To reduce terrorism, Indonesia needs to use 'credible voices' of reformed extremists

Since the early 2000s, Indonesia has experienced a series of deadly terrorist attacks from jihadists seeking to establish an Islamic state. The worst terror strikes were the Bali bombings in 2002 which killed 202 people. To deal with this problem, we must understand its deep roots and recent boosts.

Fortunately, there are solutions within grasp.

The roots are deeply ingrained. The militant struggle started in the 1940s when Darul Islam (House of Islam) fought for the creation of an Islamic state in Indonesia. At its height in the 1950s, Darul Islam was reputed to have control over vast swathes of territories in Aceh, South Sulawesi and West Java.

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Although Darul Islam was neutralised in the 1960s, its offshoots and splinter groups, including the Jemaah Islamiah, have continued the struggle to this day. And the concept is still prevalent among some ordinary Indonesians. A Ministry of Defence study revealed that 23 per cent of high school and university students agree with the idea of an Islamic state or caliphate for the country.

These deep roots have been bolstered by the more recent arrival of hardline Salafi ideas from the Middle East. These beliefs have challenged and undermined syncretic indigenous practices that have long contributed to the development of a pluralistic culture and religious tolerance in Indonesia.

Radical ideas are being purveyed through home-based pengajian (religious classes) attended by small groups of 10-15 people. This appears to be the preferred mode of jihadists and their supporters as such classes are more difficult for the authorities to monitor or regulate, unlike pesantrens or schools. It is considered a safer way of forming cells and mobilising the "faithful" as attendance is by invitation only via restricted chat groups on Telegram.

The internet has also made things worse. Its speed, accessibility and decentralised nature enlarges the potential audience of violent extremism (VE) propaganda. The intertwined online and offline elements of such VE propaganda and recruitment enable the creation of a collective identity among potential recruits through what is termed as the "echo-chamber" phenomenon, helping to reinforce individual grievances and radical ideology, and providing the intent and capability to commit acts of terrorism.

While the internet has become a key part of the problem, it can also become an important part of the solution. As targeting and identifying potential at-risk individuals purely through online methods may prove difficult, any effort to track them must simultaneously focus on both online and offline domains. This can be done by encouraging "credible voices" such as mentors to approach at-risk people, build communication, and help them leave their radical networks.

Mentors should implement the three principles of "Heart", "Hands", and "Head", known as the "Triple H Approach". The "Heart" involves securing the clients' trust; the "Hand" approach is designed to help clients channel their energies into new directions and activities as well as engaging new networks; and the "Head" approach persuades clients to consider different life priorities and steer them away from their old violent radical ways.

The "Triple H approach" has been implemented with success by former extremists. One good example is the way in which reformed convicted terrorist Arif Tuban was able to mentor Syahrul, a returned Islamic State (Isis) fighter from East Java.

Syahrul became disillusioned with Isis' lies and "un-Islamic behaviours" such as beheadings. He testified in an Indonesian court that an Isis recruiter told him that as a good Muslim, he had to help his oppressed brothers and sisters. Moreover, he was promised that he would be paid, and that he could come back home safely once the mission had been accomplished.

After Syahrul was released from prison, Arif helped him to gradually integrate himself back into society.

Firefighters extinguish a blaze after a blast in Surabaya in 2018. Photo: AFP

To implement the first principle of the mentoring ("Heart"), Arif introduced himself as a reformed convicted terrorist who managed to start a new life. This way, Arif could earn Syahrul's trust as they shared a similar life trajectory. Arif then embarked on the second step of the mentoring process ("Hand") by giving him social skills. He encouraged Syahrul to develop his business aspirations through making and selling a new candy product.

Finally, after knowing that Syahrul had developed the social networks, practical skills and changed mindset to truly become a positive father, husband, community member and businessman, Arif then embarked on the last principle of the mentoring ("Head") by revisiting the old ideology. Arif asked Syahrul to participate in social activities such as involving him in P/CVE (preventive/counter violent extremism) discussions with various university campuses, local community service organisations and village groups.

Through this public engagement, Arif encouraged and provided an opportunity for Syahrul to become a guest speaker in various prevention activities, including with the national counterterrorism agency.

Arif also helped Syahrul to restore his community reputation by introducing him to the local police and involving him in joint assistance activities. This opened up opportunities for him to become acquainted with community leaders and to have new social networks and platforms to channel his aspirations in public engagement, both offline and online.

This is a story of two individuals, Arif and Syahrul. However, it can be replicated hundreds of times if there is a national programme to do so. There is a clear urgency to intensify deradicalisation efforts to stem the recruitment of vulnerable youths, women and children, both online and offline in places like religious classes.

In the online space, it is not enough for the government and social media companies to adopt only "negative supply-side measures" by removing (or suppressing) online violent extremism propaganda. These measures, while helpful, do nothing to address the continued demand for such propaganda, which is driven by sociopolitical grievances and theological exhortations. Therefore, strong "positive demand-side measures" are also needed to proactively engage individuals and communities flirting with VE ideology. The use of reformed convicted terrorists in Indonesia in such measures should be further developed in scope and sophistication as they have the unique potential to counter violent extremism.

A stronger national effort to profile the "credible voices" of former terrorists would help to persuade potential recruits to pause and think again before joining the cause. Making this a major national priority would help significantly reduce the threat of terrorist attacks in Indonesia.

Noor Huda Ismail is Visiting Fellow, S. Rajaratnam Institute of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

This piece was first published as an essay by the Asian Peace Programme (APP) on October 28. The APP is part of the Asia Research Institute at the National University of Singapore. Read the original here.

This article originally appeared on the South China Morning Post (SCMP).

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