Rob Attar: Your book is titled Triumph and Illusion. Whose was the triumph, and what was the illusion?
Jonathan Sumption: It's deliberately ambiguous. The English were on top at the beginning of the period [1422], but they quickly declined and lost everything they'd gained over the previous decade. They then deceived themselves into thinking that there was some way in which they could conserve at least part of what they'd conquered.
There were triumphs and illusions on the other side, too. Eventually, the French did triumph: they excluded England from every part of France except Calais. But they had their own illusions. They felt that the English had no support in France except from traitors, but the striking thing is that the English had a lot of support in the areas that they occupied until they started losing, particularly in Normandy.
This was a very early example of a military occupation, and the English absolutely grasped the fact that they had to win the hearts and minds of the subjects in order to survive. They did that, initially, simply by providing an effective government and a working system of law. This had been completely missing in previous decades because France was in the middle of a civil war, and neither party to that war could supply that effective government.
As you alluded to there, when we're talking about the Hundred Years' War, France was not united, was it?
That's absolutely right. The English only ever got a secure foothold in France when it was divided by civil war. The 15th century witnessed the most serious civil war that France had ever experienced – between supporters
