The Debate on the Constitution: Federalist and Antifederalist Speeches, Articles, and Letters During the Struggle over Ratification Vol. 1 (LOA #62): September 1787-February 1788

By Bernard Bailyn (Editor)

Here, on a scale unmatched by any previous collection, is the extraordinary energy and eloquence of our first national political campaign: During the secret proceedings of the Constitutional Convention in 1787, the framers created a fundamentally new national plan to replace the Articles of Confederation and then submitted it to conventions in each state for ratification. Immediately, a fierce storm of argument broke. Federalist supporters, Antifederalist opponents, and seekers of a middle ground strove to balance public order and personal liberty as they praised, condemned, challenged, and analyzed the new Constitution Gathering hundreds of original texts by Franklin, Madison, Jefferson, Washington, and Patrick Henry—as well as many others less well known today—this unrivaled collection allows readers to experience firsthand the intense year-long struggle that created what remains the world’s oldest working national charter.

Assembled here in chronological order are hundreds of newspaper articles, pamphlets, speeches, and private letters written or delivered in the aftermath of the Constitutional Convention. Along with familiar figures like Franklin, Madison, Patrick Henry, Jefferson, and Washington, scores of less famous citizens are represented, all speaking clearly and passionately about government. The most famous writings of the ratification struggle — the Federalist essays of Hamilton and Madison — are placed in their original context, alongside the arguments of able antagonists, such as "Brutus" and the "Federal Farmer."

Part One includes press polemics and private commentaries from September1787 to January 1788. That autumn, powerful arguments were made against the new charter by Virginian George Mason and the still-unidentified "Federal Farmer," while in New York newspapers, the Federalist essays initiated a brilliant defense. Dozens of speeches from the state ratifying conventions show how the "draft of a plan, nothing but a dead letter," in Madison's words, had "life and validity...breathed into it by the voice of the people." Included are the conventions in Pennsylvania, where James Wilson confronted the democratic skepticism of those representing the western frontier, and in Massachusetts, where John Hancock and Samuel Adams forged a crucial compromise that saved the country from years of political convulsion.

Informative notes, biographical profiles of all writers, speakers, and recipients, and a detailed chronology of relevant events from 1774 to 1804 provide fascinating background. A general index allows readers to follow specific topics, and an appendix includes the Declaration of Independence, the Articles of Confederation, and the Constitution (with all amendments).

LIBRARY OF AMERICA is an independent nonprofit cultural organization founded in 1979 to preserve our nation’s literary heritage by publishing, and keeping permanently in print, America’s best and most significant writing. The Library of America series includes more than 300 volumes to date, authoritative editions that average 1,000 pages in length, feature cloth covers, sewn bindings, and ribbon markers, and are printed on premium acid-free paper that will last for centuries.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Library of America
• Release date: Jun 1, 1993
• ISBN: 9781598531176

Book preview

THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION

Federalist and Antifederalist Speeches, Articles, and Letters During the Struggle over Ratification

PART ONE

_______________

DEBATES IN THE PRESS AND IN PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE

September 17, 1787–January 12, 1788

DEBATES IN THE STATE RATIFYING CONVENTIONS

Pennsylvania, November 20–December 15, 1787

Connecticut, January 3–9, 1788

Massachusetts, January 9–February 7, 1788

_______________

Bernard Bailyn, editor

THE LIBRARY OF AMERICA

Volume compilation, notes, and chronology copyright © 1993 by

Literary Classics of the United States, Inc., New York, N.Y.

All rights reserved.

No part of this book may be reproduced commercially

by offset-lithographic or equivalent copying devices without

the permission of the publisher.

Some of the material in this volume is

copyright 1981, 1983, 1984, 1988, 1990 by the State

Historical Society of Wisconsin; copyright 1977 by

The University of Chicago; copyright 1955 by

Princeton University Press. Reprinted by permission.

For acknowledgments, see Note on the Texts.

THE LIBRARY OF AMERICA, a nonprofit publisher, is dedicated to publishing, and keeping in print, authoritative editions of America’s best and most significant writing. Each year the Library adds new volumes to its collection of essential works by America’s foremost novelists, poets, essayists, journalists, and statesmen.

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Print ISBN: 978-1-59853-165-7

eISBN 978-1-59853-201-2

The publishers wish to thank

The Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation

for funding the publication of The Debate on the Constitution.

The publishers also express their appreciation to

John P. Kaminski and Gaspare J. Saladino, editors of

The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution,

and the State Historical Society of Wisconsin, the publisher,

for editorial assistance, the use of archival materials, and

permission to reprint extensive excerpts.

Contents

DEBATES IN THE PRESS AND IN PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE

September 17, 1787–January 12, 1788

Benjamin Franklin’s Speech at the Conclusion of the Constitutional Convention, September 17, 1787

I Agree to This Constitution, with All Its Faults

Z Replies to Franklin’s Speech, December 6, 1787

No Wonder He Shed a Tear

Alexander Hamilton’s Conjectures About the New Constitution, September 1787

A Revolution Effected by Good Sense and Deliberation, September 24, 1787

David Redick to William Irvine, September 24, 1787

The Loss of American Liberty

Strictures on the Proposed Constitution, September 26, 1787

An American Citizen [Tench Coxe] I, September 26, 1787

The English and American Constitutions Contrasted

An American Citizen [Tench Coxe] II, September 28, 1787

Senators and Nobles

An American Citizen [Tench Coxe] III, September 29, 1787

An Uncorrupted House

Cato I, September 27, 1787

Deliberate with Coolness, Analyze with Criticism, Reflect with Candor

Reply to Cato I: Cæsar I, October 1, 1787

On the Language of Distrust

Rebuttal to Cæsar I: Cato II, October 11, 1787

On the Right of Free Deliberation

James Madison to George Washington, September 30, 1787

Congress Forwards the Constitution to the States

Richard Henry Lee to George Mason, October 1, 1787

On the Deviousness of Congress’s Action, and the Need for Amendments

Rev. James Madison to James Madison, c. October 1, 1787

For an Experimental Period and an Absolute Separation of Powers

Southwark, October 3, 1787

Antifederalists—Tories Reborn

Centinel [Samuel Bryan] I, October 5, 1787

A Most Daring Attempt to Establish a Despotic Aristocracy

James Wilson’s Speech at a Public Meeting, October 6, 1787

Every Thing Which Is Not Given, Is Reserved

Reply to Wilson’s Speech: A Democratic Federalist, October 17, 1787

What Shelter from Arbitrary Power?

Reply to Wilson’s Speech: Centinel [Samuel Bryan] II, October 24, 1787

To Avoid the Usual Fate of Nations

Reply to Wilson’s Speech: Cincinnatus [Arthur Lee] I, November 1, 1787

To Defeat a Monstrous Aristocracy

Reply to Wilson’s Speech: An Officer of the Late Continental Army [William Findley?], November 6, 1787

A Set of Aspiring Despots, Who Make Us Slaves.

Rebuttal to An Officer of the Late Continental Army: Plain Truth, November 10, 1787

I Have Answered All the Objections

Reply to Wilson’s Speech: Cincinnatus [Arthur Lee] V, November 29, 1787

O Sense Where Is Your Guard! Shame Where Is Your Blush!

An Old Whig [George Bryan et al.] I, October 12, 1787

No Amendments Will Ever Be Made Without Violent Convulsion or Civil War

Marcus, October 15, 1787

Interests and the Constitution

A Citizen of America [Noah Webster], October 17, 1787

An Examination Into the Leading Principles of the Federal Constitution

Brutus I, October 18, 1787

If You Adopt It. . . Posterity Will Execrate Your Memory

The Weaknesses of Brutus Exposed: A Citizen of Philadelphia [Pelatiah Webster], November 8, 1787

Congress Can Never Get More Power Than the People Will Give

A Political Dialogue, October 24, 1787

"There Is Some Trick In It"

James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, October 24, 1787

The Constitution Explained and Justified, with an Immoderate Digression on a Defeated Proposal

Thomas Jefferson Replies to Madison, December 20, 1787

"The Will of the Majority Should Always Prevail"

Cato III, October 25, 1787

The Dangers to Liberty and Happiness

Publius, The Federalist I [Alexander Hamilton], October 27, 1787

"Vigour of Government Is Essential to the Security of Liberty"

John Humble, October 29, 1787

"To Lick the Feet of Our Well Born Masters"

Americanus [John Stevens, Jr.] I, November 2, 1787

"We Must Think, We Must Reason, For Ourselves"

Elbridge Gerry to the Massachusetts General Court, November 3, 1787

"The Greatest Men May Err"

Reply to Elbridge Gerry: A Landholder [Oliver Ellsworth] IV, November 26, 1787

"To Alarm the Fears of the People"

A Further Reply to Elbridge Gerry: A Landholder [Oliver Ellsworth] V, December 3, 1787

"To Combat Phantoms"

Letters from the Federal Farmer to The Republican, November 8, 1787

"Examine Coolly Every Article, Clause, and Word"

Refutation of the Federal Farmer: Timothy Pickering to Charles Tillinghast, December 24, 1787

"The Best Constitution We . . . Have Any Right To Expect"

George Washington to Bushrod Washington, November 10, 1787

"Is It Best for the States to Unite, or Not to Unite?"

Thomas Jefferson to William Stephens Smith, November 13, 1787

"The Tree of Liberty Must Be Refreshed from Time to Time with the Blood of Patriots and Tyrants"

Publius, The Federalist VI [Alexander Hamilton], November 14, 1787

"Men Are Ambitious, Vindictive and Rapacious"

Brutus III, November 15, 1787

"Representation Is Merely Nominal—A Mere Burlesque"

Resolution of the Inhabitants of Pittsburgh, November 17, 1787

Nothing Better Could Be Expected

Philanthrop to the Public, November 19, 1787

"Real True Self Interest Considered on a Large Extensive Scale, Is Public Good"

A Landholder [Oliver Ellsworth] III, November 19, 1787

"Power When Necessary for Our Good Is as Much to Be Desired as the Food We Eat"

Publius, The Federalist VIII [Alexander Hamilton], November 20, 1787

Militarism, the Inevitable Result of Disunion

Publius, The Federalist IX [Alexander Hamilton], November 21, 1787

A Confederate Republic: The Internal Advantages of a Republican with the External Force of a Monarchical Government

George Mason, Objections to the Constitution, circulated early October 1787, published in full November 22, 1787

America Under the Constitution: "A Monarchy, or a Corrupt Oppressive Aristocracy"

A Prolix Comment on Mason’s Objections: James Madison to George Washington, October 18, 1787

Reply to Mason’s Objections: Civis Rusticus, January 30, 1788

Not to Condemn, But to Correct

Answers to Mason’s Objections: Marcus [James Iredell] I–V, February 20–March 19, 1788

"A System of Government Which I Am Convinced Can Stand the Nicest Examination"

I, February 20, 1788

II, February 27, 1788

III, March 5, 1788

IV, March 12, 1788

V, March 19, 1788

Cato V, November 22, 1787

Can an American Be a Tyrant? On the Great Powers of the Presidency, the Vagueness of the Constitution, and the Dangers of Congress

Publius, The Federalist X [James Madison], November 22, 1787

"To Break and Control the Violence of Faction"

A Countryman [Roger Sherman?] II, November 22, 1787

On the Interests of Rulers and Ruled

Americanus [John Stevens, Jr.] II, November 23, 1787

"Cato’s Folly: A President Possessing the Powers of a Monarch"

Louis Guillaume Otto to Comte de Montmorin, November 26, 1787

There Is No Way to Go Back

Brutus IV, November 29, 1787

Fair Representation Is the Great Desideratum in Politics

Publius, The Federalist XIV [James Madison], November 30, 1787

"A Revolution Which Has No Parallel in the Annals of Human Society"

Americanus [John Stevens, Jr.] III, November 30, 1787

On Representation and the Modern State

Agrippa [James Winthrop] III, November 30, 1787

On the Present Prosperity: Recommit the Constitution

Samuel Adams to Richard Henry Lee, December 3, 1787

The Sovereignty and Diversity of the States Will Be Lost

Agrippa [James Winthrop] IV, December 4, 1787

The Despotism and Misery of a Uniform National State.

Publius, The Federalist XVI [Alexander Hamilton], December 4, 1787

Civil War and the Death of the Union

Americanus [John Stevens, Jr.] IV, December 5 & 6, 1787

On the Errors of Cato and of Celebrated Writers

Richard Henry Lee to Governor Edmund Randolph, December 6, 1787

Must We Kill Ourselves For Fear of Dying?

John Adams to Thomas Jefferson, December 6, 1787

The Dangers of the One and of the Few

Agrippa [James Winthrop] V, December 11, 1787

On the Derangement of the Federal Courts

George Lee Turberville to James Madison, December 11, 1787

Some Puzzling Questions

Publius, The Federalist XXI [Alexander Hamilton], December 12, 1787

The Extent and Malignity of the Present Disease

Americanus [John Stevens, Jr.] V, December 12, 1787

On Montesquieu, a System Monger Without Philosophic Precision, and More on the Errors of Cato

Philadelphiensis [Benjamin Workman] IV, December 12, 1787

"This Monster, This Colossus of Despotism"

Brutus V, December 13, 1787

On the Necessary and Proper and the General Welfare Clauses, and on Congress’s Power to Tax: the States Will Be Destroyed

Publius, The Federalist XXII [Alexander Hamilton], December 14, 1787

Further Defects in the Present System

Agrippa [James Winthrop] VI, December 14, 1787

The Power to Incorporate, and the Regulation of Commerce

Lawrence Taliaferro to James Madison, December 16, 1787

"The Federal Sistum Is Rufly Handeld"

A Landholder [Oliver Ellsworth] VII, December 17, 1787

"No Religious Test Shall Ever Be Required"

Dissent of the Minority of the Pennsylvania Convention, December 18, 1787

Reply to the Pennsylvania Minority: America [Noah Webster], December 31, 1787

A Cumberland County Mutual Improvement Society Addresses the Pennsylvania Minority, January 2, 1788

"Support the Drooping Cause of Liberty and Annihilate the Proposed Aristocratic Delusion"

Reply to the Pennsylvania Minority: A Citizen of Philadelphia [Pelatiah Webster], January 23, 1788

"Their Folly and Wickedness in Opposing the New Government"

Publius, The Federalist XXIII [Alexander Hamilton], December 18, 1787

On Military Power: Ends and Means

Publius, The Federalist XXIV [Alexander Hamilton], December 19, 1787

The Danger of a Standing Army: "An Intention to Mislead the People"

Philadelphiensis [Benjamin Workman] V, December 19, 1787

"Diabolical Plots and Secret Machinations . . . to Destroy Your Liberties"

Joseph Barrell to Nathaniel Barrell, December 20, 1787

"A Constitution . . . Dictated by Heaven Itself"

Ezra Stiles: Pluses and Minuses of the Constitution, December 24, 1787

Publius, The Federalist XXVII [Alexander Hamilton], December 25, 1787

On the Acceptance of Federal Authority

Governor Edmund Randolph’s Reasons for Not Signing the Constitution, December 27, 1787

"I Will, as an Individual Citizen, Accept the Constitution"

George Washington to Charles Carter, December 27, 1787

The Constitution or Anarchy: The Need to Ratify

Brutus VI, December 27, 1787

The Dangers of Unlimited Taxation: "Give! Give!"

Publius, The Federalist XXX [Alexander Hamilton], December 28, 1787

"An Unrestrained Power of Taxation"? On the Necessity and Uses of Federal Revenue

Agrippa [James Winthrop] IX, December 28, 1787

On the Virtues of Pure Blood and Limited Federal Power

Luther Martin, The Genuine Information I, II, VIII, IX, XII, December 28, 1787–February 8, 1788

Resisting the Federalists’ Violent Struggle . . . to Obtain All Power and Dominion

I, December 28, 1787

II, January 1, 1788

VIII, January 22, 1788

IX, January 29, 1788

XII, February 8, 1788

The New Roof [Francis Hopkinson], December 29, 1787

Skilful Architects and Intriguing Old Women

Giles Hickory [Noah Webster] I, December 1787

On the Absurdity of a Bill of Rights

Agrippa [James Winthrop] X, January 1, 1788

A Summary View: "This System Ought to Be Rejected"

Publius, The Federalist XXXII-XXXIII [Alexander Hamilton], January 2, 1788

On Repugnancy, Concurrence, and Reciprocal Forbearance

Centinel [Samuel Bryan] VIII, January 2, 1788

"The Rapacious Hand of Power"

Brutus VII, January 3, 1788

"Unlimitted Authority in Matters of Revenue"?

Publius, The Federalist XXXIV [Alexander Hamilton], January 4, 1788

State vs. National Revenues: "Calculate . . . on Permanent Causes of Expence"

Samuel Osgood to Samuel Adams, January 5, 1788

"An Inexhaustable Fountain of Corruption"

The Republican to the People, January 7, 1788

"The Principal Circumstances Which Render Liberty Secure"

Resolutions of the Tradesmen of the Town of Boston, January 8, 1788

To Promote Trade, Industry, and Morality

Publius, The Federalist XXXVI [Alexander Hamilton], January 8, 1788

The Representation of Interests and Federal Taxation

Thomas B. Wait to George Thatcher, January 8, 1788

"Darkness, Duplicity, and Studied Ambiguity"

Brutus VIII, January 10, 1788

On the Calamity of a National Debt That Cannot Be Repaid, and on Standing Armies

Mark Antony, January 10, 1788

Slavery Ought To Be Regreted . . . But It Is Evidently Beyond Our Controul: A Defense of the Three-Fifths Clause

James Madison to Governor Edmund Randolph, January 10, 1788

The Dangers of a Second Convention

Samuel Holden Parsons to William Cushing, January 11, 1788

"Our Security Must Rest in Our Frequently Recurring Back to the People"

Publius, The Federalist XXXVII [James Madison], January 11, 1788

"An Abstract View of the Subject"

Agrippa [James Winthrop] XII, January 11, 15, 18, 1788

"Cherish the Old Confederation Like the Apple of Our Eye"

Publius, The Federalist XXXVIII [James Madison], January 12, 1788

A Bedlam of Criticism and a Counsel of Perfection

Americanus [John Stevens, Jr.] VI, January 12, 1788

"An Iron Handed Despotism"?

DEBATES IN THE STATE RATIFYING CONVENTIONS

Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, November 20–December 15, 1787

James Wilson’s Opening Address, November 24, 1787

John Smilie Responds to Wilson on the Lack of a Bill of Rights, November 28, 1787

James Wilson and John Smilie Debate the Need for a Bill of Rights, November 28, 1787

The Defect Is in the System Itself: Robert Whitehill on the Dangers of the Powers of Congress and the Illogic of the Habeas Corpus Clause, November 30, 1787

Benjamin Rush Speaks Against a Bill of Rights, November 30, 1787

William Findley on the Constitution as a Plan for National Consolidation, December 1, 1787

James Wilson Replies to Findley, December 1, 1787

James Wilson on the Slave-Trade Clause, December 3, 1787

Robert Whitehill Replies to Wilson on the Slave-Trade Clause, December 3, 1787

James Wilson’s Summation and Final Rebuttal, December 11, 1787

Benjamin Rush on Morality and Government, December 12, 1787

Robert Whitehall’s Amendments and the Final Vote, December 12, 1787

Connecticut Ratifying Convention, January 3–9, 1788

Oliver Ellsworth Defends the Taxing Power and Comments on Dual Sovereignties and Judicial Review, January 7, 1788

Governor Samuel Huntington on the Need for Coercive National Power, January 9, 1788

Massachusetts Ratifying Convention, January 9–February 7, 1788

Letter to the Massachusetts Centinel by Marcus Objecting to Instructing the Delegates, January 9, 1788

Fisher Ames on Biennial Elections and on the Volcano of Democracy, January 15, 1788

A Sharp Exchange on the Powers of Congress and Its Probable Corruption, January 17, 1788

Major Martin Kinsley on the Excessive Powers of Congress, January 21, 1788

Thomas Dawes, Jr., on Legitimate Standing Armies, January 24, 1788

Amos Singletary and Jonathan Smith on Leviathan Swallowing Up Us Little Folks and on the Danger of Anarchy, January 25, 1788

Abraham Holmes and Christopher Gore on the Possible Abuses of the Federal Judiciary, January 30, 1788

General William Heath on Slavery, January 30, 1788

Charles Jarvis on the Amendment Procedure: An Irrefutable Argument for Ratification, January 30, 1788

The Reverend Daniel Shute and Colonel William Jones on Religious Tests and Christian Belief, January 31, 1788

John Hancock Proposes Ratification, with Amendments Recommended to Quiet the Apprehensions of Gentlemen, January 31, 1788

Samuel Adams Supports Hancock’s Proposition, January 31, 1788

Samuel Nasson’s Pathetick Apostrophe to Liberty, and Judge Increase Sumner’s Reply, February 1, 1788

Isaac Backus on Religion and the State, Slavery, and Nobility, February 4, 1788

Charles Jarvis Supports Hancock’s Strategy on Amendments, February 4, 1788

Nathaniel Barrell, a Plain Husbandman, Warns of the Passion for Power, but Favors Ratification, February 5, 1788

John Hancock’s Final Observations: We Must All Rise or Fall Together, February 6, 1788

The Form of the Ratification of Massachusetts, February 6, 1788

APPENDIX

The Declaration of Independence

The Articles of Confederation

Letter from the Constitutional Convention to the President of Congress

Resolutions of the Convention Concerning the Ratification and Implementation of the Constitution

The Constitution

Biographical Notes

Chronology of Events 1774–1804

Notes on State Constitutions, 1776–90

Note on the Texts

Notes

Index

DEBATES IN THE PRESS AND IN PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE

September 17, 1787–January 12, 1788

I AGREE TO THIS CONSTITUTION, WITH ALL ITS FAULTS

Benjamin Franklin’s Speech at the Conclusion of the Constitutional Convention

Philadelphia, September 17, 1787

I confess that I do not entirely approve of this Constitution at present, but Sir, I am not sure I shall never approve it: For having lived long, I have experienced many Instances of being oblig’d, by better Information or fuller Consideration, to change Opinions even on important Subjects, which I once thought right, but found to be otherwise. It is therefore that the older I grow the more apt I am to doubt my own Judgment and to pay more Respect to the Judgment of others. Most Men indeed as well as most Sects in Religion, think themselves in Possession of all Truth, and that wherever others differ from them it is so far Error. Steele, a Protestant, in a Dedication tells the Pope, that the only Difference between our two Churches in their Opinions of the Certainty of their Doctrine, is, the Romish Church is infallible, and the Church of England is never in the Wrong. But tho’ many private Persons think almost as highly of their own Infallibility, as that of their Sect, few express it so naturally as a certain French lady, who in a little Dispute with her Sister, said, I don’t know how it happens, Sister, but I meet with no body but myself that’s always in the right. II n’y a que moi qui a toujours raison.

In these Sentiments, Sir, I agree to this Constitution, with all its Faults, if they are such: because I think a General Government necessary for us, and there is no Form of Government but what may be a Blessing to the People if well administred; and I believe farther that this is likely to be well administred for a Course of Years, and can only end in Despotism as other Forms have done before it, when the People shall become so corrupted as to need Despotic Government, being incapable of any other. I doubt too whether any other Convention we can obtain, may be able to make a better Constitution: For when you assemble a Number of Men to have the Advantage of their joint Wisdom, you inevitably assemble with those Men all their Prejudices, their Passions, their Errors of Opinion, their local Interests, and their selfish Views. From such an Assembly can a perfect Production be expected? It therefore astonishes me, Sir, to find this System approaching so near to Perfection as it does; and I think it will astonish our Enemies, who are waiting with Confidence to hear that our Councils are confounded, like those of the Builders of Babel, and that our States are on the Point of Separation, only to meet hereafter for the Purpose of cutting one another’s Throats. Thus I consent, Sir, to this Constitution because I expect no better, and because I am not sure that it is not the best. The Opinions I have had of its Errors, I sacrifice to the Public Good. I have never whisper’d a Syllable of them abroad. Within these Walls they were born, & here they shall die. If every one of us in returning to our Constituents were to report the Objections he has had to it, and endeavour to gain Partizans in support of them, we might prevent its being generally received, and thereby lose all the salutary Effects & great Advantages resulting naturally in our favour among foreign Nations, as well as among ourselves, from our real or apparent Unanimity. Much of the Strength and Efficiency of any Government, in procuring & securing Happiness to the People depends on Opinion, on the general Opinion of the Goodness of that Government as well as of the Wisdom & Integrity of its Governors. I hope therefore that for our own Sakes, as a Part of the People, and for the Sake of our Posterity, we shall act heartily & unanimously in recommending this Constitution, wherever our Influence may extend, and turn our future Thoughts and Endeavours to the Means of having it well administred.—

On the whole, Sir, I cannot help expressing a Wish, that every Member of the Convention, who may still have Objections to it, would with me on this Occasion doubt a little of his own Infallibility, and to make manifest our Unanimity, put his Name to this Instrument.—

Then the Motion was made for adding the last Formula, viz Done in Convention by the unanimous Consent &c—which was agreed to and added—accordingly.

NO WONDER HE SHED A TEAR

Z Replies to Franklin’s Speech

Independent Chronicle (Boston), December 6, 1787

Mess’rs. ADAMS & NOURSE, When I read Dr. FRANKLIN’S address to the President of the late Convention, in the last Monday’s Gazette, I was at a loss to judge, till I was informed by mere accident, from which of the contending parties it went to the press. I confess, says the Doctor, (and observe the Printers tell us it was immediately before his signing) I confess that I do not entirely approve of this Constitution at present. Surely, I thought, no zealous federalist, in his right mind, would have exposed his cause so much as to publish to the world that this great philosopher did not entirely approve the Constitution at the very moment when his hand marked his approbation of it; especially after the federalists themselves had so often and so loudly proclaimed, that he had fully and decidedly adopted it. The Doctor adds, I am not sure I shall never approve it. This then is the only remaining hope of the federalists, so far as the Doctor’s judgment is or may be of any service to their cause, that one time or another he may approve the new Constitution.

Again, says the Doctor, In these sentiments I agree to this Constitution, with all its faults, if they are such; because I think a general government necessary for us, and there is no FORM of government but what may be a blessing to the people, if well administered. But are we to accept a form of government which we do not entirely approve of, merely in hopes that it will be administered well? Does not every man know, that nothing is more liable to be abused than power. Power, without a check, in any hands, is tyranny; and such powers, in the hands of even good men, so infatuating is the nature of it, will probably be wantonly, if not tyrannically exercised. The world has had experience enough of this, in every stage of it. Those among us who cannot entirely approve the new Constitution as it is called, are of opinion, in order that any form may be well administered, and thus be made a blessing to the people, that there ought to be at least, an express reservation of certain inherent unalienable rights, which it would be equally sacrilegious for the people to give away, as for the government to invade. If the rights of conscience, for instance, are not sacredly reserved to the people, what security will there be, in case the government should have in their heads a predilection for any one sect in religion? what will hinder the civil power from erecting a national system of religion, and committing the law to a set of lordly priests, reaching, as the great Dr. Mayhew expressed it, from the desk to the skies? An Hierarchy which has ever been the grand engine in the hand of civil tyranny; and tyrants in return will afford them opportunity enough to vent their rage on stubborn hereticks, by wholesome severities, as they were called by national religionists, in a country which has long boasted its freedom. It was doubtless for the peace of that nation, that there should be an uniformity in religion, and for the same wise and good reason, the act of uniformity remains in force to these enlightened times.

The Doctor says, he is "not sure that this is not the best Constitution that we may expect." Nor can he be sure that it might not have been made better than it now is, if the Convention had adjourned to a distant day, that they might have availed themselves of the sentiments of the people at large. It would have been no great condescension, even in that august Body, to have shown so small a testimony of regard to the judgment of their constituents. Would it not be acting more like men who wish for a safe as well as a stable government, to propose such amendments as would meliorate the form, than to approve it, as the Dr. would have us, with all its faults, if they are such. Thus the Doctor consents, and hopes the Convention will "act heartily and unanimously in recommending the Constitution, wherever their influence may extend, and turn their future tho’ts and endeavors to the means of having it well administered." Even a bad form of government may, in the Doctor’s opinion, be well administered—for, says he, there is no form of government, but what may be made a blessing to the people, if well administered. He evidently, I think, builds his hopes, that the Constitution proposed, will be a blessing to the people,—not on the principles of the government itself, but on the possibility, that, with all its faults, it may be well administered;—and concludes, with wishing, that others, who had objections to it, would yet, like him, doubt of their own infallibility, and put their names to the instrument, to make an Unanimity MANIFEST! No wonder he shed a tear, as it is said he did, when he gave his sanction to the New Constitution.

Alexander Hamilton’s Conjectures About the New Constitution

September 1787

The new constitution has in favour of its success these circumstances—a very great weight of influence of the persons who framed it, particularly in the universal popularity of General Washington,—the good will of the commercial interest throughout the states which will give all its efforts to the establishment of a government capable of regulating protecting and extending the commerce of the Union—the good will of most men of property in the several states who wish a government of the union able to protect them against domestic violence and the depredations which the democratic spirit is apt to make on property; and who are besides anxious for the respectability of the nation—the hopes of the Creditors of the United States that a general government possessing the means of doing it will pay the debt of the Union, a strong belief in the people at large of the insufficiency of the present confederation to preserve the existence of the Union and of the necessity of the union to their safety and prosperity; of course a strong desire of a change and a predisposition to receive well the propositions of the Convention.

Against its success is to be put, the dissent of two or three important men in the Convention; who will think their characters pleged to defeat the plan—the influence of many inconsiderable men in possession of considerable offices under the state governments who will fear a diminution of their consequence power and emolument by the establishment of the general government and who can hope for nothing there—the influence of some considerable men in office possessed of talents and popularity who partly from the same motives and partly from a desire of playing a part in a convulsion for their own aggrandisement will oppose the quiet adoption of the new government—(some considerable men out of office, from motives of ambition may be disposed to act the same part)—add to these causes the disinclination of the people to taxes and of course to a strong government—the opposition of all men much in debt who will not wish to see a government established one object of which is to restrain this means of cheating Creditors—the democratical jealousy of the people which may be alarmed at the appearance of institutions that may seem calculated to place the power of the community in few hands and to raise a few individuals to stations of great preeminence—and the influence of some foreign powers who from different motives will not wish to see an energetic government established throughout the states.

In this view of the subject it is difficult to form any judgment whether the plan will be adopted or rejected. It must be essentially matter of conjecture. The present appearances and all other circumstances considered the probability seems to be on the side of its adoption.

But the causes operating against its adoption are powerful and there will be nothing astonishing in the Contrary—

If it do not finally obtain, it is probable the discussion of the question will beget such struggles animosities and heats in the community that this circumstance conspiring with the real necessity of an essential change in our present situation will produce civil war. Should this happen, whatever parties prevail it is probable governments very different from the present in their principles will be established—A dismemberment of the Union and monarchies in different portions of it may be expected. It may however happen that no civil war will take place; but several republican confederacies be established between different combinations of particular states.

A reunion with Great Britain, from universal disgust at a state of commotion, is not impossible, though not much to be feared. The most plausible shape of such a business would be the establishment of a son of the present monarch in the supreme government of this country with a family compact.

If the government is adopted, it is probable general Washington will be the President of the United States—This will ensure a wise choice of men to administer the government and a good administration. A good administration will conciliate the confidence and affection of the people and perhaps enable the government to acquire more consistency than the proposed constitution seems to promise for so great a Country—It may then triumph altogether over the state governments and reduce them to an entire subordination, dividing the large states into smaller districts. The organs of the general government may also acquire additional strength.

If this should not be the case, in the course of a few years, it is probable that the contests about the boundaries of power between the particular governments and the general government and the momentum of the larger states in such contests will produce a dissolution of the Union. This after all seems to be the most likely result.

But it is almost arrogance in so complicated a subject, depending so entirely on the incalculable fluctuations of the human passions, to attempt even a conjecture about the event.

It will be Eight or Nine months before any certain judgment can be formed respecting the adoption of the Plan.

A Revolution Effected by Good Sense and Deliberation

Daily Advertiser (New York), September 24, 1787

The result of the deliberations of the National Convention is now laid before the public, and I congratulate each patriot heart on the important disclosure. The causes which have all pressed, as it were to a point, to render a thorough reform indispensably necessary, have been long the subject of general speculation. The Casuist has disputed—the Orator has harangued—and the Essayist has reasoned on them. Indeed, the necessity of the Convention has been generally admitted, and almost universally felt. We have now offered to us a Constitution, which, if happily received, will disappoint our enemies, render us safe and happy at home, and respected abroad. Heaven, in mercy to us, has furnished this auspicious event, in order to snatch us from impending ruin, and to re-establish this favored land on the substantial basis of liberty, honor and virtue. The means of wiping opprobrium from our country are now in our power; let us neither reject nor forego them. It will be the duty of all honest, well-disposed men, friends to peace and good government, as well in this State as throughout the Union, to cultivate and diffuse, as far as their walk may extend, a spirit of submission to the counsels of this great patriot band; who have sought to procure, and have been anxious in their endeavors to establish, our liberty, and aggrandize our fame. If the New Constitution is not as perfect in every part as it might have been, let it be considered, that it is much more so than the most friendly and sanguine expected; and, at the same time, let it be remembered, that "the mutual deference and concession" and that spirit of amity from which this Constitution has resulted, ought to have a strong operation on the minds of all generous Americans, and have due influence with every State Convention, when they come to deliberate upon its adoption.

Every good American, when he reflects, will exult with joy that his countrymen have calmly resorted to so temperate and wise a measure as the late Convention; not only on account of the advantages, which, by the blessing of Heaven, we are likely to derive from it; but also as it furnishes a valuable precedent, if it shall be found necessary hereafter. It will likewise teach foreign nations to reflect, that, tho’ discord may rear its Hydra head, and state jealousies for a while prevail, yet the enlightened Americans will not consent that the fair fabric of Liberty, which they have established with their blood, shall be endangered by anarchy at home, or destroyed by violence from abroad. The conflict which America lately sustained in the cause of Freedom, will be historiated as an important lesson to distant nations and future ages. Let the present epoch be recorded as a lesson to future generations in these United States, as having given birth to a revolution, effected by good sense and deliberation: Let it be stiled the reign of reason, the triumph of discretion, virtue and public spirit!

Perhaps the greatest, if not the only difficulty, which will arise against the adoption of this New Federal System of Government, will be made by those ambitious citizens, in the different States, who either now are in power, or who will practise their political wiles on the ignorant and unsuspicious part of the people, in order to obtain their own private purposes. It is a lamentable consideration, that men of this stamp too frequently, by the folly and blindness of the people, are put in the exercise of such offices as give them a very dangerous degree of influence—Hence the social compact is often violated, and sometimes dissolved.

Let difficulties, if any unhappily arise, be no longer laid to our charge—and let us all, who are friends to order and good government, in the language of scriptural injunction, watch and pray.—Watch, and, with open front, manfully oppose every ambitious demagogue, however high in office, who may attempt to form combinations, with a wicked intent to destroy the labors of those distinguished worthies; and pray the Governor of the world to avert, and finally disappoint their nefarious purposes.—If the change, which genius and patriotism has presented to us, as the most advisable to be received, should be rejected, and if (which God avert) such evil-minded men should prevail, what is the alternative? Gorgon-headed anarchy, or a miserable aristocratic domination; all the wretchedness and wickedness of an aristocracy, without a single particle of its dignity.

Certain it is, we have no reason to fear (whatever pseudo-patriots may insinuate) a well digested system, which reconciles in a great measure, various interests, and embraces the happiness of the whole; which has been approved by the most dignified and patriotic citizens in the Union; and which at once gives a power that will be efficient and adequate to the support and happiness of the Confederation; and, at the same time, so guards and checks the administration of it, that there will be little danger of running into a lawless Democracy, on the one hand, or of the Sovereign authority degenerating into Tyranny, on the other.—In short, a system, which it will be wise in us to accept with gratitude—the rejection of which might, perhaps, be dreadful.

THE LOSS OF AMERICAN LIBERTY

David Redick to William Irvine

Philadelphia, September 24, 1787

The new plan of government proposed by the convention has made a bustle in the city & its vicinity, all people, almost, are for Swallowing it down at once without examining its tendencies.——

I have thought it unsafe within the wind of hurricane to utter a Sylable about it: but to you Sir I may venture to Say that in my oppinion the day on which we adopt the present proposed plan of government, from that moment we may Justly date the loss of American liberty, perhaps my fears hath contributed principlely to this oppinion. I will change the moment that I See better. My dear Sir why is not the liberty of the press provided for? why will the Congress have power to alter the plan or mode of chusing Representatives? why will they have power to lay direct Taxes? why will they have power to keep Standing Armies in time of peace? why will they have power to make laws in direct contradiction to the forms of government established in the Several States? why will they have power to collect by law ten Dollars for ever German or Irishman which may come to Settle in America? why is the Trial by Jury destroyd in Civil causes before Congress? and above all I cannot imagine why the people in this city are So verry anxious to have it adopted instantly before it can be digested or deliberatly considered. If you were only here to See and hear those people, to observe the means they are useing to effect this purpose, to hear the tories declare they will draw their Sword in its defence, to See the quaquers runing about Signing declarations and Petitions in favor of it befor the have time to examine it, to See Gentlemen runing into the Country and neibouring towns haranguing the Rabble. I Say were you to See and hear these things as I do you would Say, with me that: the verry Soul of confidence itself ought to change into distrust. If this goverment be a good one or even a tollorable one the Necessities and the good Sense of America will lead us to adopt it. if otherwise give us time and it will be amended and then adopted, but I think the measures pursued here is a Strong evidence that these people know it will not bear an examination and therefor wishes to adopt it first and consider it afterward. I hope Congress will be verry deliberate and digest it thoroughly before they Send it recommended to the States. I Sincerely hope that Such Gentlemen as were Members of Convention, and who have Seats in Congress may not be considered as verry proper Judges of their own Works.——

I pray a spirit of Wisdom and a Spirit of integrity prevade Congress, more especially at this time.

Strictures on the Proposed Constitution

Freeman’s Journal (Philadelphia), September 26, 1787

The writer of the following Remarks has the happiness and respectability of the United States much at heart—and it is with pleasure he has seen a system promulged by the late Convention, which promises to ensure those blessings: But as perfection is not the lot of human nature, we are not to expect it in the new Federal Constitution. Candour must confess, however, that it is a well wrought piece of stuff, and claims, upon the whole, the approbation of all the States. Our situation is critical, and demands our immediate care. It is therefore to be hoped that every State will be speedy in calling a Convention—speedy; because the business is momentous, and merits the utmost deliberation.

The following strictures on the proposed Constitution, are submitted with diffidence. Excepting a single instance, they regard points of an inferior magnitude only;—and as the writer is not possessed of any of the reasons which influenced the Convention, he feels the more diffident in offering these.

REMARKS.

Art. 1. Sect. 2. (3d clause) The number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every 30,000.—If we consider the vast extent and increasing population of the United States, it will appear that a Representation upon this principle (though proper to begin with) cannot last very long. It must grow far too unwieldly for business—and the Constitution must therefore be mended, and patched with new work. Let your government be invariably fixed; so far, at least, as human foresight can go—and age will secure it respect and veneration from the multitude. In framing a government, we should consider a century to come as but a day, and leave the least possible for posterity to mend. Errors sanctified by long usage are not easily relinquished. Their age attaches the people, and renders a reform difficult. There is even danger in reforming the errors of a government, but there is more in letting them alone.—Hence we ought to aim at PERMANENCY in every part of a Constitution intended to endure. In America Representation ought to be in a ratio with population—and this should be provided for in the government of the United States.

Sect. 4. (1st clause) "The times, places and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of chusing senators."—A general uniformity of acting in confederations (whenever it can be done with convenience) must tend to federalize (allow me the word) the sentiments of the people. The time, then, might as well have been fixed in Convention—not subject to alteration afterwards. Because a day may be chosen by Congress which the Constitution or laws of a State may have appropriated to local purposes, not to be subverted or suspended. Leaving the places subject to the alteration of Congress, may also lead to improper consequences, and (humanum est errare) tempt to sinister views.—Who in Pennsylvania would think it adviseable to elect Representatives on the shore of Lake Erie; or even at Fort Pitt?

Second clause. "The Congress shall assemble at least once in every year, and such meeting shall be on the first Monday in December."—Here is a kind of solecism; as the late period of assembling hardly admits of a prorogation and re-assembling in the same year: But as probably a Federal year is meant, it should have been so expressed. December is an objectionable month, too, for the Representatives of so many distant States to meet in—the depth of winter forbids the convenience of water, and the communication by land is expensive, inconvenient, and often obstructed at this season: Much time would necessarily be lost in bringing the members together.

Sect. 9. (22d clause) "No Capitation or other direct tax shall be laid, unless" &c.—I confess here a great disappointment. When I began to read this clause, I did not doubt that the poll-tax would share the fate of ex post facto laws and bills of attainder. I am sorry to find myself mistaken: For a Capitation Tax is impolitic and unjust; it is a tax upon population, and falls indiscriminately upon the poor and the rich; the helpless, who cannot work, and the robust, who can. The poll-taxes of the Eastern States, have forced many thousands of their valuable citizens to emigrate, and made those disaffected who staid behind.

Art. 3. Sect. 2. (3d clause) "The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by Jury."—I sincerely wish the Convention had said, a Jury of THIRTEEN, a MAJORITY of whom shall determine the verdict. Is it not extravagantly absurd to expect that twelve men shall have but one opinion among them upon the most difficult case? Common sense revolts at the idea,—while conscience shudders at the prostitution of an oath thus sanctified by law! Starve, or be perjured! say our Courts. The monstrous attachment of the people to an English Jury shews how far the force of prejudice can go—and the encomiums which have been so incessantly lavished upon it should caution us against borrowing from others, without the previous conviction of our own minds.

THE ENGLISH AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS CONTRASTED

An American Citizen [Tench Coxe] I

Independent Gazetteer (Philadelphia), September 26, 1787

It is impossible for an honest and feeling mind, of any nation or country whatever, to be insensible to the present circumstances of America. Were I an East Indian, or a Turk, I should consider this singular situation of a part of my fellow creatures, as most curious and interesting. Intimately connected with the country, as a citizen of the union, I confess it entirely engrosses my mind and feelings.

To take a proper view of the ground on which we stand, it may be necessary to recollect the manner in which the United States were originally settled and established.—Want of charity in the religious systems of Europe and of justice in their political governments were the principal moving causes, which drove the emigrants of various countries to the American continent. The Congregationalists, Quakers, Presbyterians and other British dissenters, the Catholics of England and Ireland, the Hugonots of France, the German Lutherans, Calvinists, and Moravians, with several other societies, established themselves in the different colonies, thereby laying the ground of that catholicism in ecclesiastical affairs, which has been observable since the late revolution: Religious liberty naturally promotes corresponding dispositions in matters of government. The Constitution of England, as it stood on paper, was one of the freest at that time existing in the world, and the American colonies considered themselves as entitled to the fullest enjoyment of it. Thus when the ill-judged discussions of latter times in England brought into question the rights of this country, as it stood connected with the British crown, we were found more strongly impressed with their importance and accurately acquainted with their extent, than the wisest and most learned of our brethren beyond the Atlantic. When the greatest names in Parliament insisted on the power of that body over the commerce of the colonies, and even the right to bind us in all cases whatsoever, America, seeing that it was only another form of tyranny, insisted upon the immutable truth, that taxation and representation are inseparable, and while a desire of harmony and other considerations induced her into an acquiescence in the commercial regulations of Great Britain, it was done from the declared necessity of the case, and with a cautious, full and absolute saving of our voluntarily suspended rights. The Parliament was persevering, and America continued firm till hostilities and open war commenced, and finally the late revolution closed the contest forever.

’Tis evident from this short detail and the reflections which arise from it, that the quarrel between the United States and the Parliament of Great Britain did not arise so much from objections to the form of government, though undoubtedly a better one by far is now within our reach, as from a difference concerning certain important rights resulting from the essential principles of liberty, which the Constitution preserved to all the subjects actually residing within the realm. It was not asserted by America that the people of the Island of Great Britain were slaves, but that we, though possessed absolutely of the same rights, were not admitted to enjoy an equal degree of freedom.

When the declaration of independence completed the separation between the two countries, new governments were necessarily established. Many circumstances led to the adoption of the republican form, among which was the predilection of the people.—In devising the frames of government it may have been difficult to avoid extremes opposite to the vices of that we had just rejected; nevertheless many of the State constitutions, we have chosen, are truely excellent. Our misfortunes have been, that in the first instance we adopted no national government at all, but were kept together by common danger only, and that in the confusions of a civil war we framed a Federal Constitution now universally admitted to be inadequate to the preservation of liberty, property, and the union.—The question is not then how far our State Constitutions are good or otherwise—the object of our wishes is to amend and supply the evident and allowed errors and defects of the Federal Government.—Let us consider awhile, that which is now proposed to us—let us compare it with the so much boasted British form of government, and see how much more it favors the people and how completely it secures their rights, remembring at the same time that we did not dissolve our connexion with that country so much on account of its constitution as the perversion and mal-administration of it.

In the first place let us look at the nature and powers of the head of that country, and those of the ostensible head of ours.

The British King is the great Bishop or Supreme Head of an established church, with an immense patronage annexed. In this capacity he commands a number of votes in the House of Lords, by creating Bishops, who, besides their great incomes, have votes in that assembly, and are judges in the last resort. They have also many honorable and lucrative places to bestow, and thus from their wealth, learning, dignities, powers and patronage give a great lustre and an enormous influence to the crown.

In America our President will not only be without these influencing advantages, but they will be in the possession of the people at large, to strengthen their hands in the event of a contest with him. All religious funds, honors and powers, are in the gift of numberless, unconnected, disunited, and contending corporations, wherein the principle of perfect equality universally prevails. In short, danger from ecclesiastical tyranny, that long standing and still remaining curse of the people—that sacrilegious engine of royal power in some countries, can be feared by no man in the United States. In Britain their king is for life—In America our president will always be one of the people at the end of four years. In that country the king is hereditary and may be an idiot, a knave, or a tyrant by nature, or ignorant from neglect of his education, yet cannot be removed, for he can do no wrong. In America, as the president is to be one of the people at the end of his short term, so will he and his fellow citizens remember, that he was originally one of the people; and that he is created by their breath—Further, he cannot be an idiot, probably not a knave or a tyrant, for those whom nature makes so, discover it before the age of thirty-five, until which period he cannot be elected. It appears we have not admitted that he can do no wrong, but have rather pre-supposed he may and will sometimes do wrong, by providing for his impeachment, his trial, and his peaceable and complete removal.

In England the king has a power to create members of the upper house, who are judges in the highest court, as well as legislators. Our president not only cannot make members of the upper house, but their creation, like his own, is by the people through their representatives, and a member of assembly may and will be as certainly dismissed at the end of his year for electing a weak or wicked senator, as for any other blunder or misconduct.

The king of England has legislative power, while our president can only use it when the other servants of the people are divided. But in all great cases affecting the national interests or safety, his modified and restrained power must give way to the sense of two-thirds of the legislature. In fact it amounts to no more, than a serious duty imposed upon him to request both houses to reconsider any matter on which he entertains doubts or feels apprehensions; and here the people have a strong hold upon him from his sole and personal responsibility.

The president of the upper house (or the chancellor) in England is appointed by the king, while our vice-president, who is chosen by the people through the electors and the senate, is not at all dependant on the president, but may exercise equal powers on some occasions. In all royal governments an helpless infant or an unexperienced youth, may wear the crown. Our president must be matured by the experience of years, and being born among us, his character at thirty-five must be fully understood. Wisdom, virtue, and active qualities of mind and body can alone make him the first servant of a free and enlightened people.

Our president will fall very far short indeed of any prince in his annual income, which will not be hereditary, but the absolute allowance of the people passing through the hands of their other servants from year to year as it becomes necessary. There will be no burdens on the nation to provide for his heir or other branches of his family. ’Tis probable, from the state of property in America and other circumstances, that many citizens will exceed him in shew and expence, those dazzling trappings of kingly rank and power. He will have no authority to make a treaty without two-thirds of the senate, nor can he appoint ambassadors or other great officers without their approbation, which will remove the idea of patronage and influence, and of personal obligation and dependance. The appointment of even the inferior officers may be taken out of his hands by an act of Congress at any time; he can create no nobility or titles of honor, nor take away offices during good behaviour. His person is not so much protected as that of a member of the house of representatives; for he may be proceeded against like any other man in the ordinary course of law. He appoints no officer of the separate states. He will have no influence from placemen in the legislature, nor can he prorogue or dissolve it. He will have no power over the treasures of the state; and lastly, as he is created through the electors by the people at large, he must ever look up to the support of his creators. From such a servant with powers so limited and transitory, there can be no danger, especially when we consider the solid foundations on which our national liberties are immovably fixed by the other provisions of this excellent constitution. Whatever of dignity or authority he possesses, is a delegated part of their Majesty and their political omnipotence, transiently vested in him by the people themselves for their own happiness.

SENATORS AND NOBLES

An American Citizen [Tench Coxe] II

Independent Gazetteer (Philadelphia), September 28, 1787

We have seen that the late honorable Convention, in designating the nature of the chief executive office of the United States, have deprived it of all the dangerous appendages of royalty, and provided for the frequent expiration of its limited power—As our President bears no resemblance to a King, so we shall see the Senate have no similitude to nobles.

First then not being hereditary, their collective knowledge, wisdom and virtue are not precarious, for by these qualities alone are they to obtain their offices; and they will have none of the peculiar follies and vices of those men, who possess power merely because their fathers held it before them, for they will be educated (under equal advantages and with equal prospects) among and on a footing with the other sons of a free people—If we recollect the characters, who have, at various periods, filled the seats of Congress, we shall find this expectation perfectly reasonable. Many young men of genius and many characters of more matured abilities, without fortunes, have been honored with that trust. Wealth has had but few representatives there, and those have been generally possessed of respectable personal qualifications. There have also been many instances of persons, not eminently endowed with mental qualities, who have been sent thither from a reliance on their virtues, public and private—As the Senators are still to be elected by the legislatures of the states, there can be no doubt of equal safety and propriety in their future appointment, especially as no further pecuniary qualification is required by the constitution.

They can hold no other office civil or military under the United States, nor can they join in making provisions for themselves, either by creating new places or encreasing the emoluments of old ones. As their sons are not to succeed them, they will not be induced to aim at an increase or perpetuity of their powers, at the expence of the liberties of the people of which those sons will be a part. They possess a much smaller share of the judicial power than the upper house in Britain, for they are not, as there, the highest court in civil affairs. Impeachments alone are the cases cognizable before them, and in what other place could matters of that nature be so properly and safely determined? The judges of the federal courts will owe their appointments to the president and senate, therefore may not feel so perfectly free from favor, affection and influence, as the upper house, who receive their power from the people, through their state representatives, and are immediately responsible to those assemblies, and finally to the nation at large—Thus we see when a daring or dangerous offender is brought to the bar of public justice, the people who alone can impeach him by their immediate representatives, will cause him to be tried, not by judges appointed in the heat of the occasion, but by two thirds of a select body, chosen a long time before, for various purposes by the collected wisdom of their state legislatures. From a pretence or affection of extraordinary purity and excellence of character their word of honor is the sanction, under which these high courts in other countries, have given their sentence—but with us, like the other judges of the union, like the rest of the people of which they are never to forget they are a part it is required, that they be on oath.

No ambitious, undeserving or unexperienced youth can acquire a seat in this house by means of the most enormous wealth or most powerful connections, till thirty years have ripened his abilities and fully discovered his merits to his country—a more rational ground of preference surely than mere property.

The senate though more independent of