide each book and each chapter, or group of chapters (where the divisions in the corpus are unsystematic), with a title, and to mark with numbers or letters the accumulating sections and subsections of the argument. Only thus can the progress of the discussion be clearly discerned and its stages understood in their proper relations. Moreover, a scheme of this kind often makes it possible, in translating, to abbreviate a long-winded back-reference by some simple phrase, e.g. ‘with regard to (1) and (2)’; ‘those included in (a), (b), and (c) above’; etc. It also helps to avoid the repetition of ‘Again . . . ; further,’ ‘and . . . and . . . and,’ ‘yet another reason is,’ and so on; which are not only tedious, but give the inexperienced reader no proper guidance as to whether they introduce a main section or a subordinate line of thought.

The next step was to deal with numerous minor parentheses. A newcomer to this exacting work will derive little encouragement to persevere from the necessity of exploring a side-track while the main road itself is yet obscure. The only means of avoiding the difficulty was to treat such passages, wherever possible, as footnotes—a device of which Aristotle might well have taken advantage, had it been known to him. I wished to reserve the footnotes exclusively for this purpose, and to relegate my own observations to a body of notes following the text; but I have deferred to the publishers’ view, that the necessity of constant reference to end-notes would entail more serious disadvantages. The reader should therefore understand that all footnotes followed by—(A.) are Aristotle’s words,¹ transferred from the body of the text; the rest are mine.

In a volume of this size editorial apparatus must be kept within narrow limits, and it would be no less impossible than inappropriate to furnish Everyman with a commentary upon the text or an exhaustive analysis of its teaching.² For this reason I have not hesitated to expand, to contract, or to rearrange sentences whose meaning could otherwise be made clear only by a spate of explanatory footnotes. My object has been to render the content of Aristotle’s words into reasonably fluent English, and in the simplest form compatible with a translation as distinct from a mere paraphrase; but the measures taken to smooth the path of inexperience by no means render the Metaphysics an ‘easy’ work to study. The reader will find that it demands at every stage the closest concentration. It has neither the literary charm of Plato’s Dialogues nor their moments of breath-taking grandeur; though it is difficult to read the seventh and ninth chapters of book Λ and not share their solemnity.

Reference should be made to the bibliography for sources of fuller information upon the history and characteristics of Aristotle’s doctrine. It may, however, be noted that the principal treatises of the Metaphysics fall into well-defined groups: ABΓE, a preliminary series determining the subject-matter of the science; ZHΘ treating of substance together with potentiality and actuality; MN, a criticism of the Ideal theory at various stages of its development; I, concerned with unity and kindred attributes of substance; and finally Λ with its proof of the existence of a prime mover. For the benefit of those readers who may wish for a more distant prospect than is afforded by chapter-headings or book titles, I have prefixed to each of these sections a brief summary of its more important features.

JOHN WARRINGTON.

1956.

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

EDITIONS. W. D. Ross, Aristotle’s Metaphysics, text and commentary, 2 vols., Oxford 1924; reprinted 1948 and (with corrections) 1953; H. Tredennick: Aristotle: The Metaphysics, text and translation, 2 vols., Loeb Library, 1933.

TRANSLATIONS. W. D. Ross: The Works of Aristotle: Volume VIII, Metaphysica, 1908; 2nd edition (revised), 1926; H. Tredennick: Aristotle: The Metaphysics (with text), 2 vols., Loeb Library, 1933.

GENERAL WORKS. L. Robin: La Théorie platonicienne des Idées et des Nombres d’après Aristote, 1908; J. A. Stewart: Plato’s Doctrine of Ideas, 1909; A. E. Taylor: Varia Socratica, 1911; F. Ravaisson: Essai sur la Métaphysique, 2nd edition, 1913; J. Burnet: Greek Philosophy: Thales to Plato, 1914; Early Greek Philosophy, 3rd edition, 1920; W. Jaeger: Aristoteles, 1923 (trans. 1934); W. D. Ross: Aristotle, 1923; 2nd edition (revised), 1930; Plato’s Theory of Ideas, 1951; E. Zeller: History of Greek Philosophy, 13th edition, 1931; G. R. G. Mure: Aristotle, 1932; Euclid’s Elements, edited by Isaac Todhunter, Everyman’s Library, 1933; W. Jaeger: Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers (trans.) 1947; Sir T. Heath: Mathematics in Aristotle, 1949; W. K. C. Guthrie: The Greek Philosophers from Thales to Aristotle, 1950.

¹ W. D. Ross, Aristotle’s Metaphysics, text and commentary, 2 volumes, Oxford 1924; reprinted with corrections, 1953.

¹ W. Jaeger, Studien zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Metaphysik des Aristoteles, Berlin 1912; Aristoteles, Berlin 1923.

¹ There are two references in N iii to M iii.

¹ Some of them will be found to contain words or figures in square brackets. This bracketed material has in each case been added by me to complete a reference or to avoid a footnote on a footnote.

² For a masterly survey of Aristotle’s metaphysical and theological doctrine, see the Introduction to Sir David Ross’s edition, pages lxxvi–cliv.

CONTENTS

A PHILOSOPHICAL LEXICON (BOOK Δ)

PRELIMINARY STUDIES (BOOKS A, B, Γ, E)

[N.B. Together with B, Γ, E is printed K, 1059a18–1065a26]

SUBSTANCE, POTENCY, AND ACTUALITY (BOOKS Z, H, Θ)

CRITICISM OF THE IDEAL THEORY (BOOKS MN)

UNITY AND KINDRED NOTIONS (BOOK I)

THE PRIME MOVER (BOOK Λ)

APPENDICES

Appendix I (Book α)

Appendix II (Book K. 1065a26–1069a14)

Appendix III (Book M. Chap. IX, 1086a21–X fin.)

Index of Chapter Headings

INTRODUCTION

BY

SIR DAVID ROSS, K.B.E., M.A., D.LITT.

(Former President of the Aristotelian Society)

ARISTOTLE was the first person to conceive of metaphysics as a separate object of study, and the very word ‘metaphysics’ is derived from the name given by later writers to his writings on the subject. It would be difficult to exaggerate the influence which these writings, studied by one commentator after another—Greeks, Arabs, St Thomas and other Schoolmen, and constantly in Dante’s mind—have had on later generations. The Metaphysics, which is certainly one of the greatest of all philosophical works, well deserves its prominent place in a series which aims at including the books that have had the greatest influence on human thought.

It is impossible in a short introduction to give readers any idea of the richness of content of the Metaphysics. What one may hope to do is to give some idea of the plan of the work, so far as it can be said to have a plan. The most cursory examination shows that it does not form a single connected treatise. The mere number attached to the second book, ‘Alpha the less,’ shows it to be a later addition put between books A and B for lack of a better place. Book Δ, a bare enumeration of the meanings of certain words, is out of place in a metaphysical treatise. K is simply a shorter version, partly of B, Γ, and E, partly of Physics, ii, iii, and v. Λ, in its first five chapters, covers much the same ground as Z and H, but treats the subject more in the manner of the Physics than in that of the rest of the Metaphysics. These chapters are much terser than Z and H, and in 1069b35 and 1070a4 there is evidence that Aristotle is putting down jottings rather than writing a treatise.

The remaining books can be regarded as forming parts of one enterprise, but can be broken up into smaller groups, the members of which belong more closely together.

The conclusion to which a study of the books leads us is confirmed by the external evidence. In the oldest extant list of Aristotle’s writings, that in Diogenes Laertius, the only part of the Metaphysics that appears is Δ, which appears under the title ‘Words with more than one meaning’; and though there is reason to think that the omission of the other books is accidental, the presence of Δ in this form shows that it had originally a separate existence. The next oldest list contains a Metaphysics in ten books, and the appendix to it a Metaphysics in nine books. It is not till we come to the latest of the ancient lists that we find a Metaphysics in thirteen books (probably the extant Metaphysics), omitting α or treating it as part of A.

Book A is a summary of the views of earlier philosophers; it is quite in Aristotle’s manner to begin with an historical survey; he does so in the Physics and in the De Anima.

B forms a suitable successor to A. It enumerates and discusses dialectically fourteen problems, which are described as the first problems to be faced by the metaphysician. Taking the order in which these are discussed in chapters ii–vi (which is not quite the order observed in chapter i), we find that the first four, which are preliminary problems about the possibility and the nature of metaphysics, are discussed in Γ and E. That BΓE form a definite unity is confirmed by the fact that the first part of K is a shorter version of these books. Question 5 is discussed in M and N, and definitely referred to in M 1076b1 and 1077a1. Questions 9 and 15 are discussed in M 10, and definitely referred to there (1086b15). Question 11 is dealt with in I 2, and referred to there (1053b10). Question 12 is dealt with in M 1–3, 6–9, N 1–3, 5, 6. Question 13 is dealt with in M 4–5.

There are other passages which deal more or less closely with problems raised in B, but without any indication that they are treated in connection with that book. Z xii and xiii show how Aristotle would answer questions 7 and 6, Z viii, xiii, xiv how he would deal with question 8, Z vii–x how he would deal with question 10, Θ viii how he would deal with question 14. But the whole block ZHΘ contains no definite reference to B, and no indication that these books take it as their point of departure, while book M and (to a much lesser extent) book I do so.

It would seem, then, that M and N should be regarded as standing nearer to ABΓE than ZHΘ do, not necessarily in time, but in subject-matter. Professor Jaeger has shown that these two books, which are devoted to the discussion of theories held in Plato’s Academy, contain a later discussion (M init.–1086a18) followed by an earlier one (M 1086a21–N fin.). M presents two curious phenomena—the repetition in M iv, v, almost word for word, of the arguments against the theory of Ideas already put forward in A 990b2–991b9, and the appearance in chapters vi–ix of a polemic against the ideal numbers (recognized by Plato and Xenocrates) which entirely ignores the polemic against them in A 991b9–993a10. The most reasonable explanation of the first phenomenon is that Aristotle, having to deal with the same subject, not now as a historian of philosophy but as a systematic philosopher, yet felt that his former discussion fully represented his views, and therefore used it again. The M passage is clearly later than the A passage; Aristotle has ceased to use the first person plural, in the sense of ‘we Platonists’; he now says ‘they.’ He has set up as an independent teacher. The explanation of the second phenomenon is that the ideal number theory, a late development in Plato’s thought, has come more to the front and demands fuller treatment than it has had in A.

The other book which, as we have seen, definitely refers to B is I. This book is concerned entirely with the nature of unity and of kindred conceptions. It contains in 1053b10–24 a recapitulation of a good deal of the discussion of unity in B 1001a4–b25. From settling the question about unity raised in B it goes on to discuss other questions about unity. This book is also connected with B in another way. Aristotle has in B 995b18–25 asked whose business it is to study sameness, difference, likeness, unlikeness, and contrariety, and in 1004a17–22 he has said that it is the business of the metaphysician; the discussion of these conceptions is found in I 3–10. Thus I belongs to the treatise of which ABΓE was to be the start, though it is rather loosely connected with that earlier part. It comes logically after, not before, MN; otherwise it would interrupt the discussion of substance which is carried on in BΓE and in MN.

ZHΘ forms a fairly continuous treatise. Z 1037a20 refers forward to H. H begins (1042a3–22) with a summary of Z. A backward reference at the beginning of Θ (1045a27–32) is probably a reference to ZH. These three books are not closely connected with ABΓE; the use of the expression ‘in our first discussions’ in Θ 1045b32 as a mode of referring to Z shows that ZHΘ is a distinct work from ABΓE. But in fact ZHΘ present a phenomenon very like that presented by Γ iii–ix. Just as there, having shown that it is the business of metaphysics to study the axioms (and thus answered the first question raised in B), Aristotle proceeds forthwith to discuss them, so here, having shown that metaphysics studies substance (and thus answered his third problem), he studies it forthwith. Thus, while ZHΘ is not a continuation of ABΓE, it is a complementary group. ZH and Θ respectively discuss the two senses of being which E declared to be the subject of metaphysics—being as classified into the categories and potential-and-actual being. The backward reference in M 1076a9–10 seems to be a reference to ZHΘ, so that Aristotle apparently meant them to be read before MN.

We come now to what is in some ways the most impressive of all the books, Λ. There are three passages in other books (E 1027a17–19, Z 1037a10–13, K 1064a33–6) which apparently refer forward to Λ, but Λ has all the appearance of having been originally a separate work. It announces itself in its first sentence as a discussion of substance, without making any reference to the full discussion of substance in ZH. The first five chapters discuss the nature of sensible substance (the very subject of ZH), but treat it in a way more akin to that of the Physics; e.g. when they analyse sensible substance into form, matter, and privation (1069b32–4, 1070b10–13). While ZH are occupied with the logical analysis of sensible substance into form and matter, Λ is concerned with the causal explanation of the existence of sensible things, and therefore constantly insists on the necessity of a motive cause as well. It thus prepares the way for its argument for the necessity of a single motive cause of the universe, the unmoved mover.

Three books remain to be considered, α interrupts the connection of B with A. It refers to no other book, and is referred to by none. One of the oldest manuscripts has a note saying that most scholars ascribed the book to Pasicles of Rhodes, a pupil of Aristotle. The thought and the language are quite Aristotelian, but the lack of connection between the three chapters confirms Professor Jaeger’s view that what we have is Pasicles’ fragmentary note of a discourse of Aristotle (not on metaphysics, but on natural science).

Δ, a philosophical lexicon, is out of place where it is, but is a genuine work of Aristotle. It is referred to in E, Z, Θ, and I, and (as we have seen) it occurs in the extant list of Aristotle’s works. It forms a useful addendum to the Metaphysics. It is apparently earlier than the physical works, while at least most of the remainder of the Metaphysics is later.

K consists of two quite distinct parts: 1059a18–1065a26 contains a shorter version of the contents of BΓE; the remainder contains a series of extracts from Physics, ii, iii, v. The earlier part is not a mechanical paraphrase of BΓE such as a pupil might have made, but an independent handling of the same topics, omitting much and inserting not a little of its own; and, with the exception of one combination of particles, the language is thoroughly Aristotelian. Its much smaller size, in comparison with BΓE, suggests that it represents a student’s notes, not of the very course of lectures that we have in BΓE but of a shorter corresponding course; and certain points suggest that this was an earlier course.

The later part of K is of quite a different order. It is a collection of excerpts taken almost word for word from the Physics, but selected with considerable skill. We cannot tell whether the selection was made by Aristotle, with a view to a short course on natural science, or by a pupil. The union of two sections with such different origins presents a curious problem; the explanation may be that the editor, finding one set of papers ending with the discussion of accident, and another beginning with the discussion of chance, saw the connection of the topics and put them together so as to make a fair-sized roll.

The question of the dates of the different parts of the Metaphysics is a difficult one, and we have not space to go into it in detail; but some points may be made. Temporal references are rare in the Metaphysics, but we may note first the reference in Δ 1015a25 and 1025a26 to the sail to Aegina, and the reference in Δ 1023b10 to the Dionysiac and Thargelian festivals. These references must have been addressed to Athenian hearers, and they probably belong to Aristotle’s first residence there, up to 348–7, rather than to his final residence there, from 335–4 to 323. The references to Coriscus in Δ 1015b17–32, E 1026b18, and Z 1037a7 have sometimes been held to point to Aristotle’s residence, about 347, at Assos, where there was a Platonic circle which included Coriscus. But we also hear of ‘Coriscus in the Lyceum’ (Physics, 219b21), and that points to the period of Aristotle’s headship of the Lyceum. In the whole of the Metaphysics the passage to which a date can most confidently be assigned is the reference (in the imperfect tense) in Λ 8 to the astronomical theory of Callippus, which must be dated about 330–325, i.e. to the last eight years of Aristotle’s life. This is probably a late addition to a book written earlier.

Professor Jaeger holds the view that, as Aristotle came to be further and further removed in time from his early Platonism, his interest in metaphysics waned and was replaced by an interest in organizing and carrying on factual inquiries—biological, historical, and literary; and he therefore holds that no part of the Metaphysics except the reference to Callippus belongs to the period of Aristotle’s headship of the Lyceum. But Professor D’Arcy Thompson suggested, and the suggestion has been pretty generally adopted—a different occupation for the years before the headship of the Lyceum. He pointed out that the biological works refer much more often to places on the east coast of the Aegean and in Macedonia than to places in the neighbourhood of Athens, and he drew the conclusion that these works were written during that period. Now these works are sufficiently bulky, and the work involved in writing them was sufficiently great, to have occupied Aristotle’s attention pretty completely during these middle years; and that tends to push the work on metaphysics, or some of it, into the final Athenian period.

New light has been thrown on the question by Professor F. Nuyens, who has pointed out that the biological works (the De Generatione excepted)—and to these I would add the psychological works known as the Parva Naturalia—work on a two-substance theory of body and soul and treat the soul as a separate substance, seated in a particular part of the body, the heart. It is only when we turn to the second book of the De Anima, and the beginning of the third book, that we find the view, which must have been a later one, that the soul is the form or entelechy of the body. Broadly, we may regard this theory as characteristic of Aristotle’s final period, as the other was of the middle period. Now there are in the Metaphysics distinct traces of this later view; the passages Z 1035b14–16, 33–1036a2, 1037a5–7, H 1043a29–36, 1075b34–7, M 1077a32–4 prove the

Reviews for Aristotle's Metaphysics

[danielstj · Rating: 3 out of 5 stars]

A pivotal, and important, Aristotelian text.

[eroot_7 · Rating: 3 out of 5 stars]

the thing about Aristotle, is i always get the impression the value is on labeling ideas and organizing them rather than the ideas themselves.still good stuff of course.

[alanejohnson-1 · Rating: 5 out of 5 stars]

This translation of Aristotle's Metaphysics by Hippocrates G. Apostle is apparently now out of print. When I read it in 1969, I was impressed with the accuracy of the translation as well as with Hippocrates Apostle's Glossary and editorial commentary. Equally serviceable translations are doubtlessly available today, though I have not consulted them.

The term "metaphysics" should not mislead the twenty-first-century reader. Unlike Plato, Aristotle exhibited no trace of mysticism in his surviving works, including this one. In this treatise Aristotle explored the fundamentals of being and of the logic of being. He approached these questions from a philosophical rather than from what we would now call a scientific perspective. Aristotle addressed scientific matters in many other treatises, including his Physics (which is properly translated as "physical nature" rather than that branch of science that is now called "physics"). Metaphysics, for Aristotle, was the study of first principles, of being qua being. Although modern science makes Aristotle's concepts unfamiliar to us, this work sets forth some of the architectonic principles of scientific thinking, including Aristotle's famous principle of contradiction (or noncontradiction): A thing cannot both be and not be at the same time and in the same respect.

[jpsnow · Rating: 4 out of 5 stars]

Again, he starts each section with a review of the extant literature. I found his commentary on Thales interesting, the latter having said that water was the fundamental element, being found even in seeds. He most frequently references Anaxagous. In every instance, he gets to the cause and then brings in the early bases of logic to make his point. He again goes straight for the reality of any concept, criticizing the Pythagoreans who found mathematics in everything and made numbers the basis of substance. (Their 10 principles in "two columns of cognates": limit and unlimited, odd and even, one and plurality, right and left, straight and curved, light and darkness, good and bad, square and oblong.) He observes that Plato first began exploring the philosophy of nature and substance upon learning it from Cratylus and Heraclitean doctrines, while Socrates was mostly concerned of ethical matters. The last section concerns a variety of topics, including the primary movement, the one vs. the many, substance and actuality, and implications of all of the above.