The Second Punic War (219–201 BC), particularly Hannibal’s Italian campaign, provides some good examples of the issues the unreliability of the sources pose for modern audiences. A recent award-winning book on the American Revolution cites George Washington’s defensive strategy as being called ‘Fabian’, which the author clarifies with “Fabius Maximus was the Roman general who defeated Hannibal.” In fact, Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus did not defeat his famous Carthaginian foe as this so boldly misstates.
Hannibal operated in Italy from spring 218 until autumn 203, making it clear that Fabius failed to achieve a strategic victory as Roman dictator in 217. We are told that he sought to avoid disadvantageous pitched battles in favour of denying supplies to the enemy, doing so with some success. Still, the invaders entered the summer campaign season “in possession of such an abundance of provisions, that they could get rid of them neither by use or waste” (Polybius, 3.90.7), and tactically, Hannibal cost Fabius a thousand men in escaping a trap at Ager Falernum before going on to punish two legions under the dictator’s nearequal subordinate Minucius at Geronium. What then is
