The Carnage was Fearful: The Battle of Cedar Mountain, August 9, 1862

By Michael Block and Gregory A. Mertz

"Profusely illustrated . . . an extraordinary and detailed account of a major battle that is often overlooked and underappreciated by Civil War historians." —Midwest Book Review

 


In early August 1862, Confederate Maj. Gen. Stonewall Jackson took to the field with his Army of the Valley for one last fight—one that would also turn out to be his last independent command. Near the base of Cedar Mountain, in the midst of a blistering heat wave, outnumbered Federal infantry under Maj. Gen. Nathaniel Banks attacked Jackson's army as it marched toward Culpeper Court House. A violent three-hour battle erupted, yielding more than 3,600 casualties. "The carnage was fearful," one observer wrote.


 


The unexpected Federal aggressiveness nearly won the day. Jackson, attempting to rally his men, drew his sword—only to find it so rusted, it would not come unsheathed. "Jackson is with you!" he cried, brandishing the sword still in its scabbard. The tide of battle turned—and the resulting victory added to Stonewall's mystique.


 


Civil War history typically breezes by the battle of Cedar Mountain, moving quickly from the Seven Days' Battles into the Second Bull Run Campaign, but the stand-alone battle at Cedar Mountain had major implications. It saw the emergence of the Federal cavalry as an effective intelligence collector and screening force. It also provided Confederate Maj. Gen. A.P. Hill's first opportunity to save the day—and his first opportunity to raise Jackson's ire. Within the Federal Army, the aftermath of the battle escalated the infighting among generals and led to recriminations and finger-pointing over why the battle was even fought. Some called it outright murder. Most importantly, the Federal defeat at Cedar Mountain halted an advance into central Virginia and provided the commander of the Army of Northern Virginia, Gen. Robert E. Lee, an opportunity to take the fight away from Richmond and toward Washington. For years, Michael Block has been deeply involved in developing interpretation for the Cedar Mountain battlefield. The Carnage was Fearful presents the battle with the full boots-on-the-ground insight Block has earned while walking the ground and bringing its story to life.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Open Road Integrated Media
• Release date: Dec 6, 2021
• ISBN: 9781611214413

Book preview

Prologue

The Battle of Cedar Mountain has never been considered part of a campaign. Many will place this fight as the opening action of the Second Manassas Campaign. However, the August 9, 1862, fight south of Culpeper, Virginia, should be considered, if anything, the concluding action of Maj. Gen. George McClellan’s Peninsula Campaign.

From the Lincoln Administration’s standpoint, the disastrous Seven Days’ fight created the need to develop a viable distraction for the Confederate armies around Richmond—a distraction to relieve pressure on Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan’s Army of the Potomac, allowing his troops to withdraw from their pocket along the James River. The creation of the Federal Army of Virginia under Maj. Gen. John Pope, merged three small armies under major generals John Fremont, Irwin McDowell, and Nathaniel Banks into one. Pope’s subsequent movement south towards the rail junction of Gordonsville compelled Gen. Robert E. Lee to divide his army to mitigate the threat Pope created.

Major General Thomas J. Stonewall Jackson was dispatched with three divisions to Louisa and Orange Counties to meet the growing threat in the Virginia Piedmont. Jackson was also given the leeway to strike at Pope if the opportunity presented itself. Pope provided that opportunity, and Jackson jumped at it—and his victory at Cedar Mountain set the stage for Lee’s first invasion across the Potomac.

The Cedar Mountain battlefield is located six miles below Culpeper. Pope’s and Jackson’s men slowly maneuvered in near unbearable heat toward this field over the course of three weeks in late July and early August 1862. Late on a hot Saturday afternoon, Jackson’s Army of the Valley fought a brief battle with Pope’s Second Corps under Banks. Two hours of heavy combat produced more than 3,000 casualties, including five general officers.

The largest monument at Cedar Mountain, built by the Battlefield Markers Association, Western Division, mentions that Confederate Gen. C. S. Winder fell at the battle. The monument also marks Cedar Mountain as the only battlefield on which Gen. Stonewall Jackson drew his sword. The sword, so disused, had rusted into its scabbard. (cm)

From a tactical standpoint, the fight was a draw. Jackson retained the field but could not advance. Pope was thrown back off the battlefield; however, arriving reinforcements from Sigel’s and McDowell’s corps ensured Jackson would not profit from the fight.

Strategically, it proved a success for both armies. Pope’s presence in the Virginia Piedmont forced Lee to detach Jackson to deal with the Federal threat in central Virginia, allowing McClellan to evacuate the James River enclave without incident. Lee, now with a sizeable force in the Piedmont and no threat from the Federals east of Richmond, could move the seat of war from the Confederate capital to the Federals’.

The battle of Cedar Mountain, though not part of either the Peninsula Campaign or the Second Bull Run Campaign, is in fact the linchpin that allowed one to end and the other to begin.

The Orange and Alexandria and Virginia Central railroads met in Gordonsville. Capture of this vital location would sever a critical supply line and was Pope’s initial objective in his advance toward Richmond. (meb)

My Services… Were Considered Necessary

CHAPTER ONE

J

UNE

– J

ULY

, 1862

Major General John Pope was a reluctant commander. On June 19, 1862, Secretary of War Edward Stanton sent a telegram to Pope, requesting his presence in Washington. Pope sensed what was coming.

Pope would have preferred to stay in the west. In later testimony before the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War on July 8, 1865, he stated, Many circumstances, which it is not necessary here to set forth, induced me to express to the President, to the Secretary of War, and to Maj. Gen. [Henry] Halleck, my desire to be relieved from command of the Army of Virginia, and to be returned to the western country. My services, however, were considered necessary in the projected campaign, and my wishes were not complied with. I accordingly took the field in Virginia with grave foreboding of the result, but with a determination to carry out the plans of the government with all the energy and with all the ability of which I was to master.

Pope arrived in Washington as a successful Western Theater commander, with his victory at Island No. 10 and success at Corinth earning him national recognition. Lincoln, longing for a winning general in the East, hoped Pope was the answer. Historians Wallace J. Schutz and Walter N. Trenerry summed up [Abraham] Lincoln’s thinking: Pope was as good a choice for this auxiliary command as any other Union officer. . . Lincoln needed someone he knew, could rely on, and who would fight; Pope met those requirements.

C

ENTRAL

V

IRGINIA

–—The battle of Cedar Mountain was fought in an area south of Culpeper on August 9. Sometimes referred to as the first battle of the Second Manassas Campaign, the battle was actually the last contest in the Richmond campaign. Stonewall Jackson’s last independent action protected the back door to the Confederate capital. All the players were in place in the region by July 25. The fight would be the first of many clashes the county witnessed during the war. Culpeper County would see fighting or occupation from one or both armies for 21 of the next 24 months.

Forty years old in the summer of 1862, John Pope graduated from West Point and won two brevets during the Mexican War. Importantly, Pope staunchly supported the Republican Party and rode east on Lincoln’s inaugural train.

In Washington, Stanton briefed Pope on Lincoln’s plan to consolidate the Army Departments of major generals John C. Frémont, Nathaniel Banks, and Irwin McDowell, along with the scattered Federal troops under Brig. Gen. Samuel Sturgis, into one army under Pope. The secretary of war gave Pope a few days to decide since Lincoln was out of town.

Lincoln announced the outcome on June 26, 1862, when he created the Army of Virginia and placed Pope at its head. By the president’s same order, Frémont’s Mountain Department became the First Army Corps, Banks’s Department of the Shenandoah became the Second Army Corps, and McDowell’s Department of the Rappahannock transformed to the Third Army Corps. The new corps commanders were all senior to Pope but now held subordinate roles.

Pope immediately faced a leadership challenge. His first day as commander of the Army of Virginia was John Frémont’s last day of active service. Frémont submitted his resignation to Stanton, stating his unwillingness to serve under Pope, who in Frémont’s mind was subordinate and inferior. Stanton accepted Frémont’s resignation that same day. In his response, he included the president’s regret. Frémont never again served a field command.

Major General Franz Sigel replaced Frémont, taking command on June 29. Like Pope, Sigel supported the Republican Party and also brought with him political support from the German immigrant community.

Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside’s IX Corps, moving from North Carolina to Virginia, caused concern for Robert E. Lee. Where the Federals disembarked would dictate Jackson’s movements as Lee protected Richmond. (na)

The Army of Virginia’s corps spread across the Shenandoah Valley and northern Virginia, despite orders to consolidate. Sigel’s and Banks’s commands were in the lower Shenandoah Valley. Sigel’s corps numbered 11,500 while Banks claimed 14,500 on paper, but could only field 8,000. McDowell’s corps with two divisions had 18,550 men scattered in Fredericksburg, Catlett’s Station, and Manassas. Pope lamented that "many of the brigades and divisions were badly organized and in a demoralized condition.

In postwar testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, Pope explained his strategic mission as he understood it from Maj. Gen. Henry Halleck:

The Virginia Department of Transportation marker offers a fairly accurate and unbiased account of the battle. Many accounts describe a Confederate victory; other accounts describe a Federal success. (meb)

It was the wish of the government that I should cover the city of Washington from any attacks from the direction of Richmond, make such dispositions as were necessary to assure the safety of the valley of the Shenandoah, and at the same time operate upon the enemy’s lines of communication in the direction of Gordonsville and Charlottesville as to draw off, if possible, a considerable force of the enemy from Richmond, and thus relieve the operations against that city of the Army of the Potomac.

By early July, the Lincoln Administration realized the threat to Maj. Gen. George McClellan’s army needed to be reduced as the War Department prepared for the likelihood of removing those Union troops from Harrison’s Landing on the James River. Halleck, appointed as Lincoln’s new general-in-chief, ordered Pope to demonstrate against the enemy and to push across the upper Rappahannock River into Culpeper County, occupy Culpeper Court House, and threaten Gordonsville, facilitating the withdrawal of the Army of the Potomac.

Maj. Gen. John C. Freemont resigned rather than serve under someone he perceived as a junior officer. Fremont was replaced by Maj. Gen. Franz Sigel and never actively served again. (loc)

Pope spent his first few weeks in Washington organizing his new command and issuing orders from a distance. Lincoln wished Pope to remain close to the White House and consulted with him on military matters, especially helping the president understand the messages and reports from McClellan that detailed what transpired on the Peninsula. This absence from his army and lack of familiarity with the officers he would command would negatively impact the Army of Virginia in the upcoming campaign.

On July 2, Pope ordered his far-flung command to assemble on the eastern side of the Blue Ridge Mountains, leaving a brigade at Winchester to protect the northern end of the Shenandoah Valley. Brigadier General James Rickett’s Division from McDowell’s Corps was ordered to Warrenton on July 3. The second division of McDowell’s Corps, under Brig. Gen. Rufus King, along with Brig. Gen. George Bayard’s cavalry, remained near Fredericksburg, protecting Washington from any Rebel forays in that direction. Banks received orders to vacate the Valley through Chester Gap near Front Royal and camp five or six miles east of Sperryville, near the town of (Little) Washington. Sigel, ordered on July 4 to follow Banks, crossed the mountains at Luray [Thornton] Gap and camped in Sperryville. Sigel finally arrived in Sperryville by July 10.

Lincoln hoped that Maj. Gen. John Pope would change the tone of the war in the east and replace Maj. Gen. George McClellan, who had fallen in disfavor with the President. (loc)

On July 5, Pope gave additional instruction to Banks: [T]he danger of an advance of the enemy in force on Washington makes it necessary that your movements be made with all dispatch. He also ordered Banks to throw forward your cavalry, as soon as you approach your new position, to Culpeper Court-House, and carefully watch the whole country toward Richmond and Gordonsville.

***

In Richmond, Confederate General Robert E. Lee, commanding the Army of Northern Virginia, had not been idle. After defeating McClellan during the Seven Days Battles and driving him from the gates of Richmond, Lee once again turned his focus west. Lee had been the strategic architect of Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Stonewall Jackson’s spring campaign in the Shenandoah Valley, and it seemed the Union armies that Jackson fought had reformed. Jackson had executed Lee’s strategic vision by tying up 60,000 Federals for four months, keeping them away from Richmond. Jackson’s success in the Valley created legends that are still studied today as a model of an effective campaign, illustrating how numerically inferior forces can outmaneuver and defeat multiple adversaries. If Stonewall’s campaign had failed, Richmond and the newly created Confederacy’s survival beyond the spring of 1862 would have been doubtful. As new Union armies formed under Pope’s command, Lee believed the time was ripe to unleash Stonewall once again.

The Exchange Hotel, at the Junction of the Orange & Alexandria and Virginia Central Railroads, in Gordonsville. Throughout the war, it served as a receiving hospital for wounded soldiers evacuated from battles in northern and central Virginia. (meb)

The key location in Lee’s Richmond western defense was the railroad junction at Gordonsville, Orange County, where the Virginia Central and Orange & Alexandria Railroads connected. Supplies for the Confederate capital and the Army of Northern Virginia principally came on the Virginia Central Railroad from the Shenandoah Valley. Gordonsville was more than a key railroad junction: it was also the second-largest rail yard in the state after Richmond. Gordonsville was an industrial town with shops, warehouses, stock yards, and infrastructure to support its rail industry. Its loss would not only deny the Confederacy the industry around Gordonsville, it would cut off the Shenandoah Valley and its agriculture from Richmond. For Robert E. Lee, controlling Gordonsville was the key to protecting Richmond and any future offensive action in northern Virginia. If Jackson’s next maneuver was successful, it would ensure that vital food supplies and war materials continued to reach Richmond.

Lee realized that any movement by Pope toward Culpeper would threaten both his supplies and Richmond. Accordingly, on July 13, Lee dispatched Jackson’s Army of the Valley to Louisa Court House and, if practicable, to Gordonsville to oppose Pope’s advance. Jackson departed with Maj. Gen. Richard S. Ewell’s division and his own division under Brig. Gen. Charles Winder.

By ordering Jackson west, Lee once again called upon him to extend the defense of Richmond, as he had done in the spring. Jackson’s command was not part of Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, but a separate, independent command. When Jackson left for Louisa, it marked the last time his command marched as the Army of the Valley and the last time he acted as an independent commander.

Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck, recently arrived in Washington, was appointed general in chief and would oversee the Union war effort, holding that post until replaced in 1864 by Ulysses S. Grant. The strategic vision for the Virginia campaign Pope intended to implement came from Halleck. (loc)

The Federal threat against Richmond lessened with McClellan and his beaten Army of the Potomac contained at Harrison’s Landing. McClellan maintained a strong defensive position with the support of the Federal James River Fleet guns protecting his army, denying Lee any opportunity for offensive action. More importantly to Lee, without significant resupply and reinforcements, the Federals were not capable of renewing offensive action.

However, Lee feared McClellan might be reinforced. I have heard of [Maj. Gen. Isaac] Stevens’s division from South Carolina, joining McClellan, Lee wrote Jackson on July 25. All [Maj. Gen. Ambrose] Burnside’s is said to have withdrawn from North Carolina. Lee also lamented in the same dispatch to Jackson his own lack of troops and the need to defend Richmond in front of McClellan but also below Richmond. In closing, Lee provided Jackson with an offensive option: "I could send you a force to suppress Pope could I see a chance of your hitting him which did not involve its too long absence. Keep me advised and yourself prepared. They will be constantly annoying the railroad unless we can find their main body and drive