Eighteen Years In Lebanon And Two Intifadas: The Israeli Defense Force And The U.S. Army Operational Environment

By Major Richard D. Creed Jr.

This monograph determined that the tactical and strategic experience of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) since 1981 was relevant to the future operational environment of the U.S. Army. The IDF's experiences are relevant because the Israeli Army was similarly equipped and organized to the heavy units in the U.S. Army, both then and now. Israel faced a similar full spectrum threat, and the IDF had to adapt to enemies who switched to asymmetric methods in order to overcome Israel's conventional military superiority. The IDF of 1981 paralleled the U.S. Army of the 2000 in many ways. It was a mechanized heavy force designed to conduct operations against a Soviet armed and equipped enemy. It fought and defeated some of those enemies decisively eight years previously. Beginning with the invasion of Lebanon (Operation "Peace for Galilee"), the IDF discovered that there were no peer competitors willing to fight it on its own terms. The nature of war changed for the IDF in sometimes unexpected ways, and it struggled to adapt to its changing operational environment. The IDF operational environment became much more complicated, because while it retained the old threats in the form of its Arab neighbors, it added sustained guerrilla war and civil insurrection.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Tannenberg Publishing
• Release date: Aug 15, 2014
• ISBN: 9781782895930

Major Richard D. Creed Jr.

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Text originally published in 2002 under the same title.

© Pickle Partners Publishing 2014, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted by any means, electrical, mechanical or otherwise without the written permission of the copyright holder.

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Although in most cases we have retained the Author’s original spelling and grammar to authentically reproduce the work of the Author and the original intent of such material, some additional notes and clarifications have been added for the modern reader’s benefit.

We have also made every effort to include all maps and illustrations of the original edition the limitations of formatting do not allow of including larger maps, we will upload as many of these maps as possible.

Eighteen Years in Lebanon and Two Intifadas: The Israeli Defense Force and the U.S. Army Operational Environment

A Monograph

by

Major Richard D. Creed Jr. Armor

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS 4

Abstract 7

CHAPTER ONE — Introduction 9

Relevance 9

Methodology 10

CHAPTER TWO — The U.S. Army's Contemporary Operating Environment 11

Trends 11

Characteristics of Military Operations 14

Operations on complex and urban terrain 14

Information warfare and information operations 14

Space Operations 15

Power Projection from the Continental United States (CONUS) 15

No homeland sanctuary available 15

Limitations on Force Capabilities 15

Complex relationships 16

Rules of Engagement (ROE) 16

Media 16

Constrained resources 17

Ambiguity 17

Rapidity 17

Asymmetry 18

Force Protection 18

Summary 18

CHAPTER THREE — The IDF Operational Environment Since 1982 20

Lebanon 21

The Palestinian Intifadas 22

Characteristics of the IDF Operational Environment Since 1982 24

Operations on complex and urban terrain 24

Information Warfare and Information Operations 24

Space Operations 26

Power projection 26

No homeland sanctuary available 27

Limitations on Force Capabilities 28

Complex relationships 29

Rules of engagement 31

Media 31

Constrained resources 32

Ambiguity 33

Rapidity 34

Asymmetry 34

Force Protection 36

Summary 36

CHAPTER FOUR — IDF Adaptation 38

IDF Adaptation to the Trends in its Operational Environment 39

IDF Adaptation to the Characteristics of Military Operations 40

Operations on complex/urban terrain 40

Information warfare and information operations 42

No homeland sanctuary available 44

Complex relationships 45

Constrained resources 46

Ambiguity 46

Rapidity 47

Asymmetry 48

Force protection 49

Summary 50

CHAPTER FIVE — Implications and Recommendations for the U.S. Army 52

General 52

Complex and Urban Terrain. 53

Information Warfare and Information Operations 53

No Homeland Sanctuary Available 54

Constrained Resources 55

Rapidity 55

Asymmetry 55

Force Protection 56

CHAPTER SIX — CONCLUSION 57

REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER 59

APPENDIX A — Definitions of Terms 60

APPENDIX B — Environmental Variables 61

BIBLIOGRAPHY 63

Books 63

Periodicals 64

Websites 66

Government Documents 67

Abstract

"Eighteen Years in Lebanon and Two Intifadas: The Israeli Defense Force and the U.S. Army Operational Environment" by Major Richard D. Creed, Jr., Armor.

This monograph determined that the tactical and strategic experience of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) since 1981 was relevant to the future operational environment of the U.S. Army. The IDF's experiences are relevant because the Israeli Army was similarly equipped and organized to the heavy units in the U.S. Army, both then and now. Israel faced a similar full spectrum threat, and the IDF had to adapt to enemies who switched to asymmetric methods in order to overcome Israel's conventional military superiority. The IDF of 1981 paralleled the U.S. Army of the 2000 in many ways. It was a mechanized heavy force designed to conduct operations against a Soviet armed and equipped enemy. It fought and defeated some of those enemies decisively eight years previously. Beginning with the invasion of Lebanon (Operation Peace for Galilee), the IDF discovered that there were no peer competitors willing to fight it on its own terms. The nature of war changed for the IDF in sometimes unexpected ways, and it struggled to adapt to its changing operational environment. The IDF operational environment became much more complicated, because while it retained the old threats in the form of its Arab neighbors, it added sustained guerrilla war and civil insurrection.

This paper summarized the trends and characteristics of the U.S. Army's Contemporary Operational Environment (COE) and used them as the basis of comparison with the IDF operational environment. IDF operations in Lebanon and the two Palestinian Intifadas represented the trends of the IDF operational environment. All of the COE characteristics were present in the IDF operational environment in some form. Nine of the fourteen COE characteristics were present in the IDF operational environment to a significant degree. The comparison between the two operational environments was valid.

Having determined that the two operational environments were similar, the remainder of the paper analyzed how the well the IDF adapted to its operational environment. The goal was to determine whether there were lessons relevant to the U.S. Army as it undergoes Transformation. The IDF was at least partially successful adapting to seven characteristics: asymmetry, constrained resources, force protection, information operations, rapidity, homeland sanctuary, and complex and urban terrain. IDF adaptation to those seven characteristics had implications from which it was possible to make recommendations about the course of Transformation.

This paper recommended that the U.S. Army pay particularly close attention to the way that the IDF adapted its mechanized and armored units to survive in complex and urban terrain. The IDF's operational environment in Lebanon was so hostile that information superiority had negligible impact on force protection. Since everyone was potentially a threat, successful enemy attacks were inevitable over time. Vehicle survivability provided force protection, which in turn gave Israel's political leadership policy options. The IDF experience confirmed that homeland sanctuary is no longer possible, and that the effort must be joint and multi-agency.

The ability to adapt to the rapidity of the operational environment demanded real time intelligence. More importantly, it required both the will and the authority at the proper levels to act on that intelligence while it was still of value. The U.S. Army needs to incorporate asymmetry into its gunnery and tactical training. It also needs to ensure that the opposing forces at the training centers be used to determine likely asymmetric methods of attack against friendly forces and use them so that friendly units can determine countermeasures. None of the findings of this monograph were revolutionary or breathtaking. There were no IDF adaptations that the U.S. Army could not improve upon, as long as it has the will to do so.

CHAPTER ONE — Introduction

Relevance

United States Army Transformation is motivated largely by the recognition that the world has changed significantly since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The current Army force structure, and until the recent publication of FM 3.0, its doctrine, were designed to defeat enemies equipped and trained like the Red Army. The collapse of European communism, the crushing military defeat of Iraq, and lukewarm relations with China led to a shortage of enemies willing or able to fight the United States 'the old fashioned way' in a conventional war. There are still enemies to fight, as the events of September 11, 2001 demonstrated. They are, however, not willing to deliberately fight U.S. using methods that the U.S. Army is best suited to defeat.

The Contemporary Operating Environment (COE) recognizes that other nations find U.S. superiority in the western method of conventional war too overwhelming to directly challenge in the near future. It is possible to argue that the U.S. Army has become a victim of its own success. Because of its technological and operational superiority in mechanized combat, potential enemies increasingly seek to achieve military or political objectives differently as a simple matter of survival. States have learned by experience (Iraq) or observation that fighting America on its own terms is not the path to success. What formerly was considered irregular