1967: Israel, the War, and the Year That Transformed the Middle East

Written by Tom Segev

Narrated by James Boles

From Israel's leading historian, a sweeping history of 1967—the war, what led up to it, what came after, and how it changed everything. Tom Segev's acclaimed works One Palestine, Complete and The Seventh Million overturned accepted views of the history of Israel. Now, in 1967—a number-one bestseller in Israel—he brings his masterful skills to the watershed year when six days of war reshaped the country and the entire region.



Going far beyond a military account, Segev re-creates the crisis in Israel before 1967, showing how economic recession, a full grasp of the Holocaust's horrors, and the dire threats made by neighbor states combined to produce a climate of apocalypse. He depicts the country's bravado after its victory, the mood revealed in a popular joke in which one soldier says to his friend, "Let's take over Cairo"; the friend replies, "Then what shall we do in the afternoon?"



Drawing on unpublished letters and diaries, as well as government memos and military records, Segev reconstructs an era of new possibilities and tragic missteps. He introduces the legendary figures—Moshe Dayan, Golda Meir, Gamal Abdul Nasser, and Lyndon Johnson—and an epic cast of soldiers, lobbyists, refugees, and settlers. He reveals as never before Israel's intimacy with the White House as well as the political rivalries that sabotaged any chance of peace. Above all, he challenges the view that the war was inevitable, showing that a series of disastrous miscalculations lie behind the bloodshed.



A vibrant and original history, 1967 is sure to stand as the definitive account of that pivotal year.

• Language: English
• Publisher: Tantor Media, Inc
• Release date: Sep 3, 2007
• ISBN: 9781400174942

Tom Segev

Tom Segev is one of Israel's most celebrated historians. His works include The Seventh Million; 1967: Israel, the War, and the Year That Transformed the Middle East; Simon Wiesenthal; and One Palestine, Complete, which was chosen as one of the best ten books of 2000 by the New York Times.

Reviews for 1967

[rivkat_2 · Rating: 5 out of 5 stars]

The strength and weakness of this book is that it is mostly solipsistic: That is, it focuses almost entirely on what Israelis did and said, both in convincing themselves that it was time to start a war and in its aftermath. This lack of outside perspective was frustrating to me for a while because it doesn’t address one crucial question: Was it true that the Arabs would start a war soon regardless, or (as some Israelis at the time maintained) would Israel’s months-away acquisition of a nuclear capability have served as a deterrent making war unnecessary? But the story Segev is telling is about how Israelis first started the war and then how they interpreted it, because that determined how they acted (as conquerors) and locked in the terrible consequences still playing out. What’s most horrifying is that many, even members of the government at the time, knew what they were doing to the Palestinians, anticipated the long-term effects of annexing territory on Israeli democracy and Palestinian suffering, and couldn’t stop it or even participated in it.

[polaris4_1 · Rating: 5 out of 5 stars]

Tom Segev has written an impressive and extremely well researched account of the pivotal year in the modern history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Once again (as with the excellent 'One Palestine, Complete') he has presented as unbiased and objective account of this topic as you are likely to find. There is no agenda with Segev except well written history. The book covers in great detail the situation both within and without Israel in the years leading up to the Six Day War of 1967; the events and thoughts of those - both public and private individuals - in the period immediately before, during, and after the war; and the fascinating political and sociological implications of the aftermath of the war. Among the well-known leaders and politicians involved, there are numerous intriguing portraits of the likes of Levi Eshkol, David Ben-Gurion, Yitzhak Rabin, Moshe Dayan, Yigal Allon, Ezer Weizman, Menachem Begin, Lyndon Johnson, Abba Eban, Gamal Nasser and King Hussein - as well as many other key political, military and intelligence aides and commanders.

The wide-ranging sources cited by Segev in this account are really the strength of the book. From LBJ's White House machinations to the minutes of the Israeli war cabinet, from myriad private letters of concerned citizens to the various press articles and columns of the day. There is an important consideration given also to the cultural atmosphere in Israeli society whether before, during or after the war. These give the book an intensity of 'putting you right there' in amongst the days of drama. Those less familiar with the personalities discussed may struggle to keep apace of the fast-moving developments and intricacies of both domestic Israeli politics and complex cold war era international relations - this is not 'an ideal introduction' to the Arab-Israeli conflict. But for the interested reader of this subject, Segev's thorough book will prove compelling, well-written, and will quite probably serve to present a perspective on the war that you may not have previously been privy to.

The chapters covering the action of the war itself are based simultaneously on the candid records of minutes and diaries of most of the principals involved, but most interestingly also include large extracts from the diary of one army reservist in particular called up weeks ahead of the conflict. This is Yeshayahu Bar-Dayan, and his diary provides a unique window into the mind of an everyday Israeli called on by his nation to do his duty. He is not a particularly gung-ho commando or special agent or anything as obvious or cliched as that, but a humble mechanic attached to a unit of the Tank Corps. His writing from the battlefield in Sinai is often at times both intimate and profound - an extremely valuable inclusion.

All told, this is an extremely good addition to the shelves of any reader with an interest in post-war 20th century history and/or the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is a particularly in-depth look at the complex Israeli national psyche of the 1960s, and the war which still shapes the fierce debate of the still ongoing troubles in the Middle East. It is a superb addition to the work of one of the finest contemporary Israeli historians around.

[justme869 · Rating: 3 out of 5 stars]

It is not an easy read unless you are very familiar with the names of the leading Israeli politicians, which I am not, from this era.

It does cast a new light on the 1967 War by focusing on the political attitudes and infighting that occurred leading up to, during and after the conflict. Was the war necessary? Should Israel have captured and held East Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip? What about the settlements that began sprouting up immediately after the war?

Regardless of one's views, it is clear that the 1967 War was a pivotal moment in the history of Israel and that we are still living with it's consequences.

[kaplanr_1 · Rating: 3 out of 5 stars]

Researcher and writer Segev attempts to take 1967's most pivotal event (If you're an Israeli or an Arab,) the Six-Day War and use it as the centerpiece of a larger history of Israel and the effects (including those still felt today) of Israel's victory in the war.

If Segev has a problem, it's that he really wants to talk about the forest but always gets caught up talking about and describing the leaves. It happens in his other works and it occurs here too. For me this means his books are good, but not great and the reader may be confused about who or what is truly significant.

In 1967, Segev introduces Israel's economic state prior to 1967, the efforts of the Eshkol government (the first post Ben-Gurion era leader) to maintain growth and economic expansion amidst a growing social malaise of undetermined reason. The reality at the time was that the Palestinians weren't a factor, had no diplomatic presence, and their military capabilities were limted; hence they don't play a significant role in the book. If Israel has interlocutors it is the Egypt of Gamel Abdul Nasser, King Hussein of Jordan and US President Lyndon Johnson.

As an overarching history of the period and conditions leading up to the war, the book is valuable, though some of his tools are questionable -- snippets of letters from people as barometers of attitude. It brings forward players and conditions we don't traditionally see or read about. As an Israeli Segev doesn't engage in the false "David and Goliath" comparisons that many pro-Israeli writers use, though he does make it clear that this was the internal perception among Israeli citizens and many government ministers in the months leading up to the war. Even though the military comanders knew better, they weren't admitting it, so they could advocate for and get the pre-emptive strike they wanted. Egypt and Syria stumbled into a war they weren't ready for, but pretended they could have; Israel called their bluff. Nasser had no business removing UNEF and blocking Israeli shipping in the Straits of Tiran and Red Sea -- a legitimate Causus Belli.

What Segev does successfully bring out is that while Israel and the IDF had masterful, well thought-out tactical plans -- what to attack, when to attack and how to attack -- there really wasn't any strategic planning -- why attack and what to do when finished. In Segev's assessment, the conditions and situation today are a result of the Israeli govenment not having had a diplomatic plan during the war, or at any time afterwards. The later (1969) developments of settlement blocks by the Israeli religious right effectively vetoed any diplomatic leeway the Israeli government could ever have.

1967 isn't an easy read, but will introduce many readers to participants they didn't know, and to conditons and situations in Israeli (and US) histlry they probably wreren't caught up on. However, this isn't for the casual reader.