A Map of the Moral World: New Ideas in Modal Ontology, Metaethics, and on the Nature of Evil

By Dave McFaul

I begin by creating an original modal ontology that brings the modal operators of necessity and possibility together. I then define a simulation as a real possibility that is not necessarily true. This new framework expands on existing philosophical knowledge, and engages with classical theories. For example, Heidegger offers a theory of inauthenticity where we get lost in the simulations of the ‘they,’ which limits what we normally accept as possible. Dasein offers another possibility, where we are the possible (not necessary) being that makes our possibilities possible. Authenticity is taking a stand on our possibilities making them uniquely our own.
Next, metaethics offers many possibilities for different ontologies with their own standards of truth that any ethical statement may occupy. A realist assumption is invoked that sees the different ways of obtaining ethical information as self-correcting feedback, reflective equilibrium, or hermeneutic circles.
In the third section, I propose that evil is what happens when we may know what is right but do what is wrong anyway. Self-deception is thinking the good is whatever we want to say it is. I portray Nietzsche as an example of an evil corrupt theory, then use him as a grand theory of evil for analyzing the political spectrum of the postmodern culture wars.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Dave McFaul
• Release date: Aug 31, 2018
• ISBN: 9780463787007

Dave McFaul

I started reading philosophy in 1978 at the age of fifteen. I achieved a B.A. in Philosophy in 1993 and a M.A. in Political Science in 2001, both from the University of Calgary. I am extremely well read on a wide variety of topics which allows me to look at things from many different perspectives simultaneously. I’m used to dealing with multiple realities which involves comparing contrasting interpretations. What I do best is to connect the dots no matter how far afield. My first book is ‘A Map of the Moral World: Original Ideas in Modal Ontology, Metaethics, and on the Nature of Evil.’ I will quickly follow it up with ‘A History of the Ideologies of the Welfare State with Special Reference to Canada.’

Book preview

A Map of the Moral World:

Original Ideas in Modal Ontology, Metaethics, and on the Nature of Evil

Dave McFaul

A Map of the Moral World: Original ideas in Modal Ontology, Metaethics, and on the Nature of Evil

By Dave McFaul

Copyright © 2018 Dave McFaul

Smashwords Edition

This e-book is licensed for your personal enjoyment only. This book may not be re-sold or given away to other people. If you would like to share this book with another person, please purchase an additional copy for each recipient. If you’re reading this book and did not purchase it, or it was not purchased for your use only, then please return to your favorite e-book retailer and purchase your own copy. Thank you for respecting the hard work of this author.

Thanks to Rene Bennett and Tiffany Sostar for your invaluable editing.

About the Author

I started reading philosophy in 1978 at the age of fifteen. I achieved a B.A. in Philosophy in 1993 and a M.A. in Political Science in 2001, both from the University of Calgary. I am extremely well read on a wide variety of topics which allows me to look at things from many different perspectives simultaneously. I’m used to dealing with multiple realities which involves comparing contrasting interpretations. What I do best is to connect the dots no matter how far afield. My first book is ‘A Map of the Moral World: Original Ideas in Modal Ontology, Metaethics, and on the Nature of Evil.’ I will quickly follow it up with ‘A History of the Ideologies of the Welfare State with Special Reference to Canada.’

Table of Contents

Abstract

Preface

Part I: Simulations and Authenticity: Modal Operators, Heidegger, and The Matrix

A Quick Look at Modal Ontology

Simulations ~□(◊◊α→α)

Heidegger and the Inauthentic ‘Simulations’ of the ‘They’

Authenticity ◊◊◊

The Matrix

God ◊◊◊◊

Conclusion

Part II: Metaethics as a Pluralist Moral Ontology

An Historical Choice

A) William of Ockham (1288-1348)

B) John Duns Scotus (1266-1308)

Part A: Something is good because we love it

1) Error theory

2) Non-cognitivism

3) Proceduralism

Part B: We love something because it is good

1) G. E. Moore’s Intuitionism

2) Cornell Realism

3) Sensibility Theory

3a) Charles Taylor

4) Virtue Ethics

Conclusion

Part II: Evil in the Postmodern Culture Wars

Introduction

Hegel’s Definition of Evil

The Postmodern Age

A: Nietzsche

Nietzsche’s Anti-realism

Nietzsche’s Will to Power as a Grand Theory of Evil

What We Can Learn from Nietzsche

B: Positions in the Culture Wars

1) The Satanic Left

Marquis de Sade

George Bataille

Aleister Crowley

2) Neo-conservatism: the ‘Noble Lie’ and ‘Reality Enforcement’

3) An Intolerant Religion of Resentment for the Masses

Conspiracy and Collusion

Authenticity, Integrity, Empathy and Client Centered Therapy

C: Foucault

Discipline and Group Homes

Recidivism

Servant Leadership: A Network of Feedback vs. the Pyramid of Power

Bibliography

Abstract

Have you ever pondered such questions as: How is moral knowledge possible? What is the nature of evil? What errors lead people into being bad? How can we help heal what’s broken in society? How can we make work a more fulfilling and productive place? What is true happiness? You will find these quandaries discussed in this book. You will also find help if you have ever felt trapped in a dead end, sure that you are capable of much more, or alienated from your life, like you’re just drifting along.

Logical formulas are used in a new way from the usual course in logic, being a means of expression, instead of just exploring necessity. The modal operators of possibility and necessity are added together to create a complete list of ontological categories, offering a new definition of simulations. Finally, this book offers a look at authenticity in Heidegger. The book covers all positions in metaethics. It discusses the nature of evil, offering a definition of evil and one of self-deception, then uses Nietzsche as both an example and a grand theory of corruption for looking at the political spectrum.

Preface

I begin by creating an original modal ontology that brings the modal operators of necessity and possibility together. I then define a simulation as a real possibility that is not necessarily true. This new framework expands on existing philosophical knowledge, and engages with classical theories. For example, Heidegger offers a theory of inauthenticity where we get lost in the simulations of the ‘they,’ which limits what we normally accept as possible. Dasein offers another possibility, where we are the possible (not necessary) being that makes our possibilities possible. Authenticity is taking a stand on our possibilities making them uniquely our own.

Next, metaethics offers many possibilities for different ontologies with their own standards of truth that any ethical statement may occupy. A realist assumption is invoked that sees the different ways of obtaining ethical information as self-correcting feedback, reflective equilibrium, or hermeneutic circles.

In the third section, I propose that evil is what happens when we may know what is right but do what is wrong anyway. Self-deception is thinking the good is whatever we want to say it is. I portray Nietzsche as an example of an evil corrupt theory, then use him as a grand theory of evil for analyzing the political spectrum of the postmodern culture wars.

Part I: Simulations and Authenticity: Modal Operators, Heidegger and The Matrix

This chapter is an attempt to give an exhaustive account of ontology in terms of modal operators. First, I explain what is meant by combining modal operators in various ways. Next, I look at the phenomenon of simulations, using a logical formula derived from combining modal operators. I discuss The Matrix, but give more attention to Heidegger’s account of ‘fallenness,’ within which he describes the average everyday experience of being lost in inauthenticity. Third, I look at Dasein as a third possibility operator, and Heidegger’s theory of authenticity as an answer to the problem of simulations; exploring the theory first, then describing the plot of The Matrix in a way that illustrates the theory. Finally, I look at God from the perspective of combining modal operators, offering a unique argument for His possible existence.

General logic symbols

~ not …

& … and …

˅ … or …

→ if … then …

α = A

Modal logic symbols

necessity □

possibility ◊

impossibility ~◊

A Quick Look at Modal Ontology

There has been great debate between the Ancients and the Moderns over what should be the basis of a first philosophy which forms the foundation for everything else. Aristotle, and Heidegger, thought the most foundational discipline is ontology, which is the study of being. William of Ockham and Descartes thought the foundational discipline should be epistemology, which is the study of knowledge, answering the question how do we know what we know?

One of Gödel’s theorems states that the truth cannot always be proven. Something can be true without our being able to prove it, so ontology has a wider range than epistemology. Logic has often been used to model metaphysics. It is universally valid independent of whatever is used for its material substance. [1] This can be considered the self-sufficient ontological objectivity of the reality of logic, as opposed to psychologism, which says logic is only contingently true because of the way the mind or brain works. Modal logic deals with possibility and necessity, which are ontological categories.

Duns Scotus (1987, p. 1.2) says the first thing we are aware of is an inarticulate impression of being. The disjunctive oppositions of necessity or contingency, possibility or impossibility, and actuality or potentiality are ‘transcendentals’ coextensive with being. These transcendentals have the same meaning for both infinite God and finite man and form the basis for an accurate comparison and understanding. We might even hazard to say that, for Duns Scotus, modality is a part of divine logic. The modal operators of possibility and necessity modify whole statements and qualify the ‘is’ of propositions, which Heidegger argued are not clarified by the ontology of first order logic (Heidegger, Being and Time, 1926/1962, pp. 1. V33-34). By going beyond the simple true/false binary, we can move beyond the metaphysics of ‘presence’ that Heidegger says restrain the Western tradition. Do possibilities exist? We cannot even count how many possibilities there are. They go beyond what are given as facts. What may be possible for one person may not be possible for another. Heidegger says first order logic assumes the ‘is’ of a continuous present, or series of now moments. The future and past do not exist in the present. However, they exist as either future possibilities or as a history with the potential to be repeated. In this way time is ecstatic (outside itself) and beyond the metaphysics of presence.

Heidegger is dismissive of modal logic (1926/1962, p. 183), which seems more concerned with necessity and transitivity. In terms of ‘truth’ and ‘knowledge,’ necessity has usually been prioritized over contingent truth, which in turn takes precedence over mere possibility. It is necessarily the case that if something is necessary then it exists or is true, and if something exists then necessarily it is possible, therefore if something is necessary then it is possible: □(((□A→A) &(A→◊A)) →(□α→◊α)).

In Kripke’s possible worlds semantics, a transitive relation assumes the reflexivity of a world to itself; x=x. Philosophers have always tried to find necessary truth modeled after mathematics, and felt this kind of truth was superior in being more certain and secure. Heidegger disagreed with this evaluation by showing how important possibility was as our projection toward the future. Heidegger was wrong about the limitations of modal logic, however. We can combine the operators of modal logic in various ways to create a comprehensive ontological inventory.

Modal logic has already defined necessity □, possibility ◊, impossibility ~◊, and contingency (A&◊~A). Something is necessary if it is true in all possible worlds, while something is possible if it is true in at least one possible world. Something may be a necessity because it happens to be contingently true for all possible worlds. We could have local necessity □, where if we relaxed some assumptions it may no longer be necessary. If you want a roof over your head, you must pay the rent. However, if you do not care about having a roof over your head, this is not necessary. What is necessarily necessary □□ are the rules of logic, which are the conditions for any possibility to be possible. For anything to be possible it must be consistent and coherent.

We can add possibility operators to necessity ones. To say something is a possible necessity ◊□ is an epistemic statement - it could be necessary, but we don’t know. Or it may be a temporal statement - it may become necessary, but not yet. In the future it may be necessary to drive a car because cities are so vast we could not get anywhere on our own otherwise. What if for some reason public transit was no longer practical or feasible? This is not true now and is unlikely, but we can’t say for sure since we don’t know for certain. It is a possible necessity that is only merely possible, not yet actual as far as we know. Alternatively, to say something is a necessary possibility □◊ is to say that it remains an open question and cannot be foreclosed. It is without end and reveals the element of infinity found in normative concepts. We could always be wrong or fall short. When asleep we generally don’t realize we are sleeping, but our dreams are false. How do we know we aren’t asleep now? We could be living a simulation like The Matrix, or be insane and not know it. We can’t rule that out. Can we? To say we could never be wrong would be arrogant, not recognizing our finite limitations.

We can also have possible possibilities ◊◊. These are real possibilities as opposed to merely theoretical possibilities ◊. All something needs to be theoretically possible ◊ is internal consistency. For something to be possibly possible ◊◊ it must be able to occur in conjunction with other facts we know about the world - external consistency. Since there is no actual Sherlock Holmes, anything that happens involving him is a work of fiction and not ‘really’ possible, and therefore not a possible possibility. Real possibilities ◊◊ however, are made possible by actual, as opposed to fictional or hypothetical, situations, people, and natural laws. They are in-the-world publicly available to everyone. These different combinations of necessity and possibility operators are limited by our imagination, but the symbols of square □ (necessity) and diamond ◊ (possibility) can be descriptive and expressive.

Simulations ~□(◊◊α→α)

An example of a descriptive modal formula could be one that defined a simulation: ~□(◊◊α→α). Just because something may be a real possibility does not necessarily mean it is true. In The Matrix, Morpheus explained to Neo what the Matrix is:

Neo: This isn’t real?

Morpheus: What is real? How do you define real? If you’re talking about what you can feel, what you can smell, taste and see then real is simply electrical signals interpreted by your brain. …It exists now only as part of a neural-interactive simulation that we call the Matrix. … What is the Matrix? Control. The Matrix is a computer-generated dream-world built to keep us under control in order to change a human being into [a power source].

In the real world of the movie, endless numbers of people were kept asleep so their bioenergy could be used to power the machine city, like Descartes’ omnipotent and malevolent demon. Morpheus bade Neo Welcome to the desert of the real, which is a direct quote from Jean Baudrillard, in whose famous book Simulacra and Simulations Neo hid his illegal software. He defined simulacra as never that which conceals the truth – it is the truth which conceals that there is none (Baudrillard, 1983, p. 1). Just because something may be a true possibility does not mean the possibility has been realized. Just because something walks like a duck and quacks like a duck does not necessarily mean it is a duck. It could be a simulation of a duck, as good a replica as the state of technology allows.

Nietzsche (1873) said our truths were lies, useful fictions, wanton leaps and false inferences; we simplify the chaos of reality to create stories with which we can live and make sense of our lives. However, simulations are not lies but possible truths. We may not know whether a possibility is true, but we can still tell whether something is truly possible or not. Simulations meant to teach skills simulate situations that could actually happen. They are real possibilities ◊◊.

A lie is saying something is A or α when it is not A or ~α, which would end in contradiction. Life-like simulations may seem to be something they are not, but their real advantage for teaching skills lies in being an open range of ‘true possibilities,’ defined as remaining ‘consistent with potential facts’ in a way that lies and fictions do not have to; pilots learn to