Vietnam's partnership with China is 'window dressing' as it aims for flexibility in international relations

Following Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to Vietnam in mid-December, Beijing and Hanoi said they agreed to deepen their partnership, which is already considered among the closest bilateral relationships in the region.

However, analysts said the joint statement by the two countries on a comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership does not indicate a significant shift in their alliance. Rather, it is an attempt by Vietnam to diversify its foreign policy options, given that it already has signed comprehensive strategic partnerships with five other countries namely Japan, South Korea, the US, India and Russia, they added.

"The joint statement is not a commitment to a new alignment with China so much as window dressing on initiatives that have been under way for several years," said Carl Thayer, emeritus professor of politics at the University of New South Wales in Australia.

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According to Thayer, Vietnam's alliance with its powerful neighbour and the statement's commitment to building a "community with a shared future that carries strategic significance" could be seen as "making a virtue out of necessity".

"Vietnam must maintain manageable good relations with China because of their geographical proximity and economic interdependence," he said.

The joint statement says the two countries agreed to increase cooperation in several areas, including security, economic issues, the construction of cross-border rail connectivity and joint patrols between their defence ministries in the Gulf of Tonkin.

Despite ongoing skirmishes between the two countries in the South China Sea, their economies are interdependent with much of Vietnam's exported goods built using Chinese-made parts.

Bilateral trade between the two nations exceeded US$200 billion annually over the past two years and reached US$202.07 billion from January to November. It accounts for 25 per cent of China's trade with Asean, according to China's General Administration of Customs, the biggest proportion within the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations bloc.

Nguyen Khac Giang, a visiting fellow at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore, said that adding the "community with a shared future" concept in the statement does not necessarily elevate China above Vietnam's other partners.

"China's advantage lies in its close party-to-party relationship with Vietnam, a by-product of their ideological alignment. However, this dynamic hasn't changed significantly with Xi Jinping's recent visit," Giang said.

The two countries' communist parties share a common history of fighting Western imperialism and foreign invaders. From 1946 to 1954, former Chinese leader Mao Zedong extended ideological, political and material support to Vietnam in the latter's struggle for independence from the French. Chinese troops were also involved in Vietnam's war against the US over several years in the 1960s.

Noting that Vietnam was one of the last Southeast Asian countries to partner with China in the "community with a shared future" concept, Giang said that Hanoi's initial hesitation likely stemmed from its desire not to appear aligned with either China or the US.

Hence, embracing the concept might be a concession made by Hanoi in response to its recent diplomatic upgrades with the US and Japan to comprehensive strategic partnerships.

Derek Grossman, a senior defence analyst at the Rand Corporation, noted that, over the past year, Vietnam has forged three comprehensive strategic partnerships - with Japan, South Korea and the US. This showed that Hanoi has "devalued" the distinction, Grossman said.

But Thayer said Vietnam has not downgraded such partnerships. Rather, Hanoi has removed "long-standing rigidities" in its 2003 policy of "cooperation and struggle" that privileged China, Russia and India over the US, Japan, Australia and South Korea, he added.

Noting Vietnam's proposed comprehensive strategic partnership with Australia that is expected to be effective in March 2025, Thayer argued that the designation suits Hanoi's policy of diversification of relations.

Describing the comprehensive strategic partnerships as the "apex" of Vietnam's bilateral diplomatic relationships, Giang said the framework gives the country greater flexibility to collaborate in any area and at any level with its partners.

"However, the practical extent of this cooperation is contingent upon Vietnam's priorities and capabilities, as well as prevailing international conditions," he said.

Citing India as an example, Giang said Vietnam's relationship with the South Asian country under the comprehensive strategic partnership is not on the same level as that with China or the US.

Bich Tran, a postdoctoral fellow in the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore said it is difficult to compare the comprehensive strategic partnerships among different countries as they emphasise different aspects such as trade, investment, or maritime security.

Vietnam has been flexible in calibrating its partnerships in different areas such as arms supply and security.

One of the world's 20 biggest buyers of weapons, Vietnam has an annual budget for arms imports estimated at US$1 billion that is set to grow, according to GlobalData, a provider of military procurement intelligence. Most of that money has historically gone to Russia but in recent years, Hanoi has also turned to suppliers from India and the US.

When the US and Vietnam upgraded their ties in September amid long-standing tensions over conflicting claims in the South China Sea between China and Vietnam, Washington and Hanoi pledged to further cooperation in maritime law enforcement and maritime security.

In due course, Vietnam might also look to elevate its partnerships with some Asean members to the level of comprehensive strategic partnerships, Bich said.

"Doing so, however, requires more resources to carry out a higher level of cooperation. Hanoi will need to balance between its goal and capacity," she added.

This article originally appeared on the South China Morning Post (SCMP).

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