‘NEVER BEEN BOMBED LIKE THEY ARE GOING TO BE BOMBED’
resident Richard Nixon’s daily briefing on Dec. 20, 1971, reported a buildup of North Vietnamese troops above the Demilitarized Zone and southbound troop movements on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The North Vietnamese air force was moving units south, including the newly established 927th Fighter Regiment, equipped with MiG-21PFM fighter jets. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Adm. Thomas Moorer had advised Nixon in November that Hanoi’s air defense units were attacking AC-130 Spectre gunships and B-52 Stratofortess bombers supporting Laotian Maj. Gen. Vang Pao’s forces fighting communist Pathet Lao insurgents.
Realizing that Hanoi intended to start an offensive in 1972, Nixon ordered the armed services to reinforce their air power in Indochina. That same day Moorer approved airstrikes against military targets up to the 20th parallel, essentially all targets south of Hanoi and the key port at Haiphong. Nixon and the Joint Chiefs thought the bombing would deter Hanoi from launching an offensive the size of the massive Tet Offensive in 1968. They were wrong.
COMMUNIST PARTY FIRST SECRETARY LE DUAN—Hanoi’s actual leader since December 1963, even though Ho Chi Minh was technically the head of government until his death in September 1969—viewed 1972 as an opportune time for a large-scale offensive to conquer South Vietnam. Le Duan believed that America’s antiwar movement would constrain Nixon’s response. Then, if the offensive succeeded as expected, Republican Nixon would be defeated in the November election or at least weakened in negotiations for a peace agreement. Le Duan’s memoirs speak of his preference for Democrats Hubert Humphrey, the 1968 presidential nominee, and George McGovern, who advocated for unconditional withdrawal and became the party’s presidential candidate in 1972. Additionally, Nixon’s not-sosecret communications with Beijing to establish better relations with China, one of North Vietnam’s major patrons, threatened a source of crucial support for Le Duan, which reinforced his need to damage Nixon politically.
Having imprisoned most Communist Party members who favored a peace agreement, Le Duan faced little opposition to a new offensive. He calculated that Hanoi had the political will to continue fighting
