Pennsylvania Politics and Policy, Volume 2: A Commonwealth Reader

By Michelle J. Atherton and J. Wesley Leckrone

Designed to showcase current issues of interest, Pennsylvania Politics and Policy, Volume 2 isthe second reader consisting of updated chapters from recent issues of Commonwealth: A Journal of Pennsylvania Politics and Policy. The editors and contributors to this volume focus on government institutions, election laws, the judiciary, government finance and budgeting, the opioid crisis, childcare, property taxes, environmental policy, demographics, and more. Each chapter is supplemented by discussion questions, suggestions for further reading, and forums with arguments in support of or opposed to contested elements of state policy.

In addition, Pennsylvania Politics and Policy, Volume 2 includes a detailed guide to researching state government and policy online, as well as a comprehensive chapter on the structure of Pennsylvania government. It is designed as a text or supplement for college or advanced high school classes in American government, state and local politics, public policy, and public administration. 

Contributors include: John Arway, Jenna Becker Kane, Jeffrey Carroll, Bob Dick, Ashley Harden, Stefanie I. Kasparek, Vera Krekanova, Maureen W. McClure, John F. McDonald, Josh Shapiro, Marc Stier, Jennie Sweet-Cushman, James Vike, and the editors.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Temple University Press
• Release date: Aug 23, 2019
• ISBN: 9781439919163

Book preview

Chapter 1

Government Structure

Pennsylvania Government

An Overview

J. WESLEY LECKRONE

MICHELLE J. ATHERTON

Astate’s political system is shaped by a combination of how its institutions are designed, its demographic, economic, and cultural characteristics, and its historical development. At the same time, national events and the experiences of other states help to shape state politics. This chapter draws on all of these factors to provide an introduction to the basics of Pennsylvania politics. It explores the Commonwealth’s political culture, constitutional history, and the structure of its governmental institutions. This background is designed to provide foundational knowledge to assist readers in interpreting the policy specific chapters that follow.

The Political Culture of Pennsylvania

A state’s orientation toward politics is the consequence of its historical, demographic, geographic, and economic development. These factors create a political culture that is the source of different habits, concerns, and attitudes that exist to influence political life in different states (Elazar 1966, 80). The most prominent model of political culture was developed by political scientist Daniel J. Elazar. He argued that three political cultures influence politics in the American states: moralistic, individualistic, and traditionalistic (see Table 1.1). These political cultures are deep seated, almost second nature, to the citizenry and are passed down from generation to generation, changing slowly if at all (Kincaid 1982, 6).

TABLE 1.1 THE DYNAMICS OF ELAZAR’S THREE POLITICAL CULTURES

TABLE 1.1 THE DYNAMICS OF ELAZAR’S THREE POLITICAL...

Pennsylvania is considered by scholars to be a quintessential example of the individualistic political culture. Three characteristics of the Commonwealth are particularly noteworthy in relation to this discussion. First, political, social, and cultural life in the state are based primarily on local and regional loyalties. Consequently, there is not a common Pennsylvania identity that helps create a sense of shared experience and common purpose (Beers 1980, 1–2). Journalist John Baer captures how this affects Pennsylvania’s politics:

It’s a big state that seems more like multiple states than one. As a result, there are very few statewide focal points, very little emphasis on issues that apply to residents in all markets. And the geography of the state and the difference among its regions encourages [sic] a parochialism that is reflected in the action (and more often inaction) of the legislature. . . . Incumbents remain incumbents by addressing, if only with lip service, the local and regional needs of their constituents while the larger, all-encompassing issues . . . historically get shorted. (2012, 24)

Pennsylvania’s parochialism lends itself to the individualistic political culture’s marketplace model of government where interests compete to get as much out of the political system for themselves without necessarily considering the common good.¹

Second, politics is best left to professionals in the individualistic political culture because it is a power game involving dirty shenanigans and is considered to be vulnerable to corruption. Being a politician is considered to be as much of a way to gain prominence and wealth as any other career. Political parties serve as the strongest competitors for power in the Commonwealth, as is customary in the individualistic political culture. Pennsylvania observer Paul Beers contends that contentious party strife is the characteristic most closely associated with Pennsylvania politics (1980, 4). Legislative partisanship means that a line is drawn on most every issue and on either side there’s an army of Republican and Democratic giants who bombard each other with blunted objects (4). This results in the legislature’s ability to pulverize any idea, movement or proposal that comes its way (Fulbright 1972, i). Reelection rates and careerism in the state legislature have increased over the course of the last century as the role has taken on the benefits of a full-time job: high salaries, fringe benefits, and a pension (Treadway 2005, 203–204).

Figure 1.1 Sports and politics in Pennsylvania. Paul Beers...

Figure 1.1 Sports and politics in Pennsylvania. Paul Beers claimed that Pennsylvania’s long-time passionate involvement with athletics—the fervor over tournaments, championships, and football heroes—contrasts with its often slack-jawed approach to the responsibilities of citizenship in a democracy (1980, 3). This was evident as Philadelphia Eagles quarterback Nick Foles was added to the pantheon of great Pennsylvanians at the city’s parade honoring the Super Bowl champions in February 2018. (Source: Wikimedia Commons user AmPartnership.)

The previous two aspects of Pennsylvania politics lead to another characteristic common in the individualistic political culture: corruption. Brad Bumsted, who has written two books on the topic, argues that corruption has festered like a cancer in Pennsylvania, at least since the Civil War. Corruption comes in waves, then subsides, and finally returns (2013, ix). In its crudest form it involves personal enrichment through cash payments and gifts. However, it also includes misuse of government money for political campaigns, pet projects back in the district, and personal use of public funds. This is the consequence of politicians who begin as caring, conscientious lawmakers who are eventually corrupted by the system (Bumsted 2013, ix). Elazar (1966) claims that political culture is slow to change. Reform and change in Pennsylvania will be slow to take place because there is a general tolerance (or apathy) for the existing way of politics and ultimately it would require legislation from the very politicians who benefit from the status quo.

The Constitution and Structure of Government

The United States has had a long tradition of constitutionalism, dating from colonial charters to state constitutions pre-dating the federal Constitution of 1787. The American federal system provides citizens with a type of dual citizenship since they can claim access to rights in both the federal and their state constitutions. Many people look at constitutions as boring lists of powers given to various government institutions. This is an important component of the documents. However, close readings of constitutions show that they also define the purposes of government and what a good society should look like. They describe who should be part of the decision-making process in a polity, how conflict among different interests should be structured, and the limitations on governmental power (Lutz 1988, 13–16). Each state’s constitution is the result of its historical circumstances and political culture.

State constitutions cover issues of local government and public policy and as a consequence are longer than their federal counterpart. For example, the current Pennsylvania Constitution has 26,078 words, while the U.S. Constitution has only about 7,500 words. The structure of Pennsylvania’s constitution is similar to most states (Tarr 1998, 6–28). It begins with a Declaration of Rights that includes many of the same concepts included in the U.S. Constitution and its Bill of Rights, although in many cases the Pennsylvania Constitution includes more expansive language (see Table 1.2). Like other state constitutions, Pennsylvania’s also includes rights guarantees that have no parallel in the U.S. Constitution. For example, it includes the right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment and an equal-rights-for-women provision that was rejected at the federal level.

The second component of the Pennsylvania Constitution lays out the design and powers of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. There is substantially more detail concerning the operation of these branches than in Articles 1–3 of the U.S. Constitution, particularly concerning the legislative and judicial branches. Pennsylvania places the fifth most constraints on legislative operations in the country with thirty-two specific rules on its conduct. Alternatively, there are only eleven in the U.S. Constitution (Krill, Dimino, and Atherton 2012, 7–12). The structure and procedures for each type of court in Pennsylvania are also described in great detail. The third major component delineates election qualifications and procedures. Fourth, Pennsylvania’s constitution includes detailed descriptions of taxation and finance, including what types of taxes are allowed, how those taxes apply to various interests in society, and limitations on the Commonwealth’s debt. Fifth are provisions regulating local governments. Rules are provided for the structure of municipal and county governments, how much debt they can take on, and merger of local governments. Finally, provisions for constitutional amendment are provided. Pennsylvania requires that both houses of the legislature pass an identical amendment in two consecutive terms, after which voters can approve it with a majority vote. Thirty-eight amendments have been sent to the people for a vote, and thirty-two have passed, since Pennsylvania’s most recent constitution went into effect in 1968 (Dinan 2017, 10).

The Changing Pennsylvania Constitution

State constitutional change results from the political history and culture of individual states. However, states do not exist in isolation. National political and economic events also encourage states to address common issues. Throughout American history there have been three broad issues that have dominated constitutional change. The first is the distribution of power among groups and regions within a state. This includes the expansion of the right to vote as well as how representation is allocated within governmental institutions. The second theme involves the scope of governmental power and the balance of power between the three branches of state government. Finally, issues of government regulation and intervention on economic topics constitute a major theme of state constitutional change (Tarr 1996).

TABLE 1.2 EXAMPLES OF SIMILAR RIGHTS IN U.S. DOCUMENTS AND THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION

Pennsylvania’s first constitution (1776) focused on making the government representative of the population and subject to popular control. Power was concentrated in a unicameral legislature where individuals were elected to one-year terms and limited to serving only four out of every seven years. There was a plural executive without veto power that was composed of thirteen members, with a president elected by both the executive and legislative branches. The judiciary was appointed, thus lacking independence (Ford 1895; Herrington 1994; Pencak 2002, 121–123). The document created a number of fundamental power shifts from the existing order of the colonial charter. First, the most revolutionary facet of the new constitution was that the franchise was extended to all free taxpayers as opposed to only property owners (Klein and Hoogenboom 1980, 91–94). Second, a power imbalance had existed between Bucks, Chester, and Philadelphia counties and the rest of the state during the colonial era. The three eastern counties held much of the power under the colonial legislature, much to the chagrin of the more frontier western counties. Under the Constitution of 1776, this imbalance was rectified. The supreme executive council was composed of one representative from each county, and one from the city of Philadelphia. The legislature was apportioned on the basis of taxable residents, thus spreading representation more evenly throughout the Commonwealth (Dunaway 1948, 170–181).

The Constitution of 1776 was regarded as a radical experiment in democratic government because of its all-powerful unicameral legislature and requirements for frequent elections. The document was unpopular from its inception and even served as a model for how not to design a government for states and the new national government as they drafted constitutions (Williams 1988a, 1988b). The Constitution of 1790 repudiated the old governmental structure by creating three independent branches, with a strengthened governor designed to check legislative power. Executive power was placed in the hands of one person elected by the public to a three-year term. However, the governor could only serve for a maximum of nine out of every twelve years. The governor also received the power of the veto with a two-thirds majority required for a legislative override and was given broad appointment powers across the executive and judicial branches of government, including members of the state Supreme Court. The legislature was now bicameral with a House of Representatives serving a one-year term and a Senate with terms of four years. The distribution of power from groups in Pennsylvania society was not altered from the previous constitution (Dunaway 1948, 192–193; Foster 1992; Pencak 2002, 140). The document still placed power in the hands of all tax-paying freemen, who could now elect the governor and members of the state legislature. While there were attempts to have the new Senate be chosen by electors voted on by the public or apportioned on the basis of county wealth, rather than population, these attempts to make the upper house more aristocratic were defeated (Lutz 1988, 108–109; Foster 1992).

The Constitution of 1838 focused on reigning in gubernatorial power and making government institutions more accountable to the people. Pennsylvania, like many other states, expanded executive power in the late 1700s. By the 1830s, the national consensus was that governors were abusing their powers. Pennsylvania kept the three-year term for governors but further limited their service to only six out of every nine years. The new constitution also took away many of the governor’s appointment powers because government offices were used for patronage. These offices were now either elected or, as in the case of judges, not subject to confirmation by the Senate. Judges became subject to fifteen-year terms to keep them responsible to the people, and terms of office for senators were shortened from four to three years. A new mechanism for amending the constitution was also adopted, which allowed people to vote on changes after both houses of the legislature had passed them in two consecutive sessions. These reforms were undertaken to make the government more accountable to the people. However, the Constitution of 1838 did little to expand who constituted the people. There was a push for universal suffrage, but the requirement that voters pay tax was retained. More importantly, African Americans were formally denied the vote when the words white freeman were incorporated into Article III’s discussion of the voting franchise (Akagi 1924; Lapsansky 2002, 166–168; Wood 2011).

Corruption, political machine rule, and the expanded influence of business during industrialization led to the Constitution of 1874 (Branning 1960, 87–108).² The legislature had been passing special legislation designed to benefit specific businesses or individuals. Legislators would often then threaten to rescind the special legislation until they received bribes. They would also introduce pinch bills that burdened specific interests and accept payment for not taking action on the legislation. Businesses, especially railroads, held so much power over the legislature that they were referred to as the Third House (Evans 1966, 74–75). Specific provisions were written into the constitution to regulate business. Numerous provisions were also added to prevent corruption in the legislature. These included bans on types of special and local legislation, a mandate that bills only deal with a single topic, requirements for the printing of bills before final passage, and a shift to biennial meetings of the legislature. Additionally, the Senate was expanded to fifty seats and the House to two hundred under the belief that a larger legislature would be too big to bribe. Gubernatorial power was curbed by limiting the governor to one four-year term and stripping him of the ability to unilaterally use the pardoning power. Election reforms were also undertaken to weaken political machines. The Constitution of 1874 kept the requirement that males must be taxpayers in order to vote. However, the franchise was expanded as the ban on voting by African Americans in the Constitution of 1838 was removed (Fortenbaugh and Tarman 1940, 278–279; Evans 1966, 74–103; Hellerich 1967; Klein and Hoogenboom 1980, 357–360).

Voters rejected six formal attempts to revise the Constitution of 1874 before agreeing to a Constitutional Convention in May 1967 (Beers 1980, 353). There was a national push in the 1960s to increase the capacity of state governments to address problems facing their citizens. Many of the changes in the Constitution of 1968 focused on creating a more modern, professional set of state government institutions. The largest issue addressed by the new constitution was the creation of a unified judicial system that placed courts in Pennsylvania under the direction of the state Supreme Court. It also created the Commonwealth Court, an intermediary appellate court charged with dealing with cases involving the state and local governments or agencies. Local justices of the peace were replaced by district magistrates, who were required to have a minimal level of legal knowledge. The goal for the reforms was to make the judicial system more professional and accountable. The legislature had moved to annual sessions following a referendum in 1966. Following a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions in the mid-1960s requiring legislative districts to be equal in population, the new constitution created a five-person Legislative Reapportionment Commission to draw district maps every ten years. This had important ramifications for the balance of legislative power in Pennsylvania. Over the course of the twentieth century, rural areas had accumulated a disproportionate percentage of legislative seats given their populations relative to urban and suburban areas. Reforms in the executive branch allowed the governor to run for reelection for a second term, required the governor to submit an annual budget to the legislature, and mandated that all executive departments be audited (Beers 1980, 350–355; McLaughlin 2012; Pennsylvania Department of General Services 2017, 1–43). Finally, the constitution modernized provisions dealing with state and local debt. The state received more flexibility in incurring capital debt by changing the limit on borrowing from an absolute number of $1 million to 1.75 percent of the average tax revenues over the last five years. This negated the need for a public referendum every time the state needed to take on debt (Bunch 1991). Local debt limits were changed from a percentage of the total value of property in a jurisdiction to the amount of revenue raised. This was a more realistic way to judge a local government’s ability to repay its debt. Limits could be overridden if local voters approved more spending in a referendum (Brown and Ebenstein 1979).

The Pennsylvania General Assembly

Pennsylvania’s Legislature in a National Context

The Pennsylvania General Assembly is often referred to in the press as the nation’s largest full-time state legislature.³ It has 253 members—50 in the Senate, and 203 in the House—making it second in size only to New Hampshire’s total of 424. The next largest is Georgia with 236. Nebraska has the smallest legislature (but also only a Senate) at 49 members (National Conference of State Legislatures 2013).

Pennsylvania is one of a handful of states (along with California, New York, and Michigan) that counts its legislature as full time, with high salaries and large paid staffs, hence the designation of professional. The National Conference of State Legislatures categorizes states into green, gray, and gold groups, with some gradations among them (Table 1.3). Green legislatures require a lot of time from legislators, equaling 80 percent or more of a full-time job. These states are the most like Congress, with members not needing outside income (though in Pennsylvania, many do have outside jobs), and longer sessions. These states also tend to have larger populations. Those in the green lite category have shorter sessions and earn less. States in the gray category, sometimes called hybrid legislatures, usually need outside income and spend less