The story is told by Thucydides in book 3, chapter 91 and on. Demosthenes, son of Alcisthenes, had been elected as a strategos of Athens for 426. He led a force of 30 triremes around the Peloponnese, sharing command with Procles, son of Theodorus. Even though this is his first appearance, it seems clear that Demosthenes was the senior commander. Some chapters later, Thucydides relates that this force ambushed a garrison at Ellomenus in Leucadia and then moved against Leucas itself. There, the Athenian forces were joined by almost the entire levy of Acarnania. Some men from Zacynthus and Cephallenia and fifteen ships from Corcyra were also present. Demosthenes had some Messenians with him too, although they are not mentioned at this point.
The Acarnanians wanted Demosthenes to besiege Leucas, but the Messenians persuaded him to attack the Aetolians instead. Demosthenes, we are told, thought that this would be a good opportunity to conquer the mainland of Aetolia for Athens. He was to be sadly mistaken.
Errors in Aetolia
Demosthenes was further persuaded that an attack on the Aetolian tribes was a good idea (as opposed to a possibly lengthy siege of Leucas) because they fought in light armour and lived in widely separated, unwalled villages. Thus, they could be easily defeated by Demosthenes’ superior armoured hoplites. The Messenians advised to attack the Apodotians first, then the Ophioneans, and lastly the Eurytanians, the largest division of the Aetolians. Convinced that the remainder of the Aetolians would yield quickly once these tribes were conquered, Demosthenes agreed. He also anticipated that, with new Aetolian allies, he could march overland to Phocis, Athens’ ally, and then invade Boeotia.
This decision alienated the Acarnanians, who refused to accompany Demosthenes’ expedition, but he set off without them nonetheless. He had, however, men from Zacynthus, Cephallenia, and Messenia, and the 300 men from his 30 ships (the ships from Corcyra
