THE FLEET AHEAD OF ITS TIME
THE idea that it could never be economic to cater for seasonal traffic was deeply ingrained in British Railways’ policies following the revelations by Dr Beeching that equipment retained for such purposes was often used on only a handful of occasions annually.
Traffic such as farm fruit, grain and other materials that were not available throughout the year had previously been carried by a common user fleet of rolling stock controlled by the Central Wagon Authority, which distributed vehicles to loading points as required. But as the size of the fleet was reduced in the 1950s/60s, it became increasingly difficult to meet localised peak demand.
Although BR committed investment to modernise wagon-load services from the start of the 1970s, this was firmly aimed at moving regular traffic in less-than-trainload quantities, which could be combined into a single train to operate over trunk routes. These services were not designed to cater for larger trainload consignments that needed moving on a seasonal basis.
Uneconomic traffic
Sector management came into operation towards the end of 1982, when national business managers were established to gain a clear view of the overall market in various sub-sectors that had previously been managed at a regional level. One of the commodity groupings was Chemicals and Industrial Minerals, of which I was appointed as national business manager.
When looked at in isolation, the cost of providing traction for seasonal and occasional flows was uneconomic, as BR’s accounting rules imposed an unrealistic level of overheads which made the retention of locomotives just for these impossible.
To give an idea of the accounting rules, charges to Railfreight per Class 25 locomotive were £85,000 per annum (£225,000 at current values), but the actual depot expense of maintaining each loco was £25,000. The other £60,000 represented overhead charges from workshops
