Bolt Action: Campaign: Italy: Tough Gut

By Warlord Games and Peter Dennis

A new supplement for Bolt Action focusing on the later Italian Campaign, following on from Soft Underbelly, adding new units, scenarios, and special rules.

In Italy, the fight continues!

As the Allies push north up the Italian Peninsula, they have encountered heavy resistance from the Axis and their multitude of fortified and defensive lines, slowing the allied advance to a crawl. The 'soft underbelly' of Europe proved to be false, instead it was a 'tough gut'.

This supplement for Bolt Action, and the counterpart to Soft Underbelly, focuses on the battles ranging from the Gustav Line in 1944 all the way to those of the Gothic Line in 1945, with the breakouts at Anzio and Monte Cassino of particular focus. Containing a host of scenarios to refight these famous battles, along with new units, special rules, and Theatre Selectors, this book contains everything players need to bring an end to the war and liberate Italy.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing
• Release date: Aug 17, 2023
• ISBN: 9781472860200

Warlord Games

Warlord Games is one of the world's leading producers of wargaming miniatures, as well as the publisher of the successful Black Powder and Hail Caesar rule sets. Their Bolt Action range of 28mm World War II miniatures is the most extensive on the market and continues to grow and develop.

Book preview

CONTENTS

About This Book

Campaign Overview

The Invasion of Mainland Italy

On To Rome!

New Year, New Plan

Assault on the Gustav Line

A Wild Cat in the Alban Hills? The Anzio Landings

The First Battle of Cassino

Anzio: Attempted Breakout

Battles for the Thumb

The Second Battle of Cassino

Anzio: Operation Fischfang

Operation Seitensprung and Stalemate at Anzio

The Third Battle of Cassino

Operation Diadem and the Fourth Battle of Cassino

The Anzio Breakout and the Allure of Rome

Scenarios

Scenario 1: The Barracks

The Aftermath

Scenario 2: Battle For The Thumb

The Aftermath

Scenario 3: The Gates Of Hell

The Aftermath

Scenario 4: Cassino II: The Railway Station

The Aftermath

Scenario 5: Counter-Attack At Castle Hill

The Aftermath

Scenario 6: Battle For The Ruins, The Struggle For The Continental Hotel

Aftermath

Scenario 7: Operation Revenge

The Aftermath

Scenario 8: For The Freedom Of Our Nation!

The Aftermath

Scenario 9: It’s A Trap!

The Aftermath

Scenario 10: Playing With The Big Cats

The Aftermath

New British and Commonwealth Units

Headquarters and Infantry

Headquarters

Infantry Squads and Teams

Vehicles

Armoured Cars

Heroes Of The British Empire and British-Supported Nations

Sepoy Kamal Ram VC

Corporal Wojtek, The Soldier Bear

New US and French Units

Headquarters and Infantry

Headquarters

Infantry Squads and Teams

Heroes Of The United States

Staff Sergeant Audie Murphy

PFC William James Johnston Sr.

New Allied Italian Units

Headquarters and Infantry

Headquarters

Infantry

Heroes of the Kingdom of the South

General Umberto Utili

New Units Of The German Wehrmacht

Headquarters and Infantry

Headquarters

Infantry Squads and Teams

Vehicles

Tanks

Tank Destroyers

Self-propelled Artillery

Anti-aircraft Vehicles

Heroes Of The German Wehrmacht

Oberleutnant Siegfried Jamrowski

Generalmajor Ernst-Günther Baade

Major Rudolf Haen

New Axis Italian Units

Headquarters and Infantry

Headquarters

Infantry

Heroes Of The RSI

Capitano Edoardo Sala

New Theatre Selectors

British, Commonwealth, and British-Supported Theatre Selectors

National Characteristics

Extra Equipment and Attachments

Assault On The Gustav Line, January – February 1944

Anzio

Second and Third Battles Of Cassino

Operation Diadem

United States and US-Supported Theatre Selectors

Extra Equipment and Attachments

1st Battle Of Cassino

Anzio

Operation Diadem

French Expeditionary Corps Theatre Selector

Special Rules

Theatre Selectors

The First Motorised Group and the Italian Liberation Corps (CIL) Theatre Selector

Special Rules

September 1943 to July 1944

German Theatre Selectors

Special Rules

Extra Equipment and Attachments

First and Second Battles Of Cassino

Anzio

The Green Devils Of Cassino

Operation Diadem

Repubblica Sociale Italiana Theatre Selectors

Special Rules

Anzio and The Battle For Rome

Appendix

New Generic Units

Headquarters

Chaplains

Transports and Tows

Generic Equipment

Demolition Charges

Bangalore Torpedoes

Wire Cutters

Fortifications

Camouflaged Bunkers

Turret Fortifications

Fortification List

Minefields

Minefield Sections

Effect Of Minefields

Mixed Minefields

Dummy Minefields

Concealed Minefields

Clearing Minefields

Dug In

Dug In Rules

Dug In Vehicles

Dug In With Hidden Set-Up

Dug In vs. Preparatory Bombardment

Dug In vs. Tank Assault

Digging In During A Game

Multinational Forces

Allied Cooperation

Ad Hoc Unit Rules

Rule The Skies

Solid Stone Buildings

Battlefield Conditions

Trench Foot

Frostbite

Rain Or Fog

Snow

Mud

Rubble

Sewer Movement

Bibliography

Credits

About This Book

[Churchill said] ‘We should slit the soft belly of the Mediterranean.’ Well, my friends, I assure you, when I landed at Salerno, I found it was a tough old gut!

General Mark Clark, commander US Fifth Army

This supplement for Bolt Action focuses on the Italian campaign during the Second World War, in particular the fighting of the first five months of 1944. This book is the second volume in a series that looks at the long and arduous campaign. The first book, Italy: Soft Underbelly, looks at the Sicilian campaign and the Italian campaign to the end of 1943. This volume follows that and focuses on the Allies desperate struggle to break the agonising stalemate on the Gustav Line, the Liri Valley, and the deadlock at Anzio after the amphibious landings there on 22 January 1944.

Prior to reaching the Gustav Line, the British 8th and US Fifth Armies had already faced a stalemate on the Winter Line, which held them up for months, with the US Fifth battering their way through the towering mountain defences, exhausting both its commanders and men. The Fifth Army pushed through the Mignano Gap and soon found themselves facing a German defensive line under the leadership of Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, the German commander in the theatre. The Gustav Line was a formidable obstacle, backed up by natural features that made it almost impregnable. The Liri Valley seemed the best route to Rome, but it, too, was guarded by natural features. Blocking the entrance of the Liri Valley were a series of rapid flowing rivers, behind which the Germans constructed their fortified line bristling with pillboxes, bunkers, entrenchments, barbed wire, minefields, and supporting artillery which could bring down deadly fire from the high ground from which every movement below could be seen.

Immediately to the north of the valley’s mouth was the Cassino massif, surmounted by the ancient Cassino monastery, established by St Benedict in the 6th century. The monastery had dominated the vista below for well over a millennium and was a priceless symbol of Christian culture that, unfortunately, would be at the epicentre of the Allies bid to break the Gustav Line and take Rome. The bombing of the monastery on 15 February 1944 would be one of the most controversial acts of the campaign, its shattered husk becoming one of the most tragic images of the entire war. Canadian war artist Captain Charles Comfort described it vividly saying, For sheer horror and devastation I had not set eyes on its equal.

The defences of the Gustav Line kept the Allies at bay for five months, with a total of four unsuccessful battles at Cassino. In the end the Cassino positions were outflanked and its indominable defenders, the Fallschirmjäger (German paratroopers) were forced to give up their defended positions. The battles for Cassino further cemented the Fallschirmjäger’s already fearsome reputation as the world heard stories of their amazing defence of Cassino after being bombarded for hours before being attacked by elite Allied forces. They earnt the grudging respect of their foes and even General Alexander, commander of 15th Army Group in Italy conceded, saying, Unfortunately we are fighting the best soldiers in the world. What men!... I don’t think any other troops could have stood up to it perhaps except these para boys.

Cassino’s twin battle in the bid to take Rome was the Anzio landings, a daring end-run which was to threaten Rome and cut off the men of German 10th Army on the Gustav Line. Codenamed Shingle, the landings were planned to coordinate with the assault on the Gustav Line in January. The Anzio landings took place around the ports of Anzio and Nettuno, within striking distance of Rome and to the rear of the Gustav Line. The US VI Corps was commanded by a cautious and exhausted Major General John P. Lucas, who had led the corps through the grinding fight on the Winter Line. Lucas was pessimistic about the whole endeavour, writing in his diary that it was a Battle of the Little Big Horn if he went charging for Rome. The ghost of the Salerno landings in September 1943 hovered over the whole thing, and right before the landings Lt General Mark Clark, commander of the US Fifth Army warned, "Don’t stick your neck out Johnny. I did at Salerno, and I got into trouble." In the end, the landings gained surprise, but Lucas’s timidity and the German’s preparedness ensured that the campaign stalled. After brutal counter-attacks by the Germans, the Anzio front settled into a deadlock and Lucas was sacked. The controversy over the failed beachhead further reinforced the view that Italy was a sideshow, just there to draw German strength away from the main event.

In many ways, the battle of the Anzio beachhead became just as symbolic of the Italian campaign as the battle for Cassino. However, in contrast to Cassino, the fighting around Anzio was fought on mostly flat featureless land. From the Alban Hills the Germans could observe every inch of the beachhead and targeted it with heavy artillery. The ensuing stalemate created a landscape reminiscent of Flanders during the First World War. In the end, the Allies broke through and took Rome on 4 June 1944, but it had taken them a total of nine months, and just two days later the Allies landed on the beaches of Normandy. The focus of the Allies in Europe irrevocably shifted to France and the drive for Nazi Germany.

This book views the events of the Italian campaign through the eyes of the wargamer seeking to create the battles fought by these men. In addition to the Bolt Action rulebook, the reader will need access to the Armies of the United States, Armies of Great Britain, Armies of Germany, and Armies of Italy and the Axis supplements. Some units are also found in the latest Bolt Action FAQ and Errata, which is free from www.warlordgames.com. To give the player further options and to truly bring the Italian campaign to the tabletop, bonus units are referenced from Campaign Italy: Soft Underbelly. A few other units and heroes are also referenced from other Bolt Action books but are not necessary to use the theatre selectors in this book.

RSI – Regular Army by Stephen Andrew © Taken from Men-at-Arms 353: The Italian Army 1940-45 (3)

Campaign Overview

THE INVASION OF MAINLAND ITALY

After the fall of Sicily, the collapse of the Fascist Italian government, and the peace overtures of the new Italian government, the Allies committed to a full-scale invasion of the Italian mainland with the goal of knocking Italy out of the war and draw as many German troops as possible away from the Russian front and even the French coastline (in preparation for the landings in Normandy).

The Italian mainland was invaded from three major landing points in three separate operations that were to converge and drive on Naples, then Rome. One of the conditions of the armistice between the Kingdom of Italy and the Allies was that they were to land in strength, preferably in the vicinity of Rome. However, Eisenhower knew that landing that far north would leave the invasion fleet vulnerable and opted for the most northern landing point he could justify, the Gulf of Salerno. The first landing, codenamed Baytown, was undertaken by Lieutenant General Bernard Montgomery’s 8th Army on 3 September, across the Messina Strait on the toe of the Italian boot. This was followed on 9 September by two other landings: one in the Gulf of Salerno just south of Naples, codenamed Avalanche, led by the US Fifth Army under Lieutenant General Mark Clark; and another, smaller landing by the British 1st Airborne Division at Taranto (Operation Slapstick).

Preceding the landings were the twin announcements by General Eisenhower, commander of Allied forces in the Mediterranean, and Italian Field Marshal Badoglio, declaring the armistice. The Germans, having prepared for such an eventuality, promptly mobilised 22 waiting divisions stationed in central and northern Italy and disarmed the Italian armed forces. By the time the Allies landed at Salerno the Germans had occupied the Italian gun batteries and beach defences.

The plan had been for Monty’s 8th Army to be close to Salerno by the time the Fifth Army landed. However, in what would become a common theme for the campaign, the Germans, though vastly outnumbered, were able to slow and delay the Allied advance using demolitions at choke points and the effective exploitation of rugged terrain. The 8th Army couldn’t reach Salerno until the Germans opted to withdraw. In the nine-day battle at Salerno the Allies faced determined resistance from skilled and battle-hardened troops of the German 10th Army in command of the high ground that hemmed in the coastal plain. The Germans came close to splitting the beachhead and threatened to drive the Allies into the sea. Lt General Mark Clark considered abandoning the US sector of the beachhead, but the Allies were able to turn the situation around using superior firepower and the timely arrival of reinforcements, which plugged the gaping holes in the Allied lines.

A German panthersturm stands sentinel against Allied attack

Advance to Gustav Line. © Osprey Publishing Ltd. Taken from from Campaign 134: Cassino 1944

ON TO ROME!

From 18 September, the Germans conducted a fighting retreat on both sides of the Apennine Mountain range which separated the Fifth and 8th Armies from each other and made the already-narrow peninsula even tighter, with significant choke points and obstacles. The British on the Adriatic side of the Apennines tried to get around the Biferno River, landing a force at Termoli. However, in a near repeat of the Salerno landings, the force faced a furious counter-attack by the 16th Panzer Division, again only saved by the timely arrival of reinforcements. In the meantime, the US Fifth Army, after taking Naples, were stalled on the mud-soaked Volturno river for a week. While the Allies were stalled, Field Marshal Kesselring (simultaneously Commander in Chief South-west and Commander of Army Group C in Italy) sanctioned the construction of a series of fortified lines.

The Volturno and Barbara lines crossed the peninsula from the Tyrrhenian coast to the Adriatic; they were secondary lines, intended to slow down the Allied advance. The primary defensive line was the Gustav line, positioned behind the Garigliano and Sangro Rivers. On the Tyrrhenian coast the Bernhardt or Reinhard Line, a secondary defensive line, guarded the Mignano gap and merged with the Gustav line inland of Cassino. This defensive line was known as Winter Line by the Allies. In December 1943, as the Allies were battering their way through the Winter Line, Kesselring ordered construction of a further fall-back line on the Tyrrhenian coast that would be even more heavily fortified than preceding lines, known as the Hitler Line.

On 27 November, the British 8th Army took the town of Mozzagrogna, breaching the Bernhardt line. After battering their way through the Barbara Line, the US Fifth Army’s advance slowed to a crawl as it reached the mountains. The Allied advances were brought to a halt as they reached the Winter Line. For a week and a half, they tried to breach the German defences on both sides of the peninsula to no avail. Clark halted operations on 15 November to rest his army and come up with a new plan to break the German defences and drive on to Rome. The British, too, were preparing their army for a big push to Pescara from which they would make a move on Rome.

Both the British 8th Army under Montgomery and the US Fifth Army under Clark would begin their offensives in early December. Clark’s plan, Operation Raincoat, envisioned clearing all mountain defences on both sides of the Mignano Gap, followed by a rush to Rome through the Liri Valley. The British 8th would push onto to Pescara, with the New Zealand 2nd Division moving on Orsogna and the Indian 8th Division moving on Villa Grande.

Operation Raincoat began successfully, with Monte La Difensa and La Remetanea being seized by the US/Canadian First Special Service Force. The Fifth Army eventually cleared the defences of the Bernhardt Line, but it would take them all of December 1943 and well into January to approach the Gustav Line. The 8th Army did not have it any easier. It took the Canadian 1st the whole of December to advance from the Moro River to take Ortona, falling short of Pescara. While the New Zealanders and Indians also fell short of their objectives. As 1943 ended, Eisenhower and Montgomery left the theatre, replaced by Lt General Henry Wilson as Supreme Allied Commander, MTO and Lt General Oliver Leese, Commander, 8th Army.

Field Marshal Kesselring’s decision to defend southern Italy coupled with the highly defensible ground had seen the Allies fall short of capturing Rome, and the campaign now deteriorated into a costly grind.

US Army 105mm medium artillery

NEW YEAR, NEW PLAN

From the landings at Salerno on 9 September 1943 to January 1944 the Allies had struggled to advance even 100 kms. They were still battling through the mountains and approaches to the Gustav Line and the pace did not look like quickening any time soon. How could the Allies change the situation?

With Italy’s long coastline and Allies in firm control of the sea, an amphibious operation seemed an obvious solution and General Harold Alexander considered such to dislodge the Germans from their defences as early as November 1943. Unfortunately, this solution wasn’t so straightforward. In mid-December, 68 of the 90 LST (Landing Ship, Tank) crafts available in theatre were assigned for transfer in preparation for Operations Overlord (the Normandy invasion) and Anvil (the invasion of Southern France), so a plan for an amphibious landing was put forward in late November, codenamed Shingle. This was judged by Clark’s field commanders as being unfeasible due to the Allies’ inability to land enough troops during the first days of the operation.

The plan was scrapped on 18 December. In a Christmas meeting with Italian theatre commanders, Prime Minister Winston Churchill got wind of the plan and used his political pull to reinstate Shingle, making it a reality once more. Churchill also used his influence to postpone the transfer of the LSTs needed for the operation until after the landings, which was set for late January. The final plan for Shingle would see the landings co-ordinated with an offensive on the Gustav Line, intended to draw enemy reserves away from the site of the landings at the twin ports of Anzio and Nettuno.

The Fifth Army’s attacks on the Gustav Line would begin on 11 January by the FEC (French Expeditionary Corps), which first saw service in Italy in December 1943. They would attack in the mountains north of Cassino, drawing German strength. Their eventual goal was to break through and swing around Cassino from the north into the Liri Valley. Six days later, the British X Corps would attack across the Garigliano to the south of the Liri Valley, securing highway 7 along the coast and the mountains south. A few days later, US II Corps would attack the mouth of the Liri Valley and cross the Gari river.

The Anzio landings were set for between 20 – 31 January. The plan was for a landing force of two Divisions of US VI Corps (one being the attached British 1st Infantry Division) plus additional tank support, special forces, and artillery units to seize the ports, allowing reinforcements to arrive. However, the objectives of the landing force seemed ambiguous to its commander, Major General John P. Lucas. Lucas was so pessimistic about the whole operation that he placed the outcome somewhere between the disaster of Gallipoli (for which Churchill was also responsible) and the Battle of Little Big Horn. Churchill, for his part, thought VI Corps was to charge for Rome, whereas Alexander saw the operation’s purpose as seizing the Alban Hills, cutting off highways 6 and 7 and forcing German 10th Army to abandon the Gustav Line. To confuse the situation further, Clark warned Lucas to not stick his neck out as he himself had done at Salerno.

The Germans, however, were prepared for every eventuality, as the Allies were limited by the terrain to only a few avenues of attack. Case Richard, prepared by Kesselring, planned for the eventuality of an amphibious landing in the vicinity of Rome in conjunction with the Marder I plan, which outlined a response to such a landing and the appropriate responses for various commanders of different theatres to send reinforcements to the landing site. Through Case Richard, reinforcements were already organised and units allocated, with orders drawn up for a rapid response. Kesselring even took the precaution of stockpiling fuel on the routes these reinforcements would take.

British Commonwealth troops advance across Italian hills

ASSAULT ON THE GUSTAV LINE

On the night of 11 January, General Juin’s French Expeditionary Corps (FEC) went into the attack on the snow-capped mountains. Both sides fielded excellent mountain troops, with Algerians and Moroccans on one side and the elite 5th Mountain Division (5. Gebirgs Division) supplemented by grenadiers on the other. The FEC had to cross three miles of arduous mountain terrain before they reached the Gustav Line. The Allies rapidly took ground, but vicious counter-attacks by the Gebirgsjägers took back a lot of the ground gained. The Germans facing the Moroccans were pushed back to the Gustav Line but were able to stop them there, and by 17 January the FEC’s attack had petered out.

The action now shifted south, where British X Corps began their offensive to cross the Garigliano river, with the British 5th Division attacking on the coast and the 56th on their right flank. The offensive made early gains, with a strong bridgehead secured by the 18 January. By 20 January, Minturno was secured while the 56th threatened Castelforte. This progress concerned the Germans and Kesselring committed his reserve. Elements of the 90th and 29th PGD (Panzergrenadier Divisions) that had been positioned near Rome were committed. In the meantime, a diversionary attack by the British 46th Division was thwarted due to blustering wintery conditions that wrecked their assault boats.

It was time to deliver the final part of the Fifth’s plan to break into the Liri Valley, US II Corps’ strike across the Gari River. This section of the Gustav Line was the strongest, densely packed with fortifications, mines, barbed wire, pillboxes and interlocking mortar, machine gun, and anti-tank positions that criss-crossed the approaches to the river. Behind the defences were Monte Cassino to the north and the Aurunci Mountains to the south, from which every movement in the valley below could be observed. The attack was conducted by Major General Fred Walker’s Texan 36th Division. Walker himself felt the attack was doomed to fail, given the defences facing him and the raging river they needed to cross. What made matters worse for the Americans, who were scheduled to attack on the night of 20 January, were the troops dug in across the river: the elite 15th Panzergrenadier Division.

The 141st RCT (Regimental Combat Team) made their attempt to cross north of the town of Sant’Angelo, while the 143rd attempted to cross south of the town. The damp flooded ground, fog, wire, mines and enemy machine gun, mortar, and artillery fire created chaos and stymied movement. This was further exacerbated by infantry having to help the engineers carry equipment, and the tape marking minefields was torn apart by enemy fire. The river itself was inhospitable, sweeping away the assault boats they had brought up to the river. Despite this, both regiments managed to get troops across, and a few foot bridges were put up. These bridgeheads were short lived, with determined counter-attacks pushing them back across. By dawn of 22 January, the day of the Anzio landings, the brave Texans finally ceased operations, leaving behind 1,681 casualties. For now, the attacks along the Gustav line had failed, but at least they had