olitical backing for intervention in Kuwait was global, including the UN. This avoided international condemnation of the military action. Jordan and Iran were vocal in their opposition to conflict while the most surprising reaction to the Iraqi invasion in the Middle East came from the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat who emerged as the prominent supporter of the Iraqi President. The pro-Iraqi position of the Palestinian leadership as well as of the Palestinian communities in Kuwait, Jordan, and the occupied territories subsequently became catastrophic for the group’s cause. After the liberation of Kuwait, an estimated 400,000 Palestinians were expelled from Kuwait and other Gulf Arab states. Jordan faced the bulk of the problem as most Palestinian returnees were Hashemite residents. Later, when Mahmoud Abbas was elected President in January 2005 following the death of Arafat, he issued a public apology to Kuwait over the Palestinian mistake during the Iraqi invasion. India had also been quietly concerned at the situation in August 1990 amid concern for its nationals who were working in Kuwait. Delhi had strong connections with Iraq. Baghdad had enjoyed good relations with India during the Iran war, buying fighter aircraft while Iraq supported Delhi over the Kashmir issue and refused to name Iraq as the ‘aggressor’ during the eight-year Iran-Iraq War. Again, in 1990, India neither condemned nor condoned the aggression. However, its traditional sympathy for the Ba’athist ruler and more importantly the safe evacuation of its citizens resulted in it adopting a position that alienated the Gulf monarchies and invited criticisms.
