In Action with the SAS

By David Horner and Neil Thomas

The SAS is a disciplined and elite force in which the men are trained to operate deep behind enemy lines to conduct surveillance and reconnaissance operations, usually in very close proximity to the enemy, and are often involved in violent actions with that enemy. This history describes some of the most important operations in which the SAS has been involved including first action in Borneo, followed by confrontation in Vietnam, then Somalia, Kuwait, and East Timor in the 1990s. Based on firsthand reports and interviews with participants, this is an intriguing account of the regiment's first 40 years.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Allen Unwin
• Release date: Mar 31, 2010
• ISBN: 9781741766165

David Horner

David Horner is an emeritus professor at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian University, Canberra, where he was previously professor of Australian defence history. A graduate of the Royal Military College, Duntroon, who served as an infantry platoon commander in South Vietnam, Colonel Horner is the author of over thirty books on military history and defence, including High Command (1982) and Blamey: The Commander-in-Chief (1998).

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IN ACTION

WITH THE

SAS

DAVID HORNER is Professor of Australian Defence History in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University. A graduate of the Royal Military College, Duntroon, he served as an infantry platoon commander in South Vietnam and has had many years of regimental and staff experience. In 1998, as an Army Reserve colonel, he became the first head of the Army’s Land Warfare Studies Centre. He has written numerous books on military command, operations, defence policy and strategy, including Defence Supremo, Blamey: The Commander-in-Chief and Breaking the Codes (co-authored with Desmond Ball).

In 2004 he was appointed Official Historian of Australian Peacekeeping and Post-Cold War Operations.

IN ACTION

WITH THE

SAS

Updated edition of

SAS: Phantoms of the Jungle

DAVID HORNER

First published as SAS: Phantoms of the Jungle in 1989

Second edition published as SAS: Phantoms of War in 2002

This revised and updated edition published in 2009

Copyright © David Horner 1989, 2002, 2009

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publisher. The Australian Copyright Act 1968 (the Act) allows a maximum of one chapter or 10 per cent of this book, whichever is the greater, to be photocopied by any educational institution for its educational purposes provided that the educational institution (or body that administers it) has given a remuneration notice to Copyright Agency Limited (CAL) under the Act.

Allen & Unwin

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National Library of Australia

Cataloguing-in-Publication entry:

National Library of Australia Cataloguing-in-Publication entry

Horner, D. M. (David Murray), 1948-

In action with the SAS.

ISBN: 9781741755527 (pbk.)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

Australia. Army. Special Air Service Regiment–History.

Australia. Army–Commando troops.

Other Authors/Contributors:

Thomas, Neil.

Also Titled: In action with the Special Air Service

356.1670994

Index by Trevor Matthews

Set in AIProspera Book 12/16 pt by Midland Typesetters, Australia

Printed in Singapore by KHL Printing Co Pty Ltd

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

CONTENTS

Preface

Abbreviations

Notes

Bibliography

Index

MAPS

Map 1: SABAH, SARAWAK AND BRUNEI

This map shows the two areas where the SAS served in Borneo. 1 SAS Squadron generally operated in the area marked as Map 2, while 2 SAS Squadron operated in the area marked as Map 3 in 1966.

Map 2: BORDER AREA: SABAH, SARAWAK, KALIMANTAN

This map shows the area where 1 SAS Squadron generally operated in 1965. The area along the border between Kalimantan and Sarawak and Sabah consisted of a tangle of steep mountains separated by numerous rivers, and was covered by thick jungle. Maps were unreliable and it was difficult to know when the border had been crossed.

Map 3: BORDER AREA: FIRST DIVISION, SARAWAK

This map shows the area where 2 SAS Squadron operated in 1966. The border was usually along a jungle-covered ridge leading down to rivers, which were the main means of communication in this area of Kalimantan. The Sarawak side consisted of jungle with small cultivated areas around the kampongs.

Map 4: CORPS AREA – SOUTH VIETNAM

This map shows the location of Phuoc Tuy Province in relation to the remainder of South Vietnam.

Map 5: PHUOC TUY PROVINCE

From 1966 to 1971 the Australian SAS Squadron was based at Nui Dat and operated in the area covered by this map. Missions were conducted throughout Phuoc Tuy Province and across the border into Bien Hoa, Long Khanh and Binh Tuy provinces. The border and mountain areas were generally covered with extensive areas of jungle, while the areas around the villages and towns were usually cultivated, either with rice or rubber plantations.

Map 6: EAST TIMOR

In September 1999 the 3 SAS Squadron group was deployed to East Timor, and was based at Dili. It conducted operations throughout the territory, but mainly in the western areas, until replaced by 1 SAS Squadron in December 1999.

PREFACE

In Action with the SAS is the third edition of my history of the Australian Special Air Service Regiment, first published in 1989. The first edition, SAS: Phantoms of the Jungle, set out to describe the operations of the Special Air Service from its establishment in 1957 through to 1989. I had been asked to write the book by the then Director of Special Action Forces, Colonel Rod Curtis, who believed that the history of the regiment needed to be written while its early members were still alive. He also believed that the actions of the SAS in Borneo and Vietnam, which until then had been secret, needed to be put on the public record. Accordingly, in writing the history I was given full access to all the SAS Regiment’s records and was able to interview a large number of serving and ex-SAS soldiers who had served in the regiment at home and on active service. I examined almost 1400 patrol reports, which needed to have their security classification downgraded so that they could be used in the book. The two commanding officers of the regiment at the time, Lieutenant-Colonels Terry Nolan and Jim Wallace, placed the full resources of the regiment at my disposal.

The second edition of the book was published in 2002 with the title SAS: Phantoms of War. As I noted then, in the thirteen years since the initial publication the Australian SAS had seen momentous changes, with the development of new capabilities within the regiment and its involvement in numerous operations, including deployments on peace operations during the 1990s, culminating in the INTERFET operation in East Timor in 1999–2000.

For the new edition I deleted the old final chapter, replacing it with two new chapters covering the more recent period. Considering the wide range of activities carried out by the regiment in that time it was not possible to describe them in the same depth as in the original account. Further, details of some recent activities could not be published at that stage. Nor, for security reasons, was it possible to mention the names of as many individual soldiers as was the case in the earlier account. The story that emerged, however, showed how the regiment had outgrown the Vietnam legacy and had secured its place as the Australian Defence Force’s force of choice. The book remained, therefore, as a comprehensive account of the regiment’s service during a period of more than 40 years.

As with the earlier edition, I had the full support of the commanding officer during 1999–2000, Lieutenant-Colonel Tim McOwan, who gave me access to unit files and facilitated interviews with serving unit members. Brigadiers Philip McNamara and Duncan Lewis, successive Commanders Special Forces, cleared the way for the project.

This new edition, In Action with the SAS, tells the same story (1957 to 2000) as the earlier editions, but has been edited, with the assistance of Neil Thomas, to make it more accessible to a new readership. It was tempting to try to bring the SAS story up to the present, but the major campaigns in which the SAS has been involved–Afghanistan and Iraq– are still being fought. It is not yet possible to examine the full documentary record, and details of the operations cannot be released while they are still proceeding. It would also be difficult to tell the full story of the SAS in Afghanistan and Iraq without reference to the actions of other Australian and coalition forces. This would require a treatment that would not fit easily into a mere extension of the present history.

It would be useful, however, to summarise briefly what has happened since 2000. Following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon on September 11, the Australian Government deployed military forces to the Persian Gulf–Central Asia region as part of the international coalition against terror. The Australian contingent included a Special Forces Task Group that began operations in Afghanistan in December. Following the model that had been employed in Kuwait in 1998, the Task Group included a headquarters element, based on the headquarters of the SAS Regiment (commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Gus Gilmore), an SAS squadron (commanded by Major Dan McDaniel) and support elements. The soldiers were engaged in reconnaissance and surveillance tasks in the harsh Afghanistan environment and soon found themselves in contact with Islamic Taliban fighters. In February, Sergeant Andrew Russell was killed when his vehicle struck a mine; he was the first SAS soldier to die as a result of enemy action since the Vietnam War. Among several awards given to SAS soldiers, Sergeant Matthew Bouillaut was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for leading his patrol in combat in March 2002.

The Task Group was replaced by a second (led by Lieutenant-Colonel Rowan Tink) in March–April 2002, and a third (led by Lieutenant-Colonel Mark Smethurst) took over in August 2002. By the time this Task Group was withdrawn at the end of the year the Australian SAS had cemented their reputation for professionalism and ability among the other coalition partners. They had become involved in and had played key roles in some of the key battles of the war. Also, at the end of 2002 the government formed Special Operations Command under Major-General Duncan Lewis, a former coming officer of the SAS Regiment.

In preparation for the invasion of Iraq in January 2003 the government began to deploy forces to the Gulf region, including a Special Forces Task Group. It included a headquarters element (commanded by Brigadier Mike Hindmarsh), a headquarters element from the SAS Regiment under its commanding officer, an SAS squadron group of about 150 personnel, a large platoon from 4 RAR (Commando), a detachment from the Incident Response Regiment, three Chinook helicopters from the 5th Aviation Regiment, and support personnel. The SAS squadron crossed the border into Iraq on the night of 19 March and, after travelling by patrol vehicle for about 30 kilometres, was engaged in one of the first ground contacts of the war. Other SAS patrols flew into Iraq by helicopter. The SAS squadron dominated its area of operation in Western Iraq. SAS patrols captured and destroyed key Iraqi positions and, towards the end of the 42-day campaign, they captured one of Iraq’s largest air bases, the Al Asad Airbase, 200 kilometres west of Baghdad. It had been a brilliant demonstration of the SAS’s ability to operate successfully in a hostile environment behind enemy lines. More than a dozen SAS officers and soldiers were awarded medals and honours for the operations against Iraq. After the formal end of the war in May 2003 the Special Forces Task Group returned to Australia, but some SAS soldiers remained to assist with security tasks, and continued to fulfil this requirement over the succeeding years.

In September 2005 an Australian Special Forces Task Group, consisting primarily of an SAS squadron but also with troops from 4 RAR (Commando), returned to Afghanistan to help fight a resurgence of Taliban and Al Qaeda forces. The Task Group was later reinforced with two Chinook helicopters. After several rotations, the Task Group was withdrawn in September 2006. As had happened with the earlier SAS deployments, members of the Task Group received decorations for bravery and competence in combat. In May 2007 a Special Operations Task Group– again with members from the SAS Regiment and 4 RAR (Commando)– returned to Afghanistan, and, in October, Sergeant Matthew Locke was killed in a fire-fight. The previous December he had been awarded the Medal of Gallantry for bravery in combat in Afghanistan in June 2006. By this stage Major-General Mike Hindmarsh, who had commanded the SAS Regiment in Kuwait in 1998 and the Special Forces Task Group in Iraq in 2003, was commanding all the Australian forces operating in Iraq and Afghanistan. Major-General Tim McOwan, who had commanded the SAS-based Response Force in East Timor in 1999, was Commander Special Operations.

The full story of the SAS’s remarkable operations in the past decade remains to be told. In the meantime, this book seeks to put on record the story of how the SAS established and built its outstanding reputation in the first 40 years of its history.

ABBREVIATIONS

1. THE TRACTOR JOB:

2 SQUADRON, MARCH 1968

It was March 1968 and Vietnam was at the height of the dry season. In the jungles, villages and paddy fields of the Republic of South Vietnam the Americans and their allies were fighting countless battles with the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army (NVA), while for many South Vietnamese villagers the routine of tending their crops went on as it had for decades. From the passenger seat of the Army Cessna light aircraft Sergeant Frank Cashmore looked down at the dry, yellow-brown paddy fields of Phuoc Tuy Province passing slowly 1000 metres below. To his right he could see a haze of smoke where farmers were burning off the rice stubble in preparation for the growing season. To his left and also ahead was the expanse of green jungle, known as the Hat Dich area, that covered the north-west sector of the province. This was the traditional home of the 274th VC Regiment. But Cashmore had little thought for the wider issues of the war. On his knees was spread his contact-covered map with possible landing zones (LZ) circled in black, for the selection of an LZ was one of the crucial decisions facing an SAS patrol commander. Behind him sat Corporal Danny Wright, second-in-command of his patrol, and together they were planning their first operational mission in Vietnam.

Frank Cashmore knew that an SAS patrol was most vulnerable at the moment of its insertion into enemy-held territory. Would a large VC reception party be waiting on the edge of the LZ? Would the aircraft activity alert a nearby VC force so that it could move quickly to intercept and perhaps ambush the newly arrived SAS? Had the VC planted anti-personnel mines or booby traps across the LZ? After all, the SAS had been operating in Phuoc Tuy for the past twenty months and the VC had a reasonable understanding of SAS insertion techniques. And there were other considerations; for this operation Cashmore’s men would be carrying heavy loads and it was important that the LZ be relatively close to the target area.

To his left Cashmore could now see the straight red-brown scar of the Firestone Trail through the green vegetation. Hacked out of the jungle by the great Rome ploughs of the US Army engineers, it facilitated the movement of armoured vehicles and enabled the reconnaissance flights to detect whether anyone had walked or driven on it during the night. As the aircraft flew north Cashmore saw the trail swing east, cutting across their flight path a kilometre ahead. It crossed the grassy open patch known as LZ Dampier, and stretched away towards the Courtenay rubber plantation. Cashmore became more alert. LZ Dampier was the target area. They turned east, following the Firestone Trail, and shortly before reaching LZ Dampier they spotted a large bomb crater that might provide suitable cover during the operation. Not wanting to risk another flight over that area they turned south. Then Cashmore saw what he was looking for; about 600 metres south of Dampier was a small clearing that had been occupied by elements of the 2nd Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment (2 RAR) during Operation DUNTROON in January 1968. This would be a suitable LZ. Cashmore tried to take in as much as he could as the Cessna kept on its course without slackening speed.

It was by sheer chance that Frank Cashmore had been given the tractor job.¹ Along with 30 other members of the advance party of 2 SAS Squadron, he had arrived at Nui Dat on 7 February 1968 and had begun the process of in-country training and familiarisation before the rest of the squadron arrived on 27 February. There was a lot for a young SAS patrol commander to learn from the experienced hands of 1 Squadron, who were preparing to return to Australia: the rules of engagement; the orders for the observation posts manned by the SAS on Nui Dat hill; the layout of the sprawling Task Force base half hidden beneath the trees of the rubber plantation below the SAS enclave on Nui Dat hill; and the procedures for calling for support from the helicopters of No 9 Squadron RAAF. Cashmore knew the SAS Standing Operating Procedures backwards, but there were many local factors to be absorbed.

One important factor was the enemy situation. Barely a week before the SAS advance party arrived the VC had begun their celebrated Tet offensive. Two Australian infantry battalions, 2 and 7 RAR, were already operating on the border of Bien Hoa and Long Khanh Provinces. The remaining battalion, 3 RAR, which had just completed its acclimatisation and training, was soon in action clearing the enemy from the provincial capital of Baria and the nearby town of Long Dien, seven kilometres southwest and south of the Task Force base respectively. Both Long Dien and Hoa Long, only three kilometres south of Nui Dat, had to be cleared again, and in each case 1 SAS Squadron was asked to assist with the cordon and search. The new arrivals from 2 Squadron accompanied 1 Squadron and gained valuable experience, although it was not the sort of task for which the SAS was trained. Before 1 Squadron departed Cashmore was able to join only one SAS patrol, a 21-man ambush patrol delivered by armoured personnel carriers six kilometres west of Nui Dat. The country was mainly flat, open paddy fields with high grass and the ambush was in a thicket of bamboo. As it was the dry season, water was scarce, the sun was hot, and movement through the dry grass was noisy. No enemy were seen on the patrol, which lasted from 9 to 12 February, and it was scarcely an ideal introduction to SAS patrolling in Vietnam.

As a well-trained SAS patrol commander, however, Cashmore learned from these and other experiences. Raised in Collie, Western Australia, he had enlisted in the Army with the express purpose of becoming an SAS soldier. At that time new soldiers were required to serve for eighteen months in another Army posting before applying for SAS. Cashmore went to infantry, joining 2 RAR at Terendak in Malaya. In August 1962 the battalion was deployed to the Thai–Malay border region for anti-terrorist operations, and Cashmore spent two months on these operations as a Bren-gunner—good training for later patrols in a more hostile environment. While Cashmore was in Malaya, Captain Mike Jeffery from the SAS visited the battalion on a recruiting tour. Cashmore applied, returned to Australia, completed the cadre course and joined the SAS in mid 1963.

After serving in Borneo, Cashmore arrived in Vietnam as a recently promoted patrol commander in February 1968. Emotional and highly strung, Cashmore was under considerable pressure as he prepared for his first patrol. Fortunately Corporal Danny Wright was an experienced SAS soldier. Aged 28, he had joined the SAS in 1960 and served as second-in-command of a patrol in Borneo, although like Cashmore, he had seen no action. But the remainder of Cashmore’s patrol who joined him at Nui Dat on 27 February—Privates Kim McAlear (aged 19), Adrian Blacker (21) and David Elliott (22)—had only recently joined the SAS and had no operational experience.

It was probably because of this lack of experience that Cashmore’s patrol was one of the last to be given a mission. By 9 March, when they were warned that they were to undertake a reconnaissance of the area around LZ Dampier between 15 and 20 March, the squadron had already deployed eleven patrols. It was sheer chance that Cashmore had already been tasked to go to the very area where an ambush mission was now required, and suddenly he found himself joining his squadron commander, Major Brian Wade, for the short Land Rover journey to Task Force headquarters in the rubber plantation east of Nui Dat hill. Task Force commander, Brigadier Ron Hughes, had a special task for the SAS. Cashmore and Wade were met by Hughes’ SO2 Operations, Major Ian MacLean, who described their mission.

Each morning an aircraft from 161 (Independent) Recce Flight flew around the borders of the province looking for sign of enemy activity, and an observer had reported what appeared to be the tracks of a tractor and trailer across LZ Dampier. It was not known where the tractor had come from, but the French owner of the Courtenay rubber plantation had reported that his Fordson Major tractor had been stolen. It was thought that the tractor was being used to transport stores and ammunition from the more heavily populated area of the rubber plantations to the VC bases in the Hat Dich.

In the aftermath of the VC Tet offensive it was important to maintain pressure on the enemy in Phuoc Tuy Province as two Australian infantry battalions had been deployed outside the province since late January. The destruction of the tractor would seriously interfere with VC resupply activities and keep them on the defensive with a salutary reminder that they could not move with impunity in Phuoc Tuy Province. That the VC were sensitive to the security of the tractor was shown by information that the tractor might be escorted by 60 VC, 30 in the front and 30 in the rear.

Cashmore’s task was to destroy the tractor. Both Cashmore and the other patrol members later asserted that they were told that since the tractor was owned by a French firm, for political reasons they had to conduct a deniable operation; that is, there should be no indication that the Australians were involved. Wade and Hughes both denied that this was required. But Wade did instruct his men that they should make it appear as though the tractor and its cargo had exploded spontaneously; there should be no indication that the SAS was in the area.²

The task presented considerable problems. First, they needed better information on the area. Cashmore obtained from 2 RAR good, recent, oblique, aerial photographs of the Firestone Trail near to LZ Dampier.

The second problem was the technique to be used to destroy the tractor. Wade had become familiar with the technique of ‘demolition ambush’ when he had attended the US Special Warfare Course at Fort Bragg in 1965. Given that the contents of the trailer and the size of the VC escort party were unknown, he saw demolition ambush as the only practicable solution and briefed Cashmore accordingly. Cashmore selected Corporal Danny Wright to head the demolition team, and Corporal Dave Scheele joined the patrol as his assistant. A quiet, 28-year-old Dutchman, Scheele had completed his National Service with the Dutch commandos, served with 2 RAR and been on operations with 2 SAS Squadron in Borneo.

Once the technique had been decided and the team selected, Wade, Cashmore, Wright and Scheele visited 1 Field Engineer Squadron to investigate using anti-tank mines. None were available in Vietnam and the engineers recommended that they use Beehive explosive charges. Beehives were shaped charges that stood on short legs and were designed to blow a hole into the ground. The engineer squadron sergeant-major (SSM), Warrant Officer Turner, suggested that they remove the legs of the Beehive charges and set them upside down. Once initiated the charges would punch a hole right through the tractor and trailer into any explosives or weapons stored on the trailer. The engineers supplied four fifteen pound (6.8 kilogram) Beehive charges. To counter the enemy force accompanying the tractor it was decided to set up four Claymore mines.

The next problem was that the planners did not know what was on the trailer, and if it was packed with explosives they would not want to be too close when the demolition was initiated. Wade ordered that the SAS party had to be at least 100 metres from the explosion, so the explosion would have to be detonated by the weight of the tractor. But what if the tractor did not appear on the first night? The patrol would have to be prepared to remain in position for up to seven nights, and the charges would have to be expertly camouflaged to survive the scrutiny of any VC who might pass on foot during this period. There was also a chance that an innocent Vietnamese Lambro or motor scooter might drive along the track, so the demolition device would have to be adjusted so that it could only be detonated by the heavy weight of the tractor.

Wright and Scheele tackled the problem energetically and worked out a wiring diagram to detonate electrically the four Beehives and the four Claymores which would be sited to catch the flank protection escorts. The only thing missing was a suitable pressure plate to close the circuit when the target’s heaviest wheels were over it. The SSM of 1 Field Squadron designed a switch made from a baking dish, four Land Rover clutch springs (cut to compress with the weight of the main wheel of a Fordson Major tractor), an eighth of an inch (3 mm) steel plate, twelve inches (30 cm) by eighteen inches (46 cm), and battery straps. The terminals were fixed to blocks of wood, one on the baking dish and the other on the steel plate. Two pounds (900 grams) of C4 explosive were taped underneath the baking dish to ensure the destruction of the switch itself. Cells from a disassembled 64 radio set battery were then placed in a beer can and an on/off switch, a self-destruct switch and two cable-connecting terminals were soldered onto the top. The device was constructed by members of the detachment of 152 Signals Squadron attached to the SAS Squadron.

By now Brigadier Hughes was becoming agitated by the apparent delay in undertaking the mission, but Wade explained to him that proper preparation was necessary. Rehearsals were conducted day and night for three days until every move was perfected. McAlear and Blacker were to provide security to each flank while Wright and Scheele set up the demolitions. Communications between the sentries and the command group would be by URC 10 radios on 241 frequency; if enemy troops arrived unexpectedly the sentries would provide sufficient warning for the demolition team to hide until they had passed. Cashmore would keep overall control while Elliott removed the equipment from the packs in the correct order and handed it to the demolition men, ensuring that everything taken from the packs and not actually used was returned and not left on the track. It was soon apparent that they would have to carry a considerable weight and Wright decided to use only a single Don 10 wire as it would have to stretch up to 100 metres. Claymore leads of only 33 metres would require too many joins, creating more electrical resistance and thus a need for a larger and heavier power source.

A full dress rehearsal was carried out on the track that ran up Nui Dat hill past the squadron picture theatre known as Ocker’s Opry House. It took three and a half hours to dig the explosives with dummy charges into the track and to set up the ambush. When all was ready Cashmore walked up to the squadron officers’ and sergeants’ mess and invited Wade to drive his Land Rover down the track. He did so but to their dismay the switch failed to work. The Land Rover’s tyre had missed the steel plate. But once the tyre connected with the steel plate the switch worked perfectly.

The next day Wright and Scheele again checked all the charges and inspected the wires inch by inch. Meanwhile, Cashmore discussed the insertion of the patrol with the RAAF helicopter crews. Just as he was ready for his final briefing, Warrant Officer Turner arrived with one more suggestion: he was carrying an auger which he thought would be useful for digging the holes for the Beehive charges.

It took some time to organise the load to be carried by the patrol. Since they had to remain in position for up to seven days they had to carry fourteen water bottles for each man, plus seven days’ rations. Then there were the demolitions, radios and the usual weapons and ammunition.

Soon after 9 am on 17 March the six members of the patrol staggered across Kangaroo Pad (the main helicopter landing place at Nui Dat) and heaved themselves into the waiting Iroquois helicopter. It took barely fifteen minutes to reach the LZ.

An SAS insertion was nerve-racking at the best of times. By 9.30 am Cashmore’s heart was pumping faster as he prepared to leap first from the helicopter descending towards the LZ. As the skids came to within half a metre of the ground he jumped. The weight of his pack drove him face down into the rock-hard surface. Gasping for breath, he struggled to his feet in time to see the other men suffering the same fate, and the helicopter lifting slightly as it was relieved of the weight of each man. Within seconds they had reached the treeline, but realised that Dave Elliott was still struggling across the LZ. He had been the last man to jump, and by then the helicopter was almost a metre off the ground.

Quickly they helped Elliott to the edge of the trees and then discovered that he had torn the ligaments in his ankle and could barely walk. Cashmore spoke on his radio to the helicopters—instructed to circle some distance away for twenty minutes—and asked them to return. Meanwhile the team members carried out a mental check to ensure that Elliott would not be evacuated with any equipment that might be vital to the mission. They decided to sacrifice some of the food and water. Unfortunately no one remembered that he was carrying one of the URC 10 241 radios that were part of the warning group.

It took the patrol about one hour to move 200 metres north of the LZ, where they stopped and went into a lying-up position (LUP). While resting one of them suddenly realised that Elliott had been carrying one of the three URC 10s. They discussed in whispers whether to continue with the mission. Wright wondered whether the two remaining radios on the 241 frequency could communicate with the URC 10 on 243 (International Distress Emergency only) frequency that the patrol carried to facilitate emergency extractions. In the close confines of the LUP this appeared to work so it would be possible to continue with the plan to deploy the two sentries to provide early warning.

The patrol moved off again, but it was not until mid afternoon that they reached the Firestone Trail. Cashmore recalled that by this time he had a thumping headache and he set the patrol down in another LUP. After a short rest Cashmore and Wright crept forward to observe the track, striking it about 200 metres west of LZ Dampier. Cashmore received his second shock for the day when he discovered that the tractor had not driven down the centre of the trail with one wheel in each rut, but had gone west with one wheel on the track and the other in the grass, and on its return journey had one wheel in the other rut. The Firestone Trail was 30 to 40 metres wide, the tractor was relatively small, and Cashmore believed that he could not risk placing the pressure plate in only one rut and the explosives between two of the three wheel tracks. Covered by Wright, Cashmore stepped out onto the track and walked along it towards LZ Dampier as if he owned it, feeling as he said later, ‘like a spare prick at a wedding’. With one man on the track and the other covering from the jungle they moved along the track for about 100 metres until they came across a slight bend and discovered that in changing direction the tractor had cut the corner and for a short distance the wheels had been in both ruts. This was the spot for the ambush, and looking around, 50 metres to the north across the Firestone Trail, they found the large bomb crater they had earlier identified as possible cover for the patrol during the laying of the explosives.

That night the patrol moved down to the track to observe the night’s activities. At 11.20 pm the bright red tractor and trailer appeared, moving west along the Firestone Trail, and remarkably, travelling with a single, centrally placed light blazing through the jungle. At 1.45 am the tractor returned, travelling towards the east, and at last, after a long day the patrol could crawl back into their LUP and sleep.

Having timed the tractor’s movements Cashmore decided that they had sufficient information to mount the ambush on the following night, and they spent the next day resting and checking their equipment. It was a hot, uncomfortable day. There were only scattered trees and it seemed to the men that they had to keep moving constantly to remain under the shade.

Last light came at about 7 pm and after waiting a further twenty minutes they moved down to the ambush site, knowing from the previous night’s experience that they had until 11.20 pm to lay, camouflage and activate the system. They crossed the Firestone Trail from south to north, carefully obliterating any trace that they might have left. The two sentries prepared to move into position and before leaving the patrol they checked their radios; they were working, but only just. McAlear went west and Blacker, armed with a silenced Sterling submachine-gun, moved east to a position from where he could observe across LZ Dampier.

Once the sentries were in position the demolition team moved out onto the track and, in the absence of Elliott, Cashmore unpacked the demolition kits and passed them to the two demolition men. Immediately there were problems. The auger that had been carried to dig in the Beehive would not penetrate the hard-caked mud of the track. They tried to dig the holes with their machetes, but again with little success. Eventually they decided to use the central ridge of dried mud between the ruts to conceal the Beehives, but they still could not dig down far enough, and eventually they had to slightly build up the ridge.

It was exhausting work and towards the end, while they were camouflaging the charges, Danny Wright realised that he had misplaced his British issue machete. It would be a dead giveaway, and for the next ten minutes Wright, Scheele and Cashmore carried out a frantic ‘search by feel’ before it was located. With the demolitions laid and camouflaged it was now time to recall the sentries. But all attempts to raise them by radio failed. As they subsequently discovered, the 243 radio would not work to the 241 radio at a distance beyond 100 metres. Wright later described the outcome: ‘the two demo-team men had the hair-raising experience of moving out individually to locate a lone sentry, each on his first operational patrol. Accusations of slackness were soon disproved when each sentry showed an URC [pronounced ‘irk’] 10 still emitting hash and