Westmoreland's War: Reassessing American Strategy in Vietnam

Written by Gregory Daddis

Narrated by Jonathan Yen

General William C. Westmoreland has long been derided for his failed strategy of "attrition" in the Vietnam War. Historians have argued that Westmoreland's strategy placed a premium on high "body counts" through a "big unit war" that relied almost solely on search and destroy missions. Many believe the U.S. Army failed in Vietnam because of Westmoreland's misguided and narrow strategy.

In a groundbreaking reassessment of American military strategy in Vietnam, Gregory Daddis overturns conventional wisdom and shows how Westmoreland did indeed develop a comprehensive campaign which included counterinsurgency, civic action, and the importance of gaining political support from the South Vietnamese population. Exploring the realities of a large, yet not wholly unconventional environment, Daddis reinterprets the complex political and military battlefields of Vietnam. Without searching for blame, he analyzes how American civil and military leaders developed strategy and how Westmoreland attempted to implement a sweeping strategic vision.

Westmoreland's War is a landmark reinterpretation of one of America's most divisive wars, outlining the multiple, interconnected aspects of American military strategy in Vietnam-combat operations, pacification, nation building, and the training of the South Vietnamese armed forces. Daddis offers a critical reassessment of one of the defining moments in American history.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Tantor Media, Inc
• Release date: Dec 25, 2018
• ISBN: 9781541447929

Reviews for Westmoreland's War

[shrike58 · Rating: 4 out of 5 stars]

At the very least the author has achieved his basic purpose, which is to have produced a credible defense of William Westmoreland's military professionalism. Call this the other side of the coin, after Daddis left behind the idolization that the West Point of his time as a cadet inculcated in regards to Creighton Abrams. That said, the long-term student of America's involvement in Vietnam is not going to find that many deep revelations here. Those folks who want to keep their cynicism nice and shiny might wish to read "The Myths of Tet" by Edwin Moise, a man who has made a career of critiquing the misconceptions and wishful thinking of all the parties to the conflict.

[rivkat_2 · Rating: 3 out of 5 stars]

While I’m completely sympathetic to the argument that you can have a good strategy and still lose, this revisionist account doesn’t stick the landing. Daddis shows that there were people in the military, including in high places, who said that they needed to do things other than continue shoveling bodies in/killing enemies, but does not contrast them to the number or power level of the people who ensured that mostly it was shoveling/killing or do more than gesture at the fact that the killing parts interfered with the nation- and trust-building parts.