Oversight of Biological and Ecological Emergencies

By Ahilya Bandopadhyay

"Oversight of Biological and Ecological Emergencies" delves into managing biological disasters and ecological crises that impact public health and the environment. The book covers topics such as bioterrorism, invasive species management, and strategies for reducing the spread of infectious diseases.
We explore case studies on the impacts of biological emergencies and provide practical guidelines for emergency preparedness and response. The book also addresses policy frameworks and international cooperation needed to manage these crises effectively. Ideal for public health officials, environmental scientists, and emergency planners, this resource offers actionable insights for handling biological and ecological threats.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Educohack Press
• Release date: Jan 24, 2025
• ISBN: 9789361525339

Book preview

Oversight of Biological and Ecological Emergencies

Oversight of Biological and Ecological Emergencies

Ahilya Bandopadhyay

Oversight of Biological and Ecological Emergencies

Ahilya Bandopadhyay

ISBN - 9789361525339

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Preface

"Biological disaster leads to mass mortality owing to the introduction of virulent microbes into a population of prone people who live in a manner conducive to the spread of infection. The widespread infection is triggered by spore dispersal in the air. Biological invasions and natural disasters are related phenomena: their causes are well known, but their occurrence is usually unpredictable and uncontrollable. All invasions and natural disasters can cause enormous environmental damage, and the incidence of adverse events is inversely proportional to their severity. In the same way, bioterrorism covers a wide range of issues, ranging from global terrorism with mass casualties to low-tech micro-events that cause civil unrest, destruction, illness, injury and death. The goal of bioterrorism is not only to exacerbate mortality and morbidity, but also to induce social and political breakdown. Since it is a hazard of the 21st century, it is important to be aware of the biological characteristics of the instruments of war. In fact, the estimated cumulative economic cost of incursions worldwide exceeds that of natural disasters. Preventive invasion management — like natural disasters — necessitates international coordination of defense systems, urgent access to critical information, advanced training of staff, and quick response strategies.

First chapter sheds light on Novel Coronavirus – a bioweapon or not. It has become widely controversial. There are arguments both in favor and against it being a bioweapon attack. Invasive alien species (IAS) threaten human livelihoods and biodiversity globally. Increasing globalization facilitates IAS arrival, and environmental changes, including climate change, facilitate IAS establishment. Herein this book, we provide the first global, spatial analysis of the terrestrial threat from IAS in light of twenty-first century globalization and environmental change, and evaluate national capacities to prevent and manage species invasions. Preparedness for bioterrorist attacks and early recognition of specific agents are essential for public health. Emergency departments may play an important role in this field. The large spectrum of bioterrorism involves not only disastrous terrorism with mass casualties, but also microevents using low technology but producing civil unrest, disruption, disease, disabilities, and death. Preparedness appears to be the most potent defense against possible bioterrorist events.

The book aims to create awareness against biological agents and underline the importance of emergency departments in this public health problem. Moreover, it sheds light on food-related health emergency-disaster risk reduction in rural ethnic minority communities; factors influencing the response to infectious diseases: focusing on the case of SARS AND MERS in south Korea; planning of a health emergency disaster risk management programme for a Chinese ethnic minority community; the costs of saving nature: does it make cents?; and chasing ecological interactions. The increasing frequency, intensity, and severity of natural hazards are one of the most pressing global environmental change problems. From the local to the global level, governments and civil society need to increase resilience to these hazards. The book, therefore, also examines the development, tradeoffs, and benefits that arise from the implementation of the AG characteristics, and reviews their influence on resilience. Finally, the book presents reflections on a science and technology agenda for 21st century disaster risk reduction; benefits and challenges of resilience and vulnerability for disaster risk management."

Table of contents

List of contributors ix

Chapter 1 1

Novel Coronavirus (nCoV-2019): Is it a Bioweapon?

Chapter 2 7

Global threats from Invasive Alien Species in

the Twenty-first Century and National Response Capacities

Chapter 3 39

How Prepared Are We for Possible Bioterrorist Attacks:

An Approach from Emergency Medicine Perspective

Chapter 4 49

Food-Related Health Emergency-Disaster Risk Reduction in Rural Ethnic Minority Communities: A Pilot Study of Knowledge, Awareness and Practice of Food Labelling and Salt-intake Reduction in a Kunge Community in China

Chapter 5 72

Factors Influencing the Response to Infectious Diseases: Focusing on the Case of SARS and MERS in South Korea

Chapter 6 106

Planning of a Health Emergency Disaster Risk Management Programme for a Chinese Ethnic Minority Community

Chapter 7 128

The Costs of Saving Nature: Does it make Cents?

Chapter 8 139

Chasing Ecological Interactions

Chapter 9 145

The Shoe Fits, but the Footprint is Larger than Earth

Chapter 10 152

The Costs of Exclusion: Recognizing a Role for Local Communities in Biodiversity Conservation

Chapter 11 168

Adaptive Governance and Managing Resilience to

Natural Hazards

Chapter 12 209

Reflections on a Science and Technology Agenda for

21st Century Disaster Risk Reduction

Chapter 13 276

Benefits and Challenges of Resilience and Vulnerability

for Disaster Risk Management

Citation 320

Index 322

List of contributors

Syed Javaid Khurshid

Corresponding author: Syed Javaid Khurshid, Center for International Strategic Studies, Islamabad, Pakistan, Tel: [phone]; E-mail: [e-mail]

Regan Early

Centre for Ecology and Conservation, University of Exeter, Penryn Campus, Penryn, Cornwall TR10 9FE, UK.

Ali Kemal Erenler

Hitit University, Department of Emergency Medicine, Çorum, Turkey

Emily Ying Yang Chan

Collaborating Centre for Oxford University and CUHK for Disaster and Medical Humanitarian Response (CCOUC), JC (Jockey Club) School of Public Health and Primary Care, Faculty of Medicine, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China

Kyu-Myoung Lee

Department of Public Administration, Korea University, Seoul 02841, Korea; [e-mail]

Greta Tam

Jockey Club School of Public Health and Primary Care, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China

Andrew J. Tanentzap

Ecosystems and Global Change Group, Department of Plant Sciences, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom

Pedro Jordano

Integrative Ecology Group, Estación Biológica de Doñana, EBD-CSIC, Av. Americo Vespucio s/n, s/n, E-41092 Sevilla, Spain

William E. Rees

University of British Columbia, School of Community and Regional Planning, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada

Marc Ancrenaz

To whom correspondence should be addressed. E-mail: [e-mail]

Riyanti Djalante

Department of Environment and Geography, Macquarie University, Sydney 2109, Australia

Amina Aitsi-Selmi

Public Health England, London SE1 8UG, UK

Alexander Fekete

Risk and Crisis Management Section, Cologne University of Applied Sciences, 50679, Cologne, Germany

Chapter 1

Novel Coronavirus

(nCoV-2019): Is it a Bioweapon?

Syed Javaid Khurshid*

* Corresponding author: Syed Javaid Khurshid, Center for International Strategic Studies, Islamabad, Pakistan, Tel: [phone]; E-mail: [e-mail]

Abstract

The Coronavirus outbreak of January 7, 2020 at Wuhan, Hubei infected more than 45,000 people in 27 countries, killed about 1000. It has become widely controversial. There are arguments both in favor and against it being a bioweapon attack. The superpowers are blaming each other for its spread. Americans are pointing out at Chinese facilities involved in similar research, whereas, Chinese are suspecting American military laboratories around the world. The Israelis are blaming Chinese and Russians are blaming Americans but the discovery of evidence of the Biohazard containers buried at American Consulate Wuhan, has changed the scenario altogether and has to be proved otherwise.

Keywords: Coronavirus (nCoV-2019); Bioweapon; WMD; Wuhan

1. Commentary

The Coronavirus outbreak originated on January 7, 2020, in the Chinese City of Wuhan, in the province of Hubei. The common symptoms of the virus are cold with fever, cough and difficulty in breathing. This new emerging virus novel Coronavirus (nCoV-2019) is a new strain but similar to earlier viruses such as Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) and Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS).

If you look at Wuhan, it is a port city, which is a hub of transportation and education and also a tourist attraction. The shutdown of this city has badly affected the Chinese economy as the Chinese employs from other countries were there to celebrate the lunar New Year. They cannot leave and are absent from their jobs as no country is ready to accept them back, the schools in Hubei province are closed upto March 1, 2020. The supply chain is also badly affected, resulting in the reduction of productivity. The tourism has also badly suffered.

The sources of pathogen remain unclear; it is expected to spread from a seafood and animal market. However, an earlier source than the market cannot be ruled out and has to be found. Conspiracy theory of the biological terrorism was creeping up in my mind as in the world over, since, the discovery and spread of virus has occurred but there was no evidence to support. It is also severely condemned by the international community in the light of Biological Weapon Convention (BWC). The BWC came into force in 1975 and was signed by China in 1985, which bans development, production and stockpiling of entire of Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD). It was also emphasized in the 8th review conference held on 2019. However, the threat of BWC always remain there as they can really effect a large population very easily at a very low cast, similar to the spread of nCoV-2019 in Wuhan. It has severely affected public health and morale and public stability. People are also not well equipped with effective measures to combat the virus as in the case of Coronavirus. It can be considered as one of the emerging infectious diseases.

The Coronavirus has infected about 45,000 people in 27 countries till February 11, 2020 and has killed about 1000 people, whereas; more than 50 million remain under locked down conditions. World Health Organization (WHO) declared the Coronavirus as a public health emergency at the international level and to be dealt under the coordinated efforts internationally under the guidance of UN Health Authority. On February 9, 2020 WHO has dispatched its advance team led by Dr. Bruce Aylward expert in public health emergencies [1]. Some Chinese sources initially claimed that virus is the result of some US germs warfare conspiracy and believed that it is created by the US. The Chinese also blamed that it was Americans who created a fear and height about the widespread of Coronavirus, whereas, it is well under the control of the Chinese authorities and China already allocated $10.26 billion to the fight this terrible situation and provided subsidies to medical supplies companies [2].

On the other hand, Americans are blaming China by saying that even after signing the BWC in 1984, there are reports that China is maintaining an offensive Biological Weapon Program. It was easy to pin suspicion on the Wuhan Institute of Virology, a few miles away from the ground zero and to a second facility known as Wuhan Institute of Biological Products. It is the one of the eight research facilities under the BWC surveillance.

The Israeli authorities are suspecting that nCoV-2019 may be originated from a laboratory in Wuhan. They give an example of a radio report on Wuhan Institute of Virology working with the deadly viruses. An Israeli scientist Danny Shoham, a microbiologist and a senior analyst of Israeli Military Intelligence for Biological and Chemical warfare, also said that the Institute is linked to Beijing’ s Covert Biological Weapon Program [3]. An American scientist Vipin Narang, a MIT security specialist is of a view that there is no evidence that Coronavirus is a bioweapon and any claim that it is willfully spread, is misinformation and is incredibly irresponsible. He also has doubts that it is an escaped bioweapon as it does not fulfill the requirement of a bioweapon to be highly lethal and not highly communicable [3].

The Russian scientists believe that the Americans have created the Coronavirus episode in Wuhan to disturb China and to make money [4] and also to destroy Chinese economy. Chinese economy has already started showing affects and it is declared that there will be an inflation of more than 8.5% this year as compared to 3% declared earlier.

The Russian media suggests that the novel disease name as 2019- nCoV, could be an American made Bioweapon which is designed to sabotage Chinese economic activities [4]. The media also refer it to the recent tensions between America and China, a struggle between superpowers, ranging from trade supremacy, dispute on South China Sea and 5G internet. The Russians believe that this has pushed Americans to take a drastic action against China to achieve its goals [4].

The Russian news agency RIA Novosti in an article by Nikulin, a former member of UN Commission on Biological and Chemical Weapons claims that he was contacted by Chinese colleagues who believe that the Coronavirus is manmade. He reported that the spread is sabotage and also speculated that this dangerous cargo from an American laboratory might have been carried out by US diplomatic staff to Wuhan [5]. It is also supported by a foreign policy expert Lenoid Savin working at Shadowy Strategic Culture Foundation. He speculated that the creation of Coronavirus bioweapon has been financed by Bill and Malinda Gates Foundation. Nikulin goes further that Coronavirus is made by American corporations working on emerging diseases and to make money while finding a cure. He also states that America is the only country that has more than 400 military biological laboratories around the world including China to support these kinds of projects [5].

This conspiracy theory was supported on a patent filled by Pirtbright Institute, England. These allegations were denied by Mattew Frieman a Coronavirus researcher at the University of Maryland. He said that sequencing was done at the Centre for Disease Control (CDC) during the SARS outbreak and they were the ones who filled the patent.

Vladimir Zhirinovsky leader of Liberal Democratic Party told Moscow radio that Americans are surely behind this outbreak. He said that research on this virus has given a chance to Americans military to weaponize the virus.

On the other hand, the Chinese believed from the beginning that it is created by the Americans as the virus is genetically shaped in the US laboratories. Now the spokeswoman Hua Chunying of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China has released a statement on January 30, 2020, that they found eight containers with Biohazard labels [6] (Xinhua News also published their photos) wrapped in two layers of tarpaulin buried at a depth of one and half meters in the backyard of American Consulate in Wuhan. This was founded by Chinese intelligence after Americans evacuated the consulate. MoFA China has officially demanded from the US to explain why Biohazard Containers are found buried in the US Consulate at Wuhan. Since, China has not received any answers from the Americans after so many days; therefore, they called for an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council [6].

We can say that however; non-state actors are not only the potential users of the biological weapons, new technologies and changing political contexts also, make bioweapons attractive to state sponsored attacks.

In the end I would like to suggest some essential steps necessary for the national as well international security. The countries have to be more vigilant to any biological warfare in view of the new emerging technologies which are revolutionizing access to deadly germs and toxins. Secondly, we should develop and improve the ability to prevent and cope up with emerging virus warfare. Thirdly, an International and National Biological Defense Security System should be established by creating public awareness.

References

[1]World Health Organization (2020) Press Release, Feb 10, 2020.

[2]Hua J, Stanway D (2020) World News, Feb 9, 2020.

[3]Taylor A (2020) The Washington Post, Jan 29, 2020.

[4]Ebb W (2020) Many Russians think American created Coronavirus & the reasons may shock you., Dim sum Daily Hong Kong, Jan 30, 2020

[5]Nikulin I (2020) Russian media spew US Coronavirus conspiracies. RIA Novosti, Jan 27, 2020.

[6]Xinhua News (2020) Several Biohazard Containers found in US consulate Wuhan after evacuation. Feb 5, 2020.

Chapter 2

Global threats from Invasive Alien Species in the Twenty-first Century and National Response Capacities

Regan Early¹, Bethany A. Bradley², Jeffrey S. Dukes³,⁴, Joshua J. Lawler⁵, Julian D. Olden⁶, Dana M. Blumenthal⁷, Patrick Gonzalez⁸,⁹, Edwin D. Grosholz¹⁰, Ines Iban˜ez¹¹, Luke P. Miller¹², Cascade J.B. Sorte¹³ & Andrew J. Tatem¹⁴,¹⁵,¹⁶

¹ Centre for Ecology and Conservation, University of Exeter, Penryn Campus, Penryn, Cornwall TR10 9FE, UK.

² Department of Environmental Conservation, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Massachusetts 01003-9285, USA.

³ Department of Forestry and Natural Resources, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana 47907, USA.

⁴ Department of Biological Sciences, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana 47907, USA.

⁵ School of Environmental and Forest Sciences, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington 98195-2100, USA.

⁶ School of Aquatic and Fishery Sciences, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington 98195-5020, USA.

⁷ USDA-ARS Rangeland Resources Research Unit, Fort Collins, Colorado 82001, USA.

⁸ Natural Resource Stewardship and Science, U.S. National Park Service, Berkeley, California 94720-3114, USA.

⁹ Department of Environmental Science, Policy, and Management, University of California, Berkeley, California, 94720-3114, USA.

¹⁰ Department of Environmental Science and Policy, University of California, Davis, California 95616, USA.

¹¹ School of Natural Resources and Environment, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109-1041, USA.

¹² Hopkins Marine Station, Stanford University, Pacific Grove, California 93950, USA.

¹³ Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, University of California, Irvine, California 92697-2525, USA.

¹⁴ Department of Geography and Environment, University of Southampton, Southampton SO17 1BJ, UK.

¹⁵ Fogarty International Center, National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, Maryland 20892-2220, USA.

¹⁶ Flowminder Foundation, SE-11355 Stockholm, Sweden. Correspondence and requests for materials should be addressed to R.E. (email: [e-mail]).

Abstract

Invasive alien species (IAS) threaten human livelihoods and biodiversity globally. Increasing globalization facilitates IAS arrival, and environmental changes, including climate change, facilitate IAS establishment. Here we provide the first global, spatial analysis of the terrestrial threat from IAS in light of twenty-first century globalization and environmental change, and evaluate national capacities to prevent and manage species invasions. We find that one-sixth of the global land surface is highly vulnerable to invasion, including substantial areas in developing economies and biodiversity hotspots. The dominant invasion vectors differ between high-income countries (imports, particularly of plants and pets) and low-income countries (air travel). Uniting data on the causes of introduction and establishment can improve early-warning and eradication schemes. Most countries have limited capacity to act against invasions. In particular, we reveal a clear need for proactive invasion strategies in areas with high poverty levels, high biodiversity and low historical levels of invasion.

1. Introduction

Invasive alien species (IAS) are a primary threat to global biodiversity, economies and human health1. The threat of invasion at any given location has been shown to increase with the rate at which IAS propagules are introduced2 and the degree of disturbances that promote IAS establishment3. Currently, the highest numbers of IAS in the world, the strongest IAS management efforts and the greatest knowledge about the extent of invasions are found in economically developed countries, that is, those with a high Human Development Index (HDI)4,5. However, the geographical patterns of future invasions is likely to be substantially different from that of today6. The intensities and global patterns of introduction and disturbance are changing more rapidly today than at any time during human history1,6,7. Despite these changing threats, national-level legislation to prevent or control IAS has not increased8 and, as of 2010, only half of the parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) had enacted national legislation relevant to IAS4. The regions that will be most exposed to emerging invasions throughout the twenty-first century, and the disparity between IAS threats and capacities to respond to those threats, are therefore poorly quantified.

We provide the first global, spatial forecast of emerging invasions throughout the twenty-first century by analysing spatial data for the above IAS introduction and establishment factors. We also comprehensively assess national IAS response capacities based on reports to the CBD (https://www.cbd.int/reports).

International trade is a primary source of introduction of IAS as stowaways or contaminants in goods and packing materials2,9,10. The pet and plant trades are major sources of animal and plant introductions, due to the frequent escape or release of imported species into the wild11, and a primary mechanism for the introduction of insect pests and pathogen contaminants12. Transportation as stowaways in passenger planes is a major and expanding source of IAS introductions9,13,14 and marine shipping ports serve as epicentres of invasion13,15.

Disturbance promotes the establishment of IAS3. On a global scale, the most relevant disturbance factors are expansion of agriculture16, changes in the composition of native communities as a result of climate change (biome shifts)17 and increasing wildfire18,19.

To demonstrate a strong reactive capacity to control the spread of already-introduced IAS, countries must recognize that IAS threaten that country’s environment and economy20, have identified IAS already present21 and show evidence that IAS policy can be turned into management actions4. To have a strong proactive capacity, countries must attempt to prevent the introduction of IAS that are new to that country and control species that are already established and are beginning to emerge as problematic IAS. Thus, demonstrating proactive capacity requires comprehensive border-control policies22 and programmes for research, monitoring and public engagement11,23,24 (we classified national response capacities according to the criteria in Supplementary Table 1).

Our analyses of IAS threats suggest that in coming decades, biological invasions will remain high in wealthy and already highly invaded countries. These countries must prepare for a new suite of IAS as climate change disturbs resident ecosystems and introductions of species continue via the pet and plant trade. Less precedented is that IAS will increasingly threaten human livelihoods in low-HDI countries and in the last remaining biodiversity strongholds, where invasions are least well recognized and studied4,5. Our analysis suggests that current policies in most countries are under-equipped to address emerging threats from IAS, particularly throughout Africa and the eastern hemisphere. Moreover, many of the global biodiversity hotspots that are highly vulnerable to invasion are found in countries that our results suggest have little capacity to respond to IAS (in particular central America, Africa, central Asia and Indochina). Low-HDI countries will particularly require species prioritization and response schemes for IAS introduced via passenger air travel, whose establishment is aided by, and may threaten, agricultural expansion. Early-warning and eradication schemes should be tailored to the factors locally most responsible for introduction and establishment. International sharing of information on IAS and management expertize could greatly help set management priorities in regions that have little capacity to tackle IAS.

2. Results

2.1 Global distribution of terrestrial IAS threat

The twenty-first century threat of emerging IAS is extensive and distributed globally (Fig. 1). We found that 17% of the global land area (excluding Antarctica and glaciated Greenland) are highly vulnerable to invasion (high and very high categories, Fig. 1a). Although we uncovered threatened areas in some of the most economically developed and currently most invaded regions (for example, western Europe and North America4), the threat is also high in parts of low-HDI countries in Africa, South America and Asia (15% of low-HDI countries face globally high or very high threat levels, Fig. 1). Furthermore, 16% of global biodiversity hotspots (Endemic Plant and Bird Areas and WWF’s Global 200 Ecosystems) are highly vulnerable to invasion (high and very high categories, Fig. 1).

Figure 1: Global invasion threat for the twenty-first century.

Airport and seaport capacity, as well as animal, plant and total imports between 2000 and 2009, is combined into global introduction risk. Projected biome shifts and increase in agricultural intensity and fire frequency between 2000 and 2100 (emissions scenario A2) are combined into global establishment threat. Introduction and establishment axes are combined into overall invasion threat (Supplementary Fig. 1). (a) invasion threat, (b) introduction threat, (c) establishment threat, (d) seaport capacity, (e) climate change-driven biome shift, (f) airport capacity and total imports, (g) agricultural increase, (h) animal and plant imports, and (i) fire increase. All maps except (f) and (h) are displayed using the colour scheme from a, which runs from very high (VH; red) to very low (VL; blue). The scale was determined by ranking the threat value in each map grid cell, and binning cells into the following percentiles: 100–90%=very high; 90–80%=high; 80–50%=medium; 50–20%=low; and 20–0%=very low. Maps b and c, composite introduction and establishment threats, were calculated using the highest value of the constituent factors within each grid cell. Maps f and h combine the two named threat variables using the colour scheme defined in each panel. In d, grid cells containing ports are enlarged for visibility.

The distribution and level of threat did not change substantially when alternative predictions of environmental change or establishment factors were applied, but using all passenger air travel rather than only inter-continental journeys changed the spatial extent of some high-threat areas (Supplementary Fig. 1 and Supplementary Discussion).

2.2 Drivers of IAS threat

In high-HDI regions, several introduction vectors for IAS coincide. High levels of general trade and pet and plant imports coincide in Europe, China and the eastern United States (Fig. 1 and Supplementary Fig. 2). Plant and pet imports are particularly common in North America and western Europe, whereas plant imports are the dominant vector in eastern Europe and central Asia, and animal imports are the dominant vector in the Middle East and east Asia (Fig. 1). In high-HDI regions, high IAS threat occurs primarily where introduction vectors coincide with projected climate-driven biome shifts throughout the twenty-first century (Supplementary Fig. 2). Climate change, as expressed through biome shifts (Fig. 1e) and fire frequency changes (Fig. 1i), most directly translates into elevated invasion threat (Fig. 1a) in eastern North America, northern Europe, central and south Asia, polar regions and northern Australia.

In contrast to high-HDI regions, a single introduction vector predominates in low-HDI regions; namely passenger air travel (Fig. 1). Introduction pressure from passenger air travel is now as high in parts of sub-Saharan Africa, the Arabian peninsula, and southeast and south Asia as it is in Europe or North America (light blue or white pockets, Fig. 1f). Seaports make a relatively lower contribution to threats in low-HDI countries than in high-HDI countries (Supplementary Fig. 2). In low-HDI regions, multiple factors that enhance IAS establishment coincide (Fig. 1 and Supplementary Fig. 2). The highest IAS threats in low-HDI regions, and in biodiversity hotspots, occur in regions where globally