Will closer India-Australia ties boost Indo-Pacific 'Quad' group that has China in its sights?

US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo's decision to press on with a meeting of foreign ministers from Japan, India and Australia in Tokyo - despite President Donald Trump's Covid-19 diagnosis - is aimed at assuring Washington's allies in Asia of its commitment to the region.

The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) meeting is after all one of the highest-profile diplomatic gatherings for the Trump administration before next month's US presidential election, where Washington's worsening ties with Beijing have featured strongly in the campaign.

It is also meant to send a message that the four countries are committed to an "Indo-Pacific strategy", conceived to elevate India as a potential regional counterweight to China, an initiative that Beijing has opposed.

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Last Tuesday, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Wang Wenbin reiterated China's opposition to a formation of an "exclusive clique" that is detrimental to the interests of third parties, adding that "multilateral cooperation should be open, inclusive and transparent".

The Quad meeting on Tuesday will cover a host of issues, including the inclusion of Australia in the Malabar Exercise - trilateral naval exercises between India, the US and Japan - cooperation in defence and at multilateral forums, the India-China border stand-off, the coronavirus pandemic, space and technology and economic-related matters.

The top American diplomat for East Asia, David Stilwell, said in a briefing to reporters last week that while there were a lot of areas for discussion, there could be "free form as well". The meeting was unlikely to produce a joint statement, he added.

US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne, Japan's Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi, and India's Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar. Photos: AP alt=US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne, Japan's Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi, and India's Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar. Photos: AP

Tuesday's ministerial meeting comes amid months of intensifying political and economic cooperation between the four countries in the group, which together represent about a quarter of the world's population and more than one-quarter of the world's economic activity.

The four-way grouping was revived three years ago as concerns grew about China's increasing challenges to maritime boundaries and international law, such as in the South China Sea.

India and Australia were initially lacklustre about the grouping when it was first initiated in 2007 by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and backed by the US.

The next year, then-Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd pulled out of the Quad, ostensibly over concerns that the country did not want to alienate its largest trading partner, while India remained sceptical of the strategic value of the four-way grouping.

But India has overcome its initial reservations, said senior defence analyst Derek Grossman at the Washington think tank RAND Corporation. Much of this is due to how relations have deteriorated amid a months-long stand-off between troops at their disputed Himalayan border known as the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

"Although the two sides on July 5 agreed to end their military stand-off, the damage appears to have already been done. Even the most ardent supporters of maintaining balanced China ties are hardening their positions, which makes it increasingly likely New Delhi will turn to the Quad to counter China," Grossman wrote in a RAND article in July.

Australia has also had a change of heart, Grossman noted, pointed to souring political relations over accusations of Chinese interference in Australian politics and academia, and Beijing's imposition of anti-dumping tariffs and suspensions on Australian exports.

In recent months, Quad members have stepped up working-level bilateral engagements and trilateral naval exercises in the South China Sea, where Beijing, Taiwan and several Southeast Asian states have competing claims.

One question is whether the grouping will send Beijing a clear message about the military component of the partnership with a quadrilateral Malabar Exercise.

Yogesh Joshi, a research fellow with the Institute of South Asian Studies at the National University of Singapore, said that until India allows Australia to be part of the Malabar exercises, the Quad could not be considered as having a military component.

"China's recent behaviour on the Himalayan frontier may force India's hands. Most probably, we will see the navies of all the four Quad countries jointly exercising either in the Indian or in the South China Sea soon,' Joshi said.

But Liu Zhiqin, a senior fellow at the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies at the Renmin University of China in Beijing, said that India was the weakest in terms of comprehensive national strength - including on metrics such as its international stature, economic might, and technological superiority - but yet had allowed itself to be "used as a pawn by the US, Japan and Australia in order to provoke China".

India and Australia appear to have not only warmed up to the idea of the Quad, but also to each other, even as both have individual concerns about upsetting China.

In June, they elevated their bilateral ties from the 2009 strategic partnership to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and signed defence agreements. The countries' prime ministers, Narendra Modi and Scott Morrison, also signed an agreement to boost defence cooperation by, among other things, allowing access to each other's military bases for logistics support and strengthening military interoperability.

Joshi of NUS said the agreement would also yield more intelligence-sharing and surveillance between the two navies.

Putting the agreement into action, both countries' navies conducted a two-day exercise in the Indian Ocean region late last month involving a range of complex naval manoeuvres, anti-aircraft drills and helicopter operations.

An Indian navy spokesperson said the exercise also involved advanced surface and anti-air exercises including weapons firing, seamanship exercises, naval manoeuvres and cross-deck flying operations.

Rajeev Ranjan Chaturvedy, a visiting fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, said the joint exercise was an important step in enhancing understanding and interoperability among the two navies.

"This will work as a building block in strengthening defence and security cooperation between India and Australia," Chaturvedy said, adding that India and Australia were also developing trilateral security maritime cooperation frameworks with Indonesia.

Dhruva Jaishankar, a non-resident fellow with the Lowy Institute in Australia, said that even though the exercise was the first since the CSP was signed, the more significant exercise was the AUSINDEX exercise, which has been held every two years since 2015, with the next scheduled for 2021.

Noting that the CSP was much broader and deeper than the earlier joint declaration, Jaishankar said the enhanced partnership included more elements relating to security cooperation.

"There is a stronger defence technology element, for example, and more specifics on maritime cooperation relative to 2009," Jaishankar said.

He acknowledged that the constraints in bilateral security cooperation continued to be mismatched capabilities, divergent priorities, and differing strategic circumstances but believed these were "not impossible stumbling blocks".

"[They are] just factors that planners in both countries should keep in mind as they increase cooperation further," Jaishankar said. "Greater familiarity and enthusiasm should suffice to propel the relationship forward, but the differences should be kept in mind."

Jaishankar added that historically, India and Australia had weak economic and social links, and held divergent views on India's nuclear programme. "These still cast a shadow over the relationship, although a diminishing one," he noted.

But over the years, steps have been taken to overcome their differences, including signing the 2014 civil nuclear agreement, when Australia reversed its policy on nuclear sales to India.

Liu of the Chongyang Institute said the moves by India and Australia had implications for Asean countries, a point that other analysts had made before.

In a February publication by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, analyst Huong Le Thu said the Quad was unpopular among those who believed that China could be contained and those who argued that it was an improbable platform for cooperation, especially in the area of defence, and among such a diverse group.

"Concerns (and misconceptions) have also arisen among regional actors, particularly Asean, which is said to see the Quad as a way of bypassing its own centrality," Huong wrote.

Said Liu: "Many Asean countries are reluctant to take sides and have publicly said so. I think most of them will undertake a vague policy that will allow them to continue tapping on China's economy to further develop their own, while turning to the west militarily."

This article originally appeared on the South China Morning Post (SCMP).

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