THE TET OFFENSIVE

In 1967, after a year of heavy losses, Ho Chi Minh and General Giap began to fear that North Vietnamese morale would soon begin to fracture. The two decided on a dramatic shift of policy, moving away from protracted, limited warfare towards planning one great decisive battle. Up until now, the communists had been fighting on three fronts: maintaining military pressure on the ground, mobilising support from the people of South Vietnam and, crucially, eroding American public approval for US involvement.

They now believed it was time to concentrate their forces and seize swathes of strategic positions all across South Vietnam. This would, in turn, trigger a widespread general uprising against the South Vietnamese regime while simultaneously revealing to the US that the war was unwinnable, triggering a withdrawal.

In the United States, the anti-war movement was reaching new heights, with 30,000 protestors chanting “Hey, hey LBJ, how many kids did you kill today?” outside the White House – loud enough for President Lyndon B Johnson’s family to hear. With an election year coming up, Johnson was desperate to reassure the public that the war would soon be won. Convinced the communists were one heavy loss from defeat, Johnson and General Westmoreland