Arab world: Roots and insights of the crisis

By Samir Amin

This book explores the causes and trends of the current crisis of the domination system in the Arab world. The Member President of the World Forum for Alternatives invites its authors —outstanding academics from the region— to present an approach to the dynamics of social movements, the challenges of an alternative regional integration, political Islam, and the always complex relationships between the Arab world and Europe.

• Language: English
• Publisher: RUTH Casa Editorial
• Release date: Sep 20, 2017
• ISBN: 9789962645863

Book preview

978-9962-645-86-3port

Editorial:

Each period generates its critical urgencies. The xx century ended with the categorical frustration of the hopes that the October revolution had created and with the exaltation of imperialism under the most absolute leadership of the USA. These facts sum up the complexities, irrationality, perils and challenges of our time —impugnations to critical thought and to praxis—.

Ruth Journals of Critical Thought are founded under the hallmark of Ruth Casa Editorial and identified as being precisely such —of critical thought— and of international character, due to the nature of the problems they deal with, to the resolve of alternatives and to a driving force for universality.

The project must seek to be as universal as the world of capital that we are struggling to overcome. Nothing happening in the time we have chanced to live in can be alien to us. Nothing should escape the measuring stick of politically committed reflection.

For that reason we identify ourselves as a publication under the sign of revolutionary radicalism, which we differentiate from doctrinal radicalism.

We reject any dogmatic exclusion which marginalizes ingenuity and the spirit of search on the way towards socialism. Likewise, we cannot yield to any type of proposal which may distance us from the route towards a world signed by security, justice, liberty and equity for all peoples.

Table of contents:

Tripod

Samir Amin:

Introduction

Alí El Kenz:

Euro-Mediterranean relationships

Ivan Ivekovic:

The Israeli ethnocracy and the bantustanization of Palestine

Michael Warszawski:

Israel

Samir Amin:

Towards an Arab and African united front: the desirable alternative in terms of regionalisation

Samir Amin:

Political conflicts and social struggles in the Arab countries. Revolutionary advances followed by dramatic retreats

Zohdi El Chami:

The issue of agriculture in Egypt: the roots, ramifications and the future of the democratic alternative

Samir Amin:

The Arab world fossilised in its powerlessness

The God of all names

Samir Amin

: Religion, democracy and modernity

Views

Shahida El Baz:

Globalization, Arab women and gender equality

                          The Arab World

and the 21st century challenges

Tripod

Introduction

The twentieth century witnessed the spreading of the first full-scale wave of awakening of the Asian and African peoples. Their will to free themselves from imperialist domination, combined with the need of progressive social reforms, gave rise to the major transformation of the modern world that was henceforth irreversible. The struggles of the peoples concerned show that the North-South conflict (that is, the conflict between dominant imperialist centers and nations in the dominated peripheral areas) and the battle for socialism are inseparable. During this century, however, accomplishments achieved by the peoples were unequal. The major revolutions of the century (China, Vietnam, and Cuba’s) combined liberation with socialist construction projects; the other anti-imperialist liberalization movements were more or less radical, to various degrees. Also, all these achievements had their own limitations, which, in view of the fact they were not properly overcome, led to the drift of the power systems, the mismanagement of economic and social progress, ultimately putting an end to this first awakening of the South moment.

The signals of a second wave of this awakening are already seen in the way in which the so-called emerging countries are spreading their wings. Nevertheless, the strategic line for the unfolding of this second wave is still vague and full of contradictions. Will the emerging countries agree to get trapped in the concept of emerging markets, framing their growth within capitalist/imperialist globalization? Or will they impose their own concept of emerging nations that necessarily would lead them to enter into a conflict with the imperialist powers?

At present, we are in transition from a phase of this major world transformation to another. And, as Gramsci said, monsters take shape in the half-light that separates past (death) and future (what is still to come). The Arab world had led the first spreading of the awakening of the South, at the time of Bandung, du-ring the 1950’s, 60’s and 70’s. At that point in time, the era had created favorable conditions for the crystallization of a project bringing together modernization, economic development (based on industrialization), achieving autonomy vis-à-vis the global system, social progress, along with potential democratic evolution elements implying taking some distance from the religious legacies and the beginning of secularism.

The project’s contradictions and limitations, which finally brought about its defeat, gave birth to the rise of the old-fashioned dream represented by political Islam. And the contemporary Arab world is still immersed in this half-light.

Under these conditions, the paramount importance of the religious question cannot be overlooked in the analysis or artificially separated from the question posed by economic, political and social challenge. We propose therefore a reflection on this question, which in my opinion cannot be disregarded if we wish, beyond the propositions resulting from the immediate politics, to contribute to the crystallization of a coherent alternative project capable of having the Arab world leave its impasse behind. In this regard, we shall recall the history—or prehistory—of the Bandung project and the contribution made by the Arab progressive forces of the time to the crystallization of the project.

The political culture that still rules over the contemporary Arab and Islamic world emerged in the thirteenth century of the Christian era, whereas the legacy left by the first three brilliant centuries of the Islamic era had begun to decline. The autocratic structures of this power—reorganized in the framework of the Ottoman Empire and Sefevide Persia—had not been truly abolished by the modernization process conducted by the ruling classes in order to meet the outside challenge posed by imperialist Europe. Under these conditions, deterioration of legitimacy and efficiency of this power system paved the way for the emergence of a new dream: that one of the alternatives represented by political Islam, which, in fact, traps the societies of the region in an impasse. Recalling the limitations and contradictions of the Nasser experience, the people’s radical model par excellence of the 1950’s and 60’s, we give concrete expression to our critical introduction to the contemporary crisis of the region’s power system. The eight studies put together in this summary tackle the major questions posed nowadays to the peoples of the region, while the possible decline of the capitalist/imperialist globalization system in crisis begins:

The combined effect of insufficiencies that characterized the responses of Arab societies (powers and peoples) to the double challenge posed by modernity and the spreading of globalised capitalism and imperialism on the one hand, and the deployment of the project of the Triad-oriented collective imperialism for setting up a system for the military control of the planet on the other hand, gave rise to the achievements attained during the Bandung era losing ground. Far from representing an alternative on a par with the challenges, political Islam constitutes, on the contrary, a potential reserve ally for imperialism.

The difficult question of the existence of an Arab nation, or a system of Arab nations, won’t be addressed in this work. We refer the reader to the work of Samir Amin, La Nation Arabe, (The Arab nation). On the other hand, the question of Arab unity will be addressed from the standpoint of criticisms of the Arab league and from the articulation of the positions taken by Arab States vis-à-vis Palestine.

Is the idea of a possible rapprochement between Europe and the Arab World conceivable? In the light of what we have retained in this work regarding the Euro-Mediterranean project, the answer is negative. We therefore readdress this question here while specifying the conditions of that alternative, even though it is not fully visible today.

The social movements in the Arab world are neither less important nor different from those found in other regions of the world. As elsewhere, they are fragmented, on the defensive, and they lack a political project giving them global consistency and efficiency in defining political objectives. Probably the layer of lead that makes up political Islam conceals these realities. But in fact, political Islam is extensively unrelated, in fact an adversary, to all democratic movements and those with social claims. The example of the position adopted by the Muslim brotherhood in Egypt, opposed to worker’s strikes and peasants’ demands, is witness to this fact. The State position regarding these movements comes out of a self-evident conclusion: the key role played by the democratic question.

The ongoing struggles analyzed here, in view of the challenges of the 21st century, will be confronted, of course, by the ongoing deployment of the geopolitical project of contemporary imperialism, namely, the project ofthe system leader—the USA (the military control of the region), the methods of the European subordinate project known as Euro-Mediterranean; in short, the actions undertaken in this context by the State of Israel. Precisely the riots that have taken place recently in several Arab countries, including the processes occurring in Egyptian Tunisia with the overthrow of Ben Ali and Mubarak regimes, confirm the theses previously raised.

The events of Tunisia must be interpreted as a very powerful popular movement uprising, a general uprising. About 80 percent of the population of the country in many areas including in the capital were out in the streets for 45 days and continue to do so. They carried on their protests in spite of the repression and did not give up. This movement has political, societal and economic dimensions. Ben Ali regime was one of the most repressive police regimes in the world. Thousands of people in Tunisia were assassinated, arrested and tortured, but Western powers best friend never allowed these facts to be known. The Tunisian people want democracy, respect of rights.

Economic and social factors were also influential in the uprising of the people. The country experiences rapidly escalating unemployment, particularly of youth, including educated young people. The standard of living of the majority of the population is decreasing, in spite of the growth of the GDP praised by World Bank and international agencies. Growing inequality explains it. The influence of the mafia type of organization is also another important factor. The system was managed to the almost exclusive benefit of the Ben Ali family and its organization.

There is another aspect of the movement that is very interesting. The Islamic influence was not effective in the uprising. Tunisia is really a secular country. People manage to keep religion and politics separate. This is very important and positive. It was said Ben Ali protected the country from fundamentalist Muslims. He used this argument very effectively for many years. Actually it wasn’t Ben Ali but the people that protected the country from fundamentalists.

The fact that the army wasn’t against the people gave strength to the people in the streets. The Ben Ali government gave support and financial aid to the police not the army. This is why the police played such an important role in the suppression of the events in the past. This movement in Tunisia doesn’t belong to a particular group of people. This is a popular general movement. There are no foreign countries or groups behind it. It is social in essence. However it must be said that the Western powers will try to create an Islamic alternative and will try to support a movement of this sort in order to avoid a really democratic alternative. They already have started to do it, reintroducing in the country the language of Saudi Arabia as some commentators of the Tunisian people have already said. It is very difficult to try to guess what the future holds for the country. For sure the establishment of a democratic and secular regime is not easy. Assuming the best—that is a democratic government supported by the people (and that is not absolutely guaranteed), such a government will be confronted with the economic and social challenge: How to associate this democratisation of the political management with social progress? That is not easy. Tunisia’s ‘success’ for some time was based on three sources: The delocalisation of some light industries from Europe, tourism, mass out migration to Libya and Europe. Now those three channels have reached their ceiling and even start to be reversed. By which macro policy could be they replaced? Not easy to imagine for a small country, vulnerable and with little resources(no oil!). Solidarity and South-South cooperation might turn to be vital for an alternative. The Western powers will do all they can to have the democratic regime unsuccessful in this respect, and create therefore conditions favourable for a false Islamic alternative, labeled moderate. On the other hand, the case of Egypt clearly shows that neoliberalism has never been very convincing; it has never been popular in the suburbs of the world because it has brought nothing but desolation, misery and accelerated impoverishment. But it seemed that there was no alternative because the system showed itself so powerful, not only economically, but in police and military terms, by means of its violent repressive regime. This system was perpetuated only through fear.

That Nasser’s Egypt had a social and economic system is certainly questionable, but coherent. Nasser opted for industrialization to overcome the colonial international specialization, forcing the country on the task of exporting cotton. This system was able to ensure a good distribution of income in favor of the middle classes, but without impoverishing the working classes. This page of Egyptian history concluded as a result of military aggression in 1956 and 1967. Sadat and Mubarak indeed worked for the dismantling of the Egyptian production system, replacing it with another completely incoherent, based solely on the search for yield. Egyptian growth rates, allegedly high and invariably celebrated for 30 years by the World Bank, are totally devoid of meaning. Egyptian growth is very vulnerable, dependent on foreign markets and capital flows from Gulf oil countries. With the crisis in the global system, this vulnerability has been expressed with a brutal stagnation. That growth was accompanied by an incredible increase in inequality and appalling unemployment that punishes the majority of young people, a truly explosive situation that has finally burst. What happens from now, and beyond the initial claims of the regime ending and the establishment of public liberties, will represent a political battle.

The movement of the Egyptian people possesses four basic components very politicized. First, the urban young, particularly holders of diplomas with no job. They handle modern technology, Internet, Twitter, etc.; not trivial to keep in touch, but to do away with political discussions and debate. Many of them come from families with a communist tradition. They are sincere democrats, who have a refusal of reject the police dictatorship and want real social change in favor of the popular classes. They are anti-capitalist in the sense that this system is considered unacceptable. They are nationalists in the sense that Egypt cannot and should not be subject to the will of others in its role in the region and globally, in order to serve US strategic goals. This national feeling is very strong. In all the speeches in the streets and squares, it is claimed this independence and the opposition to allow Israel to exterminate Palestinians. For them to overthrow the regime is not only to remove Mubarak, but national independence and social reforms for the benefit of the masses. It has provoked that trade unions, which grew in the last decade or so, entered the revolutionary movement.

The other component is the radical left. In particular, the communists, who have always existed in Egypt. They have, in a greater or lesser extent, enjoyed general and popular respect. The difference, compared with 50 years ago, is that young people, though naturally sympathetic, are reluctant to join organized parties.

The third component is represented by segments of the democratic middle-class. Some sectors of that middle-class are suffering from the effects of the system. Although mildly nationalist, they do not attach much importance to international politics. El Baradei is a representative of this trend. This middle class is quite mixed. There are many elements of the professional occupations: doctors, lawyers, engineers, the upper layers of the working class, civil servants, but also many are representatives of small and medium enterprises, which suffer unfair competition by monopolies. And this group wants democracy.

Finally, the fourth component is the Muslim brotherhood. They initially boycotted the movement because they thought the movement would be defeated by the police, but when they saw that the movement could not be defeated, the leadership thought they could not stay out, and they moved in.

The Muslim brotherhood tries to appear as moderate when in fact they never have been. This group is not a religious movement but a political movement that uses religion. The Muslim brotherhood is not a democratic organization. It is a top down military organization and a quasi fascist party, and it has different constituencies. The leaders are multi billionaires, the cadres are backward segments of the petty bourgeoisie, mostly religious. The masses are poor chaps, recruited through social activities financed by Saudi Arabia. Since its founding in 1920 by the British and the monarchy, the movement has played an active role as an anti-communist, anti-progressive and anti-democratic agent. It is the raison d’être for the Muslim brotherhood, and they are proud of it. They claim openly that if they win an election; will be the last, because the electoral system would be an imported Western system, contrary to the Islamic nature. In that regard, they have not changed anything. In fact, political Islam has always been supported by the USA. Under this strategy, the Mubarak regime never fought against political Islam. On the contrary: what he did was to integrate it into their political system. Mubarak entrusted to the Muslim brotherhood three fundamental institutions: justice, education and television. But the military regime wanted to keep for him the direction, also claimed by the Muslim brotherhood. The USA has used this minor conflict between the military and Islamist alliance to ensure the docility of each other. It is essential that everyone accepts capitalism as it is. The Muslim brotherhood has never seriously thought of changing things. Moreover, during the great labor strikes of 2007-2008, its parlamentarians voted with the government against the strikers. Faced with the struggles of peasants forced off their land by large landowners renters, the Muslim brotherhood take sides against the peasant movement. For them, private property, free enterprise and profit are sacred things.

The US imperialist strategy in Egypt is to change everything to not change anything. It is based on giving all the power to the army, to remove the brutal aspects of dictatorship and allow elections. The White House could probably establish a strategic alliance with the Muslim brotherhood to isolate young people. Mubarak wanted to lead this process but did not succeed.

Egypt is a cornerstone in the US strategy of global control. Washington will not tolerate any attempt of Egypt to move out of its total submission. This is the main target of Washington involvement in the organization of a soft transition. Mubarak was sacrificed pragmatically by the USA, but they won’t give up saving the essential, the military and police system, and could envision their salvation in an alliance with the Muslim brotherhood.

In fact, US leaders have in mind the Pakistani model, which is not a democratic model, but a combination of a supposed Islamic power and a military dictatorship. The Muslim brotherhood and the military in Egypt, and the moderate political forces of other Arab nations are functional elements of Washington’s strategy. They accept US hegemony in the region and the peace with Israel in the current terms and, therefore, will allow Tel Aviv to continue the colonization of what remains of Palestine. However, in the case of Egypt, the mobilized popular forces are well aware of that. The Egyptian people are highly politicized. The history of Egypt is that of a country trying to emerge from the early 19th century, which has been defeated by his own shortcomings, but mainly by external aggressions suffered repeatedly. The four components of the Egyptian movement above mentioned have agreed to coordinate, a standing conference which aims to draft a new constitution. And what is hoped is not a short transition, but paradoxically a long one. At least one or two years, in order to allow the left and young people to acquire the means to make themselves known, to inform the country about their program. To have elections in a few days is meaningless, that is what Americans want, a short transition.

The events that have taken place recently in the Arab world are social uprisings that potentially carry the crystallization of alternatives that could reach a socialist perspective in the long term. However, each country has absolutely different conditions. Tunisia is a small country, with a higher level of education and of living, but it is a small country and vulnerable in the global economy. Bahrain is a tiny country, but the majority being Shiite, and the monarchy being Sunni, there have always been tensions. The popular demand is only for constitutional democracy, and equality between the Shiites and the Sunnis in the kingdom. In Yemen, the movements in the north and the south are different; the north is relatively moderate, whereas the south is much more radical because the trade unions and the Communist Party are stronger. The actual conditions are very different from one country to another. But this is a qualitative change. What we will see in the coming months and the years ahead is the deployment of movements like the Egyptian one, in many places, with advances and retreats and defeats, as always takes place in history.

That’s why the capitalist system, the capital of dominant monopolies on a global scale, cannot tolerate the development of those movements. They will mobilize all possible means of destabilization, economic and financial pressures, and also the military threat. They will support, according to the circumstances, either fascist or false alternatives, or the establishment of military dictatorships.

Samir Amin*

¹

Publisher

1(Egypt, 1931) Economist, director of the African Institute for the Economic Development and Planning in the seventies and eighties. Director of Third World Forum (FTM) and President of the World Forum for Alternatives (FMA). Author of numerous books, among his most recent publications are:Obsolescent Capitalism(2003), The Liberal Virus(2004), Beyond US Hegemony(2006), A Life Looking Forward, Memoirs of an Independent Marxist(2006), The World We Wish to See: Revolutionary Objectives for the Twenty-first Century(2008),From Capitalism to Civilization, Reconstructing the Socialist Perspective(2010).

Alí El Kenz* /

 

Euro-Mediterranean Relationships

* Professor of Political Science, specialized in Comparative Politics at the American University in Cairo. He received his Diploma in Law from Belgrade University (1965) and his Ph.D. in Political Science from Zagreb University (1981), in former Yugoslavia. From 1981-1991 he served in the diplomatic corps of his country, including postings as Ambassador to the United Republic of Tanzania and to the Arab Republic of Egypt. His teaching areas include Comparative Politics, Ideology and Development, as well as courses and seminars on specific areas such as the Balkans, Eastern Europe, USSR/Russia, Transcaucasia and Central Asia, China, Africa and the Middle East.

Apart from the relatively small economic interest that the EU has in the countries south of the Mediterranean, the latter find themselves in a most strategic position for the future of the European Union—at least in the present regional and global configuration. This is because of the importance for the Europeans of the immigration issue, as well as of the Israel-Palestinian and Israel-Arab conflicts. This position that makes them obligatory partners of the European States, which, according to us, largely justifies the laborious construction of the Barcelona process and the interest the EU is taking in the countries south of the Mediterranean.

1. Globalization and regionalization

Introduction

In light of recent events, it is Eric Hobsbawm to whom we turn when asking ourselves what is going on in the world. He has captured better than anyone the turbulent, often tragic activities of capitalism, in his excellent, dense work, The Short Twentieth Century¹ which begins with the First World War and ends with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. But we also turn to Samir Amin who, as an observer of our contemporary world, relentlessly criticizes the illusions promoted by present-day capitalism and warns us of the latest illusions, those of globalization—the new era which will make a global village of our planet.

1 After The Age of Revolution, The Age of Capital and The Age of Empire, Eric Hobsbawm completes his work with The Age of Extremes in which he paints a comprehensive, fascinating picture of what he calls this short twentieth century, the end of which is symbolically marked by the fall of the Berlin Wall and which, far from announcing some end of history, opens up a new period of uncertainty.

People often used to laugh at the naivety of socialist propaganda when it proclaimed the radiant dawn of the future. They forget that this belief in progress, typical of modern times, lies also at the heart of the capitalist adventure. It has often been belied by history but it is constantly renewed by tame intellectuals whose job it is to announce the glorious future to those who, understandably enough, have their doubts.²

2 These intellectuals are in no way free thinkers acting within the cultural superstructure, motivated mainly by the development of their ideas. As Keith Dixon, in his short but incisive historical study has shown, think tanks have been formed and educated in institutions created for this purpose by groups