Myanmar military unlikely to win war but opposition needs global help to depose junta

For two-and-a-half years, the world has largely sat by as the Myanmar military has rampaged across the country in a desperate bid to consolidate power after deposing a democratically elected government in a coup d'etat.

The military has killed more than 4,500 people, jailed nearly 25,000, and increased aerial attacks on civilian targets, including schools, hospitals and houses of worship. A recent bombing attack at a camp for internally displaced people killed 39, mainly women and children, as they slept.

While the war in Ukraine has distracted many in the international community, much of the reason why the Myanmar conflict has received so little attention is that many states have resigned themselves to the idea the military will prevail. After all, the junta has ruled the country with an iron fist since 1962, with only a brief democratic window from 2015 to the coup in February 2021.

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But the assumption of a military victory is flawed, and right now the Myanmar military is fighting a multi-front war against a determined enemy that not only maintains legitimacy and popular support, but now has a more regular supply of weapons and ammunition.

The National Unity Government (NUG) network of 300 people's defence forces, and alliances with key ethnic resistance organisations, has put the military on their back heels. Importantly, the NUG is increasingly targeting the regime's ability to wage war and contesting roads and logistics hubs.

But it is not just the NUG's battlefield tenacity that is defeating the military, but the military's own incompetence and rot.

To start with, the military is smaller than previously thought. The 10 Light Infantry Divisions that are responsible for most combat operations, should be over 200,000 men, or roughly 200 men per battalion. In September 2022, a leaked order called for a floor of 185 men per battalion. But more than 50 per cent have under 150 men. One recently leaked field report revealed that a Light Infantry Battalion had only 132 men, of which only 70 were on the front line.

The three Defence Service Academies have seen admissions dwindle and with diminished standards. Overall recruitment into the military has fallen, as the military has bombed, committed arson and pillaged villages around the country.

In August 2023, the government called up civil servants to be used as militiamen. In early 2022, police were assigned frontline combat duties, while family members of mid-ranked officers received military training for assignment as base guards.

The NUG claims the military has lost 30,000 troops since the civil war began.

Manpower has also been diminished through defections and desertions. There are known to be over 13,000 police and military defections, though the rate has slowed and there have been few unit-level defections. There has also been an increased number of arrests of officers for refusing to obey orders to go into battle.

Second, the military's strategy is not working. Myanmar's counter-insurgency doctrine is not designed to win hearts and minds. Known as the "Four Cuts", the junta's counter-insurgency doctrine is based on terrorising the population into submission, through the intentional targeting of civilians, sexual violence, using human shields, and arson. War crimes are the strategy.

Today, the military controls significantly less territory than it did when it took over the country. Fifty of the 330 townships are under martial law. The NUG is collecting taxes in 12 per cent of the townships.

Nonetheless, the military has not questioned its failed strategy, but doubled down on it, escalating attacks against civilians.

Third, the military has fewer resources to accomplish its goal based on recent economic indicators. Myanmar's GDP under its stewardship has contracted 12 per cent, while the local currency kyat has lost 250 per cent of its value. Inflation is between 14 and 20 per cent, and there are currently shortages of cooking oil. All the people who know how to run the economy are in jail or exile.

Currency controls have hit all sectors of the economy. With the exception of oil and gas rents, government revenue is either flat or has declined in all categories, according to the junta's Internal Revenue Department.

Boycotts of consumer products from military-owned firms are eating into their revenue. Sales of Myanmar Beer, for example, are down 70 per cent and the military is now trying to force stores to sell it at gunpoint.

US sanctions have limited the junta's ability to conduct dollar transactions, and little by little they are losing access to overseas banks in Singapore and elsewhere.

While foreign investment is still coming in, it has slowed and is almost entirely from China and Thailand. Western investors continue to pull out.

In the 2023 financial year, the military gave itself a 50 per cent increase in its budget to US$2.7 billion. This is unsustainable and comes at the expense of education, public health, and other social services.

In short, the military is simultaneously fighting on too many fronts, with long, vulnerable supply lines, with a failed strategy that only enhances the legitimacy of the NUG and the public's determination to resist, with diminishing resources.

The military is unlikely to win this war or consolidate power.

As such, it is imperative for the international and business community to take several steps to hasten the end of military rule.

The NUG has limited recourses and is not without faults. But it has a defined end state: a federal democratic republic with a significant overhaul of the role of security forces in the political-economy of the country. It will have to work hard to convince the ethnic resistance organisation's of its commitment to federalism and the end of Bamar political dominance.

The international community should increase its support to the NUG, including the provision of humanitarian help, funding for public health, education, and the rule of law in liberated zones. Most of all, the NUG will need help in planning for the post-coup period.

Second, the international community should impose greater sanctions that stop the regime's ability to transact in dollars, and import weapons and materials for arms production.

Third, the international community must stop the sale of jet fuel to Myanmar. The military takes what it wants from the tiny civilian aviation sector and is bombing with impunity.

Fourth, the international community should provide help to the NUG in the gathering of evidence and witness testimony for war crimes tribunals and universal jurisdiction cases. The NUG is willing, but it needs more training in gathering evidence and maintaining a chain of custody to standards that will hold up in international courts or the growing number of universal jurisdiction cases.

Fifth, businesses that continue to operate in Myanmar must pay their taxes in escrow, to deny the junta of desperately needed funds. If nothing else, it would be prudent for companies to hedge their bets.

The international and business community have to stop basing their actions on the flawed assumptions that the military will ultimately prevail. The battlefield and economic realities suggest that their time is limited.

Zachary Abuza is a professor at the National War College in Washington, DC, where he focuses on Southeast Asian politics and security issues. The views are his own and do not reflect those of the National War College or Department of Defence.

This article originally appeared on the South China Morning Post (SCMP).

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