Balloons Of The Civil War

By L-Cmdr Steven D. Culpepper

This historical study investigates the military effectiveness and combat power of Civil War balloons. The categories inherent to military effectiveness include timeliness, accuracy, usefulness, operational considerations, and logistics. Limited by available material, especially those documenting Confederate efforts, this paper highlights the history of ballooning prior to the Civil War, and focuses on the Union balloon operations during the initial fall and winter of 1861-2, the Peninsular campaign, and Chancellorsville. The analysis of the measures of effectiveness from these three periods indicates the Union balloon corps amply validated its worth. War, however, is more than just a science. In this case, the "art" of warfare better explains the collapse of Thaddeus Lowe's organization after Chancellorsville. The first two modern implications of this case study involve both the unfavorable impact of personality, and the commander's influence on the assimilation of new technology. Are we better today at bringing on line the benefits associated with technology? The final point links to the concept of battle command. With the massive infusion of information available to the modern commander, are we still sending him to the lions without a whip?

• Language: English
• Publisher: Golden Springs Publishing
• Release date: Aug 15, 2014
• ISBN: 9781782896043

L-Cmdr Steven D. Culpepper

See Book Description

Book preview

BALLOONS OF THE CIVIL WAR

BY

LCDR STEVEN DREW CULPEPPER USN

 This edition is published by PICKLE PARTNERS PUBLISHING—www.picklepartnerspublishing.com

To join our mailing list for new titles or for issues with our books – [e-mail]

Or on Facebook

Text originally published in 1994 under the same title.

© Pickle Partners Publishing 2014, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted by any means, electrical, mechanical or otherwise without the written permission of the copyright holder.

Publisher’s Note

Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.

We have also made every effort to include all maps and illustrations of the original edition the limitations of formatting do not allow of including larger maps, we will upload as many of these maps as possible.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS 4

ABSTRACT 5

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 6

CHAPTER 1 — INTRODUCTION 7

CHAPTER 2 — BACKGROUND 9

Balloonists 12

Confederate Balloon Operations 17

CHAPTER 3 — INITIAL BALLOON OPERATIONS 20

The First Fall and Winter 23

Summary 28

CHAPTER 4 — THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN 31

Siege of Yorktown 31

On to Richmond 35

Seven Pines 38

Seven-Days' Battles 43

Summary 46

CHAPTER 5 — CHANCELLORSVILLE 48

Summary 71

CHAPTER 6 — CONCLUSION 75

APPENDIX A — WIND EFFECTS 80

APPENDIX B — LITERATURE NOTES 83

REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 85

COMPLETE BIBLIOGRAPHY 86

Books 86

Periodicals 87

Government documents 87

ABSTRACT

BALLOONS OF THE CIVIL WAR by LCDR Steven Drew Culpepper, USN.

This historical study investigates the military effectiveness and combat power of Civil War balloons. The categories inherent to military effectiveness include timeliness, accuracy, usefulness, operational considerations, and logistics. Limited by available material, especially those documenting Confederate efforts, this paper highlights the history of ballooning prior to the Civil War, and focuses on the Union balloon operations during the initial fall and winter of 1861-2, the Peninsular campaign, and Chancellorsville. The analysis of the measures of effectiveness from these three periods indicates the Union balloon corps amply validated its worth. War, however, is more than just a science. In this case, the art of warfare better explains the collapse of Thaddeus Lowe's organization after Chancellorsville. The first two modern implications of this case study involve both the unfavorable impact of personality, and the commander's influence on the assimilation of new technology. Are we better today at bringing on line the benefits associated with technology? The final point links to the concept of battle command. With the massive infusion of information available to the modern commander, are we still sending him to the lions without a whip?

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost I would like to thank my wife for her patience and understanding. I am lucky indeed. Second, am especially grateful to Dr. Robertson for his time and guidance. The sources would not have materialized without his help. I owe an additional debt to MAJ Dreilinger for his painstaking efforts to reeducate me in the ways of the english language. Finally, LTC Baker, thanks for the many long hours of reflection on the topic, insights into the Union army, and more importantly, your friendship.

CHAPTER 1 — INTRODUCTION

The significance of controlling the skies over a modern battlefield lies in the decisive tactical advantage that it yields to the controlling side. This ability to control and use airspace was developed through successful implementation of technology over time. Eyes gave way to field glasses to extend the range of the observer. Eventually came the transformation of electromagnetic and acoustic energy into electronic signals which facilitated electrical scanning of the battlefield. Today, advanced signal processing, which enhance the signal to noise ratio (SNR) even further, power the way to even greater detection ranges. In between these two periods came attempts to elevate the eyes of the observer.

The concept of manned flight has captivated man's thinking for centuries. It was only natural that his thoughts should turn to application of manned flight for military purposes. The shots fired on Fort Sumter in April 1861 signaling the beginning of the American Civil war, occurred sixty-eight years after the initial use of the balloon for military observation. How well did the Union and Confederate armies bring this relatively new technology to bear?

In order to measure the effectiveness of balloons during the Civil War, the following must be assessed: timeliness, accuracy, usefulness or adequacy of the information reported by the balloonist, operational considerations and logistics. Timeliness describes the interval of time lost between when the balloonist, or aeronaut, first witnessed an event, the commander is made aware, the commander communicates an action to a subordinate, and the subordinate responds. Accuracy can be determined from a comparison between recorded balloon reports and what the enemy was doing at that time. Usefulness or adequacy describes those events the balloonist reported that were significant to the campaign. Operational considerations describe the impact of the environment in which the balloons functioned. That is, what was the influence of topography, available daylight, and weather (including the prevailing visibility)? Finally, logistics describe the requirements of manning, maintaining and supplying the needs of the balloons. The gain in combat power that these early observers provided to the commander can likewise be explored. According to the US Army Field Manual FM 100-5, Operations. combat power is maximized through the synergistic blend of maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership.{1} Maneuver describes the movement of combat forces to gain positional advantage, usually in order to deliver—or threaten delivery of—direct and indirect fires. Firepower provides destructive force; it is essential in defeating the enemy's ability and will to fight. Protection conserves the fighting potential of a force so that commanders can apply it at the decisive time and place. Leadership furnishes purpose and direction in combat which flows from a clear vision.

From a military perspective, balloons generated intelligence for the commander that was previously unavailable. The manned balloon extended the battlefield. It effectively raised the commander's eyes above the terrain, thereby permitting him to see beyond obstacles and focus on the disposition of enemy forces around him. With this new source of information, the commander might now exercise his command and control to optimize his positional advantage vis-a-vis the enemy. Security also improved with balloon use. Direct observation along existing avenues of approach greatly reduced the chance of surprise by the enemy during periods of good visibility.

The greatest limitation to the study of Civil war balloon operations stems from the mere two-year existence of the Union balloon corps and one year for Confederate activity. The technical difficulties experienced at the outset of the conflict prevented balloons from getting to the battle of First Manassas. Some of the communications at Fredericksburg were telegraphed or shouted and never recorded. Other communications were simply lost since the balloon corps was not assigned in a regular sense to the chain of command, but rather loosely attached for administrative purposes to various other organizations within the Union army. The balloons were unable to follow the Union army to Antietam for want of wagons;{2} Primary source documents are limited to sketchy coverage of Thaddeus Sobieski Constantine Lowe's correspondence throughout the period. Confederate sources are confined to journals recorded several years after the events that occurred during the Peninsular campaign. Therefore, this paper will focus on the available material prior to and including the Peninsular and Chancellorsville campaigns in which both sides conducted offensive operations while employing their respective balloons.

CHAPTER 2 — BACKGROUND

The Montgolfier brothers first harnessed the lifting power of hot air in Annonay, France, on 5 June 1783. The 35 foot diameter spherical balloon rose to a height of some 6,000 feet. That August, the world's first hydrogen filled balloon ascended over Paris. The man responsible, physicist J. A. C. Charles, improved upon the hot air idea by using the recent discovery of hydrogen by Henry Cavendish (1766){3} to provide additional lift in a 12 foot diameter globe.{4} The seeds of American ballooning were planted in Benjamin Franklin who, one week prior to signing the Treaty of Paris, witnessed the Montgolfier demonstration and informed colleagues on both sides of the Atlantic as to its military implications.{5}

Man did not venture aloft until that fall when on 15 October Jean Francoise Pilatre de Rozier ascended in a 46 foot diameter hot air balloon. Rozier died during a subsequent ascent some two years later when his balloon caught fire and crashed on the French coast.{6}

The third means used to generate lift in balloons, after hot air and hydrogen, was coal gas. It made its first appearance in 1821 at the hands of the English balloonist, Charles Green. Though heavier than hydrogen and also combustible, coal gas was available and cheap. It became the standard gas of ballooning.{7}

Hot air balloons came to America in 1784 with an ascent organized by Peter Carnes, a lawyer and tavern owner who privately built his own hot air device. In Baltimore on 24 June, a 13 year old boy by the name of Edward Warren became the first American to go aloft. The balloon was ruined the next month in an attempted manned flight by Carnes, thus ending his balloon ventures.{8} While no manned balloon flights occurred in America over the next decade, unmanned experiments flourished. A Frenchman, Jean Pierre Blanchard, reintroduced manned balloon flights to a Philadelphia crowd on 9 January 1793.{9} Two more Frenchmen, Louis Charles Guille and Eugene Robertson, performed manned flights for the crowds between 1819 and 1825.{10} Not until Robertson's flights did Americans take up manned ballooning again on their own. Five years later, Charles F. Durant went aloft in his own device having learned from his experiences with Robertson.{11} John Wise, the first of the Civil War balloonists, made his initial ascents in 1835 and some four years later introduced the ripping panel. This safety feature enabled the aeronaut